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CHAPI'ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1902 a group of Chicago residents began a campaign for a new 
municipal charter which would both free the city from the domination 
of the state legislature and substantially alter the existing structure 
of the municipal government. For the next five years the new charter 
movement occupied a prominent place in municipal affairs. The people 
of the city debated the purposes and content of that charter, clashed 
on many occasions with the state legislature over the issue, and or-
ganized into groups favoring or opposing the charter until the voters 
finally rejected the proposed charter in a special referendum in 1907. 
Although subsequent charter reform campaigns were undertaken in 1908 
and 1914, neither were as ambitious as the initial effort, and they too 
failed. As a result, Chicago has been governed for most of the twen-
tieth century under a system designed in the previous century and under 
the careful control of the state legislature. 
The Chicago c?arter reform movement was just one of many similar 
movements in large American cities in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 1 Until that time the control of state govern-
~ward Banfield an.d James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1966); Charles Beard, American City Government: A Survey 
of Newer Tendencies (New York: Century, 1912); Ernest Griffith, A His-
tory of American City Government: The Conspicuous Failure, 1870-1900 
(New York: Praeger, 1974) and A History of American City Government: 
The Progressive Years and Their Aftermath, 1900-1920 (New York: Praeger, 
1974); Martin J. S~hiesl, ~ne Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Admini-
stration and Reform in America, 1880-1920 (Berkeley: University of 
C~lifornia, 1977) provide the best overview of this subject. 
1 
ments over the internal affairs of cities had rarezy been challenged: 
no court had considered the question of an inherent right to local 
self-government until 1871 and five years later the Supreme Court had 
ruled that "a municipal corporation, in the exercise of all of its 
duties, including those most strictzy local or internal, is but a de-
partment of the State. 112 By the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury however this situation had become intolerable for both sides. 
Urban constituents deluged the state legislature for more and more 
special legislation to meet new needs brought on by rapid growth. 
On the other hand state lawmakers often used special legislation to 
keep political control of cities. They enacted laws whether or not 
desired by the city's residents--often over the city's objections--
arbitrarizy changed voting dates and terms of municipal offices, and 
gerrymande~ed wards. 
To relieve this problem some states tried to limit the use of 
special legislation. In Illinois, for example, the new constitution 
of 1870 subjected all incorporated areas in the state to the pro-
visions of a single incorporation act and forbade the General Assembzy 
to enact special legislation for any one city. Chicagoans soon felt 
the restrictions of a law designed to apply to cities of 1000 as well 
as 500,000. By the 1880s the municipal sewerage system was hopelesszy 
inadequate; the city however could not finance a new expanded system 
2Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540 (1876). See also 
Howard L. McBain, 11The Doctrine of an Inherent Right to Self-Government, 11 
Columbia Law Review l6 (1916), p. 190-216 and 299-322; John F. Dillon, 
CommeQt~ies on the Law of Municipal Corporations, 5th ed. (Boston: 
Little, Brown, l9ll); Amasa Eaton, "The Right to Local Self-Go7ernment, 11 
Harvard Law Review 13-1.4 (1900-1901). 
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because it had reached the level of municipal indebtedness allowed by 
law. Its only recourse was to ask the legislature to create a separate 
governing body for handling this problem. Although ninety percent of 
the territory and population serviced by the resulting Sanitary Dis-
trict was within Chicago the city had no control over its activities. 
other states attempted to control the proliferation of special 
legislation by classifying cities according to size of population 
and allowing special legislation for all cities within a class. This 
method too could be detrimental to cities. In a flagrant violation 
of the spirit of this law, the Ohio state legislature created eleven 
classes, each applying to just one city, and thereby continued to 
interfere at will in the affairs of individual cities. 
Neither method satisfied city residents who accused states of 
ignoring their needs and best interests and demanded municipal home 
rule. It was only logical, they argued, that local bodies could 
legislate more efficiently on matters which they understood better 
than anyone else. And since large cities had outgrown their governing 
structures and were urgently in need of reforms home rule would give 
them the power to solve current problems and meet new ones as they 
arose. Efficiency and utility were not the only motives urban dwellers 
had for advocating municipal home rule; they also strongly believed 
that the antipathetic needs and lifestyles of expanding urban areas 
and their largely rural, small-town states made home rule imperative. 
To secure both local self-government and change their existing 
municipal structures cities throughout the United States turned to 
charter reform. St. Louis led the movement for home rule. In 1875 
that city's representatives to a state constitutional convention per-
3 
suaded their fellow delegates to include a clause permitting cities 
over 100 ~ 000 (at the time only St • Louis) to frame~ adopt~ and amend 
their own home rule charters without any intrusion by the state legis-
lature. Other states followed the example of Missouri and granted 
varying degrees of home rule to their cities or at least allowed them 
to draft new municipal charters. 
In their new or amended charters cities generally replaced the old 
decentralized ward-based City Council governments with a commission~ 
a city manager~ or a strong mayor. Regardless of the specific type of 
government adopted most of the new charters had the common objective 
of transferring power from the legislative to the executive branch.3 
They stripped the Council of much of its powers to appoint and remove 
officials~ draw up the municipal budget, and grant fra..J.chises. In addi-
tion~ they often reduced the number of Council members and provided for 
at-large elections thereby eliminating the alderman's local base of 
power. The executive's power was enhanced through increased veto power, 
longer terms of office, and the replacement of old multi-member govern-
ing boards with single department heads appointed by and accountable 
only to the mayor--or headed directly by a commissioner in the case of 
a commission-type government. 
The governments of many American cities today are the products 
of the charter reforms begun in the Progressive Era. Chicago, however~ 
never experienced such reforms and this failure affected the city's 
subsequent political development in three important ways. First politi-
power was never centralized as in ma~y other cities--New York~ Boston~ 
3schiesl, p. 92-93 and l04-JD5. 
4 
, Houston, Detroit, Portland, among others; instead the city maintained 
the ward-oriented strong City Council government. This decentralized 
system facilitated the future development of a strong party system 
with patronage opportunities throughout the city, because no one city 
official was inherently more powerful than any other, and control of 
the political machinery could be gained best by building a loyal coali-
tion of office-holders and voters. Chicago's mayors from Cermak through 
Daley were strong not because of the inherent power of their office but 
because of a strong and loyal party system. 
A second consequence of Chicago's lack of reform is that the 
machinery of government itself remained divided among several separate 
authorities. The municipal corporation, the County government, Sanitary 
District, Board of Education, Park District each preparas its own budget, 
·levies its own taxes, and provides municipal services within Chicago's 
boundaries; the city controls only the municipal corporation. While 
5 
this division of authority enabled Chicago to avoid for years the crushing 
fiscal problems suffered by other large cities such as New York, this 
arrangement has also allowed Chicago to evade responsibility for pro-
viding essential public services. For instance, though the city does 
not have to finance costly public welfare and public health programs, 
leaving these responsibilities in the hands of Cook County and the state 
has meant many services readily available in other urban areas have been 
difficult to obtain in Chicago. The result is that in an area of sever-
al million there is only one general public hospital and that institution 
has for years suffered from administration by officials from outside the 
city who are often more concerned with fiscal austerity than with the 
availability of medical care to those in need. 
The recurring fiscal crises of the public school system over the 
last decade also illustrate quite clearly the problems this division of 
authority has caused. The mayor appoints the school board with city 
council approval but does not choose the Superintendent of Schools over 
whom the city has no authority. Furthermore the mayor has no power to 
remove his or her appointees to the school board. Because the Board 
of Education is not a department of the city~ the city cannot transfer 
municipal funds to the schools in the event of a crisis~ nor can it de-
mand accountability from the Board either for past or current policies~ 
nor can it prevent the state from interfering in the affairs of the 
school system. One result is that currently a state imposed financial 
authority responsible only to the legislature oversees the Board of 
Education~ leaving the people of Chicago without control over their 
children's schools a"'ld with no elected city official they can hold 
accountable. 
A third consequence of the failure of charter reform is that 
until the new state constitution of 1970 Chicago exercised no municipal 
home rule. It remained firmly dominated by a state legislature con-
sistently hostile to its needs. As an industrial city with a population 
of over two million by 1910~ much of it immigrant or the children of 
immigrants~ Cb.icago contrasted sharply with most of rural and small-
town "downstate." By the late nineteenth century downstate legislators 
were already trying to restrict permanently the number of Chicago repre-
sentatives and several times in the ensuing decades simply refused to 
reapportion electoral districts according to population thus depriving 
Chicago of its rightful representation in the General Assembly. At its 
6 
best, the history of Chicago-downstate relations has been one of polit-
ical.trade-offs; at its worst it has degenerated into political warfare 
with Chicago far too often being denied desperately needed legislation. 
W~'lile its affect on Chicago 1 s political development in the twen-
tieth century is one important reason for examining the charter reform 
movement, the movement also deserves attention for what it tells us 
about the city and its people during this crucial reform period of the 
early part of the century. Historians of Chicago, and in general those 
studying cities in the Progressive Era, have emphasized reformers and 
7 
their ideas and motives. Regardless of how the reformers are described--
as upper-class businessmen and professionals, an old or new middle-class, 
political bosses and machines, or working class ethnics--or what inter-
pretations are advanced for their motives, these works have one thing 
in common: the people studied are the civic and political leaders of 
the community. 4 What did the majority of a city 1 s residents want from 
their city and municipal government? Did they agree or disagree with 
4As representatives of the general literature see John Buenker, 
Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform (New York: Norton, 1973); . 
Samuel Hays, 11The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the 
Progressive Era, 11 Pacific Northwest Quarterly 55 (1964); Melvin G. 
Holli, Reform in Detroit: Hazen S. p· ree and Urban Politics (New York: 
Qx:ford, 1969 ; Otis .A. Pease, "Urban Reformers in the Progressive &a, 11 
Pacific Northwest Quarterl.v (April 1971); Bradley Rice, 11The Galveston 
Plan of City Government by Connnission: The Birth of a Progressive Idea, 11 
Southwestern History Q:.1arterlv 73 (1975); Schiesl, The Politics of 
Efficiency. For Chicago in particular see Alex Gottfried, Boss Cermak 
of Chicago: A Study of Political leadership (Seattle: University of 
Washington, 1962); Nick A. Kom.ons, "Chicago, 1893-1907: The Politics 
of Reform11 (Ph.D Dissertation, George W::ishington University, 1961); 
Michael P. McCarthy, 11l3usinessmen and Professionals in Municipal Reform: 
The Chicago Experience, 1887-1920 11 (Ph.D Dissertation, Northwestern 
University, 1970; Joel Tarr, A Study in .Boss Politics: William Lorimer 
of Chicago (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1971). 
various reform proposals and for what reasons? Did they actively 
oppose some of these reforms and attempt to implement ones of their 
own, and if so how did they go about this? These questions have re-
mained unasked, often for want of a viable method~logy. 5 
These questions can be asked of the charter reform movement be-
cause it encompassed widespread popular participation. Over half of 
the delegates to the convention which wrote the charter were private 
citizens, and neither political party controlled the charter's writing; 
newspapers heightened public interest by reporting extensively on the 
debates of the convention and throughout the city, various interest 
groups sent communiques to the body urging it to include specific 
provisions, and these provisions and their implications were widely 
discussed. The ensuing referendum campaign gave the citizens further 
opportunity to publicly debate the charter and to organize in support 
or opposition. 
Middle and upper-class businessmen and professionals, reform or-
ganizations, business clubs, ethnic societies, organized labor, women, 
politicians, the Socialists, and other special interest groups all ex-
pressed their opinions in the course of the charter movement. Even 
blacks, a small and relatively powerless group in the city at this time, 
participated to some degree. All these groups attempted to directly 
influence the content of the charter and had the opportunity to accept 
5carl V. Harris in his work Political Power in Birmingham. 1871-
1921 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1977) has suggested using social 
economic interest groups to study the distribution of urban political 
power, and this interest group methodology is one which can be applied 
to studying cities in the Progressive Era. 
or reject the finished product in a popular referendum (with the excep-
tion of the women~ of course). 
Because of the public character of the discussions~ sources are 
abnndant for determining the views of many groups in the city. The 
formal Proceedings of the charter convention contain the member's de-
bates on all aspects of charter reform as well as the letters sent to 
that body by outside groups. E..J.glish language dailies~ as noted before~ 
followed the movement closely~ as did foreign language newspapers. 
In early 1906 several hnndred of the city's ethnic societies formed 
into a common organization~ the United Societies for Local Self-Govern-
ment, for promoting and protecting their interests. Ethnic groups 
conducted their charter activities through the United Societies and 
because the Germans were among the principal leaders of this organi-
zation their daily newspapers are a particularly good source for infor-
mation on these activities. The German newspapers reported extensively 
on the debates within the ethnic commnnities, the speeches of various 
ethnic leaders~ and printed the pamphlets and bulletins issued b,y the 
United .. Societies on the questions of charter reform. The Socialist 
newspapers~ the monthly journal and meeting minutes of the Chicago 
Federation of Labor~ a special newsletter published by the United 
Societies~ the manuscript collections and memoirs of prominent figures 
in the movement~ the records and publications or organized groups in 
the city, among others all contain debates on charter reform. 
The major issues and ideas of Chicago's charter reform movement, 
as well as the nature of the city's municipal problems were those facing 
all large cities in the United States during the Progressive Era. The 
9 
focus of this study is not the similarity of these issues but how the 
people of Chicago responded to their municipal problems and the measures 
introduced to solve them. It is fruitless to characterize Chicagoans 
as reformers or non-reformers. MOst of them saw that there were de-
ficiencies and corruption in their municipal government and they be-
lieved that reform was needed, but the issues involved were complex. 
Few argued against municipal efficiency but they differed on how to 
accomplish it and even about what efficiency meant; and those who 
agreed with each other on one issue did not necessarily agree on others. 
The charter reform movement reveals quite strikingly the intense 
interest which so many different groups took in the political affairs 
of their city. They were determined to participate in the decision-
making process and they clearly shared in the optimisn of the Progressive 
Era that they could effect changes which would make their city a much 
better place. An examination of the problems confronting Chicago by 
the early twentieth century, how these directed residents to seek char-
ter reform, and of the debates and activities of charter reform will 
show how these various groups participated in the movement, why they 
favored or opposed specific parts of the charter, how these reflected 
their ideas of a city as a community, and the roles which they believed 
the citizens themselves and the government should play in determining 
the growth and direction of that community. 
CHAPTER II 
CHICAGO IN THE 1890s 
But there is another side to Chicago. There is the back side 
to her fifteen hundred million dollars of trade, her seven-
teen thousand vessels, and her ninety thousand miles of rail. 
Away from the towering offices, lying off from the smiling 
parks, is a vast wilderness of shabby houses ... 
I 
l George Steevens 
When, in 1893, the Columbian Exposition drew to Chicago tourists 
from around the world, visitors had strong reactions to what they saw. 
Some were overwhelmed by the Fair 1 s gleaming 11White City11 constructed 
a·long grand classical lines. A traveler from India thought the Fair 
11a spectacle that exceeded all my expectations of grandeur"; while a 
Scottish author was dazzled by "this etheral emanation of pure and un-
economic beauty. 11 others, such as French diplomat Francois Bruwaert, 
equated the Fair with the city and predicted that "the most beautiful 
exhibition will be Chicago itself, its citizens, its business, its 
2 institutions, its progress." Still others lmew that the city needed 
to be judged by more than its World 1 s Fair. Walking through the streets 
Italian playwright Guiseppe Giacosce was appalled by the sights. 
I had two different impressions of Chicago, one sensual and im-
mediate ... the other intellectual and gradual .••. To the eye, the 
~aul M. Angle, ed., Prairie State: Impressions of Illinois. 1673-
1967. By Travelers and other Observers (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1968), p. 426. 
2Bessie L. Pierce, As Others See Chicago: Impressions of Visitors, 
1673-1933 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1933), p. 340, 352, and 358. 
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city appears abominable •.• I would not want to live there for 
anything in the world •••• During JI:JY stay of one week, I did not 
see anything in Chicago but darlmess: smoke; clouds, dirt and 
an extraordinary number of sad and grieved persons •••• the rich 
metropolis gave me a sense of oppression so grave that I still 
doubt whether, beyond their factories, there exist celestial 
spaces.3 
But Giacosce was also attracted by the city's vibrance. 
The ideas of a social order, simple and progressive; the sight 
of so many ways open to human industry; the sight of so many 
natural resources, and of its increase in work--all these lead 
[the visitor] to a concept of actual life so clear, so open-
minded, so large and so powerful, and to a certain apprehension 
of the fu~ure, which makes him forget quickly the disgust he 
suffered. 
Chicago merited both these observations yet not all visitors 
were as charitable as Giacosce. Probably the most vehement reaction 
was that of Rudyard Kipling. "Having seen it, " Kipling declared of 
Chicago, "I urgently desire never to see it again. It is inhabited 
by savages. Its water is the water of the Hughli, and its air is 
dirt. 115 Nor did Kipling appreciate the symbols of elegance and pro-
gress of which many Chicagoans were so proud. .Advised to go to the 
Palmer House, one of the finest hotels, to observe the elite and 
12 
powerful, Kipling could only see "a gilded and mirrored rabbit-warren"". 
a huge hall of tessellated marble, crammed with people talking about 
money and spitting about everywhere. 116 He departed Chicago convinced 
it was a vulgar and unlivable city. A less agitated British journa-
list, George Steevens, observed the relationship between Chicago's 
3Ibid., P· 276-77. 
4Ibid., P· 282-83a 
5Ibid.' P· 251. 
6Ibid. 
potential wealth, the poverty of many of its citizens, and civic 
corruption. In Chicago, he wrote, "everyone is fighting to be rich, 
is then straining to be refined, and nobody can attend to making the 
city fit to live in. n7 
The reactions of these men were visceral; they came from seeing 
the Fair, walking the streets, viewing the stockyards, and breathing 
smoke-ridden air. For a while the bright facade of the Fair hid much 
of the disorder and misery, but once the Fair closed visitors and 
residents alike were increasingly disturbed by what they saw. In 1898, 
the English reformer and member of the London County Council, Sidney 
Webb, visited Chicago. Webb came specifically to study the municipal 
government and its relationship to municipal problems. To his dismay 
13 
he discovered that this government was hopelessly outmoded. Graft, 
corruption, and the serious problems observed by himself and previous 
visitors were the logical results, Webb believed, of a City Council 
which decided on municipal improvements 11by passing around a list of 
improvements they were to vote on in that session, each alderman putting 
in what·ever he wanted for his ward, and these were voted en bloc. ••8 
Webb was quite correct in his assessment. Rapid industrialization, 
a burgeoning population, new technology, and the annexation of surround-
ing communities had changed the city dramatically in the past twenty-
five years. The magnitude of Chicago 1 s economic and technological 
achievements astounded both residents and visitors; but new problems 
resulting from these changes made life unpleasant for many of the 
7 Angle, p. 426. 
8Thid., p. 43L 
residents and were beyond the abilities of the municipal government 
to solve adequately. 
Chicago had emerged from the fire of 1.871 badly scarred but 
determined to rebuild; even the depression could only slow, not 
blunt, the city's growth and by the end of the nineteenth century 
Chicago was the premier city of the midwest. The Union Stockyards 
and over three-fourths of the city's grain elevators and lumberyards 
had been outside the fire area. Burned out plants and factories, in-
eluding the McCormick Reaper Works, were quickly rebuilt restoring the 
city's economic prominence in meatpacking, livestock, grain, and 
lumber. The railroad freight terminals on the edge of the city had 
also escaped the fire and when the railroads subsequently erected 
grand new passenger terminals people and goods once again flowed 
through Chicago. 9 
External events combined with the vigor of the city's residents 
to ~and and alter Chicago's economy in the succeeding years. Be-
14 
tween 18'70 and 1.890 millions of people moved into the midwest, advancing 
the population center of the United States westward over one hundred 
mileso Since eastern manufacturing and industrial cities were not 
easily accessible for these people Chicago, with its great transpor-
tation network and thriving business community was the logical place 
to ship raw materials for finishing and distributing on to customers. 
9The best general account of Chicago's economic development is in 
Bessie L. Pierce, History of Chicago, val. 3, The Rise of the Modern City 
1871-1893 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1957). For information after 
1893 see Harold M. Mayer and Richard 0. Wade, Chicago: Growth of a Metro-
polis (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969); Charles Merriam, Chicago: 
A More Intimate View of Urban Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1929). 
Chicago eagerly accepted this challenge and by the end of the 
century evolved from a city of commerce into the manufacturing and 
industrial center of the midwest. Heavy industry made substantial 
gains in this period: several smaller concerns combined to form the 
Illinois Steel Company in 1889 and its steel production soon worried 
Pittsburgh; the Pullman Palace Car Company, Grant Locomotive Works, 
and new firms building trolley cars boosted Chicago's equipment out-
put, while six Chicago factories, led by McCormick (later International 
Harvester), produced one-seventh of the country's agricultural imple-
ments. Light industry also prospered. Between 1880 and 1890 printing 
and publishing was the city's second fastest growing industry and 
employed over 20,000 people by 1900, second only to New York City. 
The immigrant population of Chicago and other midwest cities attracted 
the brewing industry and the city's largest German brewery was also 
the fifth largest in the country. Clothing and dry goods manufacturing 
and selling increased significantly also. The ready-to-wear women 1 s 
and children 1 s garment business joined the already thriving men 1 s wear 
establishments. 
The growth of industry was accompanied by the development of 
mercantile houses which helped keep Chicago a center of commerce. 
Dry goods wholesalers supplied clothing and other Chicago products to 
eager customers. Montgomery Ward, the first nationwide mail order 
company, began operations in 1872 and when twenty-one years later 
Sears, Roebuck and Company opened, Chicago became the home of the 
country's two largest catalog stores. Wholesalers then founded retail 
department stores to serve local customers; the largest, Marshall 
15 
Field and Company, increased its retail trade from $3.1 to 7.5 
million in the twenty years after 1872. 
To foster this economic growth and attract more industry and 
money to the city, Chicago businessmen introduced the concept of the 
organized industrial district where on~ businesses could locate. 
In a district plant space could be rented and services provided which 
an individual business might not be able to afford. One of the first, 
the Central Manufacturing District, was organized in 1890 by the 
Chicago Junction Railway and the Union Stockyards on a square mile 
tract of land north of the Stockyards and along the south branch of 
the Chicago River. Enterprises locating in the District had their 
own railway at their disposal; the Chicago Junction served the Stock-
yards and connected directly with every trackline entering the city. 
Other industrial districts were soon organized as businessmen hoped 
to show that Chicago was the most conventient and profitable city 
in which industry could locate. 
People streamed to Chicago to fill the new jobs created by econom-
ic expansion. One half million people lived in Chicago in 1880. In 
ten years the population doubled, and by 1900 it reached almost 1.7 
million. 10 Annexation of surrounding areas accounted for part of this 
growth; between 1880 and 1890 the population of "old" Chicago grew from 
503,000 to 792,000 with the remaining increase coming from annexed 
townships. 11 But, prior to annexation, the outside townships were 
10u.s., Census Office, Tenth Census, 1880; Eleventh Census, 1890; 
Thirteenth Census, 1910. 
~er and Wade, p. 176. 
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growing rapid~ also and whether people were migrating directly into 
the city or its suburbs, they were coming to Chicago. For instance, 
lllltil 1889 the Union Stockyards was located outside of the city limits, 
therefore many of the immigrants who found jobs in the Stockyards and 
wanted to live near their work lived outside the city proper. 
The character of Chicago's population would be as significant 
for the city's future as its size. The foreign born and their chil-
dren comprised rough~ seventy-five percent of the total population 
for the two decades from 1890 to 19l0, giving Chicago a greater per-
centage of residents from foreign stock than any other major United 
States city except New York and Milwaukee, and the highest percentage 
of foreign born outside of New York and Boston. 12 B.f the beginning 
of the twentieth century the nationalities of the new immigrants had 
changed as Polish, Italian, and Bohemian immigrants replaced the 
German, Irish, and Scandinavians who had arrived earlier. Of these 
six major nationality groups only the Irish ever lost population. 
As the business conmmnity sought ways to perpetuate itself and 
help its members, so did the immigrants. To give shelter against an 
unfamiliar, often hostile environment, help maintain aspects of the 
group 1 s culture, and provide social services which the city did not, 
immigrants established their own benevolent and fraternal societies. 
German Turnvereins, Bohemian Sokols, Swedish Svithiods, the Polish 
~oward Chudacoff, The Evolution of American Urban Society 
(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 91. In Chicago 77o5% of the 
population was foreign stock; in both New York and Milwaukee it was 
78.6%. Chicago's population was 35o7% foreign born compared to 
40o4% for New York and 35.9% for Boston. 
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National Alliance, the Italian Unione e Fratellanze, and numerous other 
organizations were the focus of life for many of these people. In 
addition, a very active ethnic press served as the primary link between 
:iJnmigrants and their new city. 13 Published in the native language 
these papers devoted much space to news of the home country, but they 
were also a major source of information about Chicago, reporting and 
explaining events and issues and how they affected their readership. 
Unlike the business community however, immigrants remained for 
quite some time outside the mainstream of the community. Through the 
end of the century ethnic societies were fairly parochial organizations 
concerned with the needs of their own members. They showed slight 
interest in the problems of the city as a whole or of immigrants in 
general. The newspapers too treated municipal affairs only insofar 
as they affected their nationality group. 
The experience of black-Chicagoans matched in certain respects 
those of the European immigrants. Both groups remained outside the 
mainstream of politics and society for quite some time and relied on 
their own political, business, and social societieso However by the 
early twentieth century blacks were still only a tiny portion of 
Chicago 1 s population. Although their aggregate numbers increased 
by ten times from 1870 to 1900 they were only 1.9 percent of the 
total population. Industrial growth had yet to attract large numbers 
13 Among the older immigrant groups the Germans supported three 
daily newspapers, the Abendpost, Illinois Staats-Zeitung, and Chicagoer 
Freie Presse; the Irish had the Chicago Citizen; and the Swedish com-
munity published the Svenska Amerikanaren and Svenska-Tribunen (later 
the Svenska Tribunen-Nyheter). For the newer groups the Poles read 
18 
the Dziennik Chicagoski, Narod Polski, and the daily Zgoda; the Italians 
had 1 1 Italia and La Tribuna Italiana Transatlantica; and the Bohemians 
the Svornost and Denni Hlasatel. 
of blacks and the problems of this small community touched very few 
of the white population. The small size of their community and racial 
discrimination combined to separate blacks decisively from the rest 
of the city and keep them dependent on their old traditions of self-
help and self-protection14 while European immigrants gradually began 
to abandon their insularity and insert themselves into the larger 
conmrunity. 
At the same time as the city was growing in size, technological 
developments were changing Chicago 1 s appearance in other ways. Street 
car tracks, for example, crisscrossed the city. Eighty-six miles of 
cable car track had been laid by 1894 while simultaneously electric 
trolleys were being run experimentally along the old horse-drawn 
trolley tracks. The electric trolley cost far less than the cable 
cars and traveled at double the speed of the horse-drawn ones; the 
electric cars soon surpassed all other forms of rapid transit and by 
1893 they ran over five hundred miles of track. To help relieve con-
gestion in the streets the South Side Rapid Transit Company began con-
structing an elevated (El) line on the south side in 1890. Using 
steam locomotives the El carried passengers at fifteen miles per hour. 
Three years later there was a west side El, and by the end of the 
decade the Northwestern Elevated Railroad extended to Wilson Avenue 
which just eleven years previously had been almost three miles north 
of the city limits. 15 Public transit gave people more freedom of 
19 
~he best source on this subject is Allan H. Spear, Black Chicago: 
The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1967). 
15Mayer and Wade, p. 138-42 and 208-14. 
movement and choice of living area and enabled the city to keep ex-
panding. Gas, electricity, and telephone lines made living and 
business easier and Chicagoans naturally clamored for more and better 
services from these utilities. 
But while Chicagoans exalted in their growth, their municipal 
problems worsened. All those new people needed places to live and 
schools for their children; there were more streets to be paved and 
cleaned, more garbage to be removed, graver sanitation problems, and 
a desperate need for more and better public transportation; the police 
and fire departments had to be improved and expanded. The municipal 
government could not meet the rising demands for services. 
The deterioration of the city's housing stock is perhaps typical 
of the problems caused by growth. Unlike older eastern cities, before 
the fire most Chicagoans lived in single-family dwellings. Such 
buildings inefficiently used the city 1 s limited available land and 
after W'?l new types of housing appeared: multi-family 11flats" (apart-
ment buildings) were constructed, especially along the street car 
routes, and by the end of the decade six-flats had became popular. 
While apartment buildings could be well-constructed, pleasant places 
to live, the wooden, cheaply built tenements which also appeared 
often were not. The chief virtue of tenements was that they were 
able to house many families. To relieve further the housing shortages, 
builders crammed together as many tenements as possible; little or no 
passageway was left between buildings, new tenements were erected in 
front of existing buildings situated on the back of a lot, and often 
these buildings were joined into one large structure--the so-called 
"double-decker. 11 In the older parts of the city small frame single-
20 
family houses were subdivided to accommodate several families. The 
results were neither pleasing to live in nor to see. "Street stretches 
beyond street of little houses, mostly wooden, begrimed with soot, 
rotting, falling to pieces, 11 was what George Steevens observed as he 
walked through the poor sections of Chicago. 16 
Cheap housing accommodated the immigrants however and crowded 
tenements proliferated. The Department of Health officially assessed 
21 
the state of much of the tenement housing in 1.896 as "old, dilapidated 
or rotten, unventilated, badly lighted, badly drained, unprovided with 
proper facilities for disposal of excreta and without adequate or even 
necessary water supply. 1117 Five years later a private survey of three 
Chicago neighborhoods conducted by the City Homes Association confirmed 
the Department's earlier findings. 18 Although as early as 1872 the 
city's health commissioners had asked the City Council to regulate 
conditions within and around tenements, the incessant need for cheap 
housing and a reluctance to interfere with private property frustrated 
these requests. At the turn of the century Chicago had no canprehensive 
building and sanitary code and the few building codes actually enacted 
were freely violated; 19 the municipal government remained aloof from 
the problem. 
16Angle, p. 426. 
17chicago Department of Health, Biennial Report (1895-1.896), p. 63-64. 
See also Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull-House (New York: Macmillan, 19J.D). 
18Robert Hunter, Tenement Conditions in Chicago: A Report by the 
Investigating Committee of the City Homes Association (Chicago: City Homes 
Association, 1901), passim. 
19Ibid., p. 1.61-62. 
Outside the buildings conditions were equally depressed. Garbage 
piled up rapidly, sewer 5,fstems were hopelessly inadequate, streets 
were often unpaved, unrepaired, and seldom cleaned. As with the 
housing stock, the municipal government's methods of handling these 
problems were obsolete. For instance the private firms hired to col-
lect garbage seldom fulfilled their contracts in tenement neighborhoods 
and the ward garbage inspectors were political appointees who like-
wise tended to evade their responsibilities. Landlords contributed 
to the problem by providing too few collection boxes for their build-
ings allowing garbage to overflow and litter the streets, alleys, 
and yards. 
The conditions of streets aod sidewalks throughout the city 
again showed the two sides of Chicago 1 s character. In its desire to 
"present a city to World 1 s Fair visitors worthy of its much trumpeted 
glories 11 Chicago had resurfaced over one thousand miles of streets 
and doubled the number of its sidewalks between 1889 ·and 1893. 20 As 
usual, only specific areas benefitted from this civic improvement, 
so that Sidney Webb could comment three years after the Fair that the 
sidewalks "are nothing but rotten planks in the slUm. streets, with 
great holes rendering it positively dangerous to walk in the dark. u21 
To escape the crowding, dirt, and noise of the city many resi-
dents began moving out to the surrounding townships. The growth of 
street car lines and commuter railways enabled people to live in the 
suburbs and work in the city and increasing numbers of people took 
20Pierce, History of Chicago, vel. 3, p. 313. 
21 Angle, p. 431. 
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advantage of this new freedom. By the late 1800s the commuter rail-
ways carried 27,000 daizy- commuters into the city; cable cars and elec-
tric street railways transported thousands more. 
Street car lines along Evanston (now Broadway), Clark, Lincoln, 
and Milwaukee avenues and new service on the Chicago and Northwestern 
and Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul railroads drew people north into 
the townships of Lake View, Rogers Park and Edgewater, and northwest 
into Jefferson Park. Chicagoans followed the Rock Island line south-
west into Beverzy- and Morgan Park. The greatest expansion was to the 
south sections of the area serviced by the Illinois Central and the 
street cars along Cottage Grove Avenue. Hyde Park township, com-
prising forty-eight square miles grew from 15, 700 residents to 133,000 
in the 1880s; 22 George Pullman located his factory town at the far 
south end of Hyde Park in this period. Expansion to the west pro-
ceeded more slowzy-. Located along Lake Michigan, Chicago 1 s beautiful 
lakefront and the presence of large immigrant slums immediately west 
of the central city determined the city's elongated north to south 
configuration. 
Cheaper land com~ined with new mass transit to attract families, 
but also industry to the suburbs. More and more industries located 
outside the city proper making it necessary for many workers to live 
there as well. The meat packers, for instance, concentrated the 
Stockyards in a one mile square area in Lake Township directly west of 
Hyde Park. The Rock Island railroad traversed the township and the 
22City of Chicago Department of Development and Planning, 
Historic City: The Settlement of Chicago (Chicago, 1976), Po 43. 
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trolleys of the Chicago City Railway company allowed people to commute 
throughout the township 1 s thirty-six square miles. Between 1880 and 
1890 the population of Lake multiplied more than five times from 
8 000 t . t 100,000.23 1 , o JUS over 
Real estate speculators quickly capitalized on these desires 
and began developing the areas outside the city limits enticing people 
to the charms and advantages of suburban living. S .E. Gross and 
Company, for example, missed few tricks in selling its properties. 
Its handbills promoted Lake View in 1883 as an ideal location, 
11only three blocks from present terminus of Street Cars. One of the 
most pleasant rides in the city, passing in front of Lincoln Park 
along a finely shaded area, and away from the streets leading to the 
to the cemeteries." The handbill further promised churches, schools, 
water pipes, and passenger trains running between Lake View and 
downtown. 24 
Realtors ran free excursion trains to their building sites 
where they provided potential customers with free lunches, fireworks, 
and band concerts. They appealed to different income groups in their 
advertising. The wealthier citizens were urged to move to Hyde Park, 
Kenwood, or Morgan Park where they could buy spacious single-family 
homes on large lots. For those who could not afford such amenities 
cheaper housing was available. After the fire of 1871 Chicago building 
codes outlawed wooden buildings in the downtown area and realtors now 
directed their appeals to people looking for less expensive housing 
23Ibid. 
~otocopy in Mayer and Wade, p. 156. 
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outside of the "brick area." Lake View, proclaimed the Gross 
and Company handbill was "Outside Fire Limits! You Can Build Wooden 
Houses!" 
The flood of people into the townships caused more municipal 
problems than it solved and led groups in the suburbs and the city 
to consider annexing these areas to the city. 25 For township dwellers 
annexation quickly became the only wa:y to relieve their seemingly in-
surmountable fiscal problems. Each township financed its own public 
utilities, school system, police and fire departments, and other essen-
tial services. Because many of the townships were commuter suburbs 
with little industry they did not have an adequate tax base to pa:y 
for these services. E~en those with a broader tax base desired an-
nexation for several reasons. Some believed their local police forces 
were too small and weak to control growing labor problems; others 
hoped it would rid them of existing political corruption; and all 
wanted to use the city's well-developed water supply system. On the 
other hand Chicagoans favored annexation because they wanted to recap-
ture the wealth and industry which had fled to the suburbs and acquire 
the people and territory which would enable Chicago to become a great 
metropolitan area. 
Leading the annexation movement, the Citizens' Association of 
Chicago in 188'7 asked the state General Assembly to enact a law per-
mitting willing townships to consolidate their governments with the 
25The best accounts of the annexation movement are in McCarthy, 
p. 1-21, Pierce, History of Chicago, vol. 3, p. 331-33, and Mayer and 
Wade, p. 154-78. 
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city. The Legislature agreed and citizens from Hyde Park, Lake, Lake 
View, Cicero, and Jefferson Park townships petitioned for annexation. 
But not all suburbanites favored annexation which first had to be 
approved by the township voters at a special referendum. Some oppo-
nents predicted the extension of Chicago's fire laws and building 
codes would price workers out of the home buying market by allowing 
the building only of the more expensive brick houses; some feared 
that after joining the city the saloon interests in Chicago would 
wipe out the township prohibition districts; others simply wanted 
to keep the evils of the big city out of the suburbs; and many local 
politicians, of course, knew that annexation would ruin them. In a 
November 1887 referendum citizens of Lake and Lake View rejected an-
nexation while those in Hyde Park, Cicero, and Jefferson Park voted 
to join the city. 
The votes were nullified several months later when the Illinois 
Supreme Court ruled the annexation law unconstitutional. Although 
this disappointed the annexationists, it gave them the opportunity 
to reorganize and perhaps this time persuade recalcitrant voters of 
the benefits of becoming part of the city. In 1889 therefore they 
secured a new law from the state legislature and the Chicago City 
Council helped the cause by passing two ordinances guaranteeing the 
preservation of township prohibition districts after incorporation, 
and prohibiting the extension of Chicago's building codes to new areas 
without their consent. Despite the continued opposition of local 
politicians and a few other prominent suburbanites--George Pullman 
vigorously resisted the incorporation of his company town and meat 
26 
packer Philip Armour made a deal with local politicians in Lake town-
ship to oppose annexation in return for a law tax assessment on his 
26 
company property --the voters of Hyde Park, Lake, Lake View, Cicero, 
and Jefferson Park this time accepted annexation. 
The city continued annexing suburban areas for the next four 
years, mainly to the southwest. In 1893 the far north townships of 
Rogers Park and West Ridge joined Chicago and although a few areas on 
the western periphery were added later Chicago's geographic expansion 
ended. The city's total area had been increased in this period from 
thirty-five square miles to one hundred and ninety. 
II 
The expansion of the city offered the chance of enormous profits 
for those who could provide needed municipal services. Because few 
Americans of the late nineteenth century believed in municipal owner-
ship or operation of utilities, cities enfranchised private companies 
to build and run gas, electric, telephone, and transit systems. These 
franchises generally required the company to pay an initial fee to the 
city for using the municipal property along which trolley tracks, gas, 
electric or telephone lines would be laid; in return for this fee the 
company could keep all profits derived from the utility. 
Greedy entrepreneurs and city officials milked the franchise 
system for personal gain paying little attention to the consequences 
for the city. Awarding franchises at its discretion the City Council, 
led by Alderman Johnny Powers, perfected the art of franchise graft. 
26 McCarthy, p. 13-14. 
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It granted street franchises one block at a time to the highest bidder, 
required companies to purchase new franchises if they wanted to make a 
major change such as converting a horsecar line to a cable or trolley 
system, and sold street rights separately to each utility, 27 That 
these practices drove up utility costs and often resulted in multiple 
systems along one street bothered the Council little. Bribery flour-
ished as prospective owners did whatever was necessary to obtain a 
franchise: the right amount of money to the right aldermen secured a 
franchise; additional sums could help eliminate competitors or lower 
property assessments for tax purposes. As a final measure of its lack 
of concern for the quality of municipal services provided, the Council 
rarely exercised its right to place certain performance requirements in 
the franchises. Once a company paid the initial fee it was virtually 
free to do as it pleased. One result of. these practices was that be-
tween 1860 and 1890 sixty different companies held rights to 175 city 
streets. 28 
The gas trust scandals of the 1890s illustrate the deplorable 
consequences of the franchise system. After receiving a suitable fee 
the City Council in 1894 first passed the Universal Gas ordinance 
giving the Gas Trust (nine companies combined specifically for this 
purpose) rights to lay gas mains anywhere in the city. This ordinance 
in effect gave the gas trust monopoly rights to decide when and where 
mains would be laid and how much customers would be charged. Knowing 
28 
27Ray Ginger, Altgeld's America {New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1958; 
reprint edition New York: New Viewpoints, 1973), p. 93-94; IJ.oyd Wendt 
and Herman Kogan, Bosses in Lusty Chicago (Bloomington: University of 
Indiana, 1943), p. 39. 
28G· 94 lllger, p. • 
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that more money could still be made from gas franchises, a year later 
several aldermen had the Council grant the Ogden Gas Trust a fifty year 
franchise with blanket gas rights throughout the city as long as it sold 
the gas at ninety cents per lOOO cubic feet. Since the original Gas 
Trust sold at $1.20 this presumably would cut the Trust out of the 
market. The catch was that Ogden Gas existed only on paper and the 
new ordinance was a blatant attempt to force the Gas Trust to b~ up 
the rights of Ogden Gas. 29 When they did the money went straignt into 
the aldermen's pockets. 
Even worse for Chicago residents was the traction situation 
created by Charles Yerkes. After serving time in prison in Philadelphia 
for embezzlement Yerkes arrived in Chicago and began acquiring traction 
franchises. He quickly laid 250 miles of track under franchises to 
eight separate companies and effectively controlled the city's transit 
system. Yerkes helped finance his empire by plundering the riders. 
Buying franchises block by block he put more than one line along a route 
and refused to issue transfers between lines; riders thus had to pay 
multiple fares if they used separate companies. To save money Yerkes 
also regularly ran fewer cars than were necessary on his routes, con-
temptuously observing that it was "the straphangers who pay the divi-
dends },30 Neither in awarding franchises nor in running the streetcars 
did the Council or Yerkes consider customer convenience, the price of 
29 Komons, p. 123 and J35. 
30
carter Harrison, Stormoc Years: The Autobiography of Carter H. 
Harrison, Five Times MaYor of Chicago (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1935), p. 110-12; Wendt and Kogan, p. 38. 
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fares, or what would benefit the city. 
Chicago's City Council, its traditionarparty system, and the 
interference of the state legislature encouraged these abuses and left 
many residents feeling powerless. The alderman manipulated the fran-
chise system so well because the city had a strong council form of 
government. The Council drew up the budget, created new boards and 
departments, accepted and rejected all mayoral appointments, enacted 
a broad range of ordinances, and distributed city jobs and franchises. 
In the hands of less than scrupulous men, politics became a free-for-
all in which jobs, franchises, and favorable ordinances were for sale.31 
The traditional political parties had neither the inclination 
nor the power to clean up the situation. Unlike other American cities 
(and highly ironic in light of its future political development) 
Chicago had no solid political machine or power boss in this period. 
Instead, at any one time several factions, or "rings" as they were 
popularly called, jostled for political power. Neither party was 
cohesively unified. Three factions of Republicans appealed to dif-
ferent segments of the population. Business, the press, reformers, 
and the middle-class residents of the city's outlying districts supported 
Charles Deneen; north siders, particular~ the Germans, followed Fred 
Busse; and William Lorimer, the closest the Republicans came to having 
a political boss, dominated west side politics. 
The Democratic party was hard~ better. John Hopkins and his 
lieutenant Roger Sullivan controlled a party machine strong enough 
to elect a number of their people to the Council and keep them in line 
3~oyt King, "The Reform Movement in Chicago, 11 The Armals 25 
(March, 1905), p. 235. 
on crucial votes. Hopkins was elected mayor in 1893 and 1895 and 
was behind some of the more notorious franchise grant scandals of the 
period, but his group was not strong enough to prevent rival Democrats 
from winning the mayor 1 s office in JJ397. Carter Harrison Jr., whose 
father had been assassinated in 1893 while mayor, was himself elected 
to that office four times from 1897 to 1903. Personally popular among 
the voters Harrison advocated reforming the Council and represented 
moderate reform-minded Democrats. The more radical reformers and many 
workers backed Edward Dunne who successfully ran for mayor in 1905. 
Although the Harrison and Dunne factions often supported one another 
such support was neither automatic nor without reciprocity. In 1905 
Harrison backers forced Dunne to accept one of their men as candidate 
for city treasurer in return for their support of Dunne's nomination.32 
Lacking internal unity, neither party nor any one faction was 
strong enough to control the city. Instead all scrambled for whatever 
offices and political influence they could get and spent more time and 
energy attacking opponents than the city's growing problems. 
31 
The actions of the state legislature great~ exacerbated Chicago's 
problems. This body~ for instance, had the power to set certain terms 
for granting municipal franchises and its disregard for Chicago's 
residents and their needs in these matters contributed to the franchise 
mess. Charles Yerkes had many friends in the legislature and in 1895 
he persuaded both houses to extend several of his traction franchises 
for ninety-nine years without paying compensation. Fortunately, 
Governor Altgeld vetoed this measure but two years later the legislature 
3~arrison, p. 252. 
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passed the Allen Bill authorizing the City Council to grant streetcar 
franchises for terms up to fifty years instead of the prevailing twenty 
year limit. Since several of Yerkes franchises expired in 1903, he 
attempted to push quickly through the Council his extensions but out-
raged voters who lmew this meant losing all control of the street rail-
ways for another fifty years defeated all state legislators who had 
voted for the Allen Bill and forced the Council to deny Yerkes' request.33 
As Yerkes' dealings with the City Council and state legislature 
show, the possibilities for corruption and political machinations in 
the late nineteenth century were great. These possibilities were en-
hanced by the complex structure of the city's government. Until 1.870 
this governing structure and all municipal powers t~ere fixed by a charter 
from the state. This individual agreement enabled the legislature to 
enact laws which applied only to Chicago simply by changing a piece of 
the charter. Though the city often had cause to resent the state's 
arbitrary interference--when the legislature abolished the office of 
High Constable in 1839 and failed to inform the city for two months, 
Chicagoans sarcastically suggested that they be ... infonned more quickly 
when it decided 11to remove Chicago from the shore of Lake Michigan"--
it was possible to replace an outmoded. charter entirely.34 The city 
had in fact requested and received new charters in 1851 and 1863. 
The state constitution of 1870 however replaced such charters 
with a single general incorporation act applying to all cities and 
33Ibid., p. 140 and 174-75. 
34Albert Lepawsky, Home Rule for Metropolitan Chicago (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1932), p. 114. 
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towns regardless of size and Chicago lost this measure of flexibility. 
Thereafter it operated within the strictures of a law designed to apply 
as well to towns of one thousand inhabitants and to reserve significant 
powers to the legislature. 35 Able to exercise only those powers specifi-
cally conferred by the incorporation act and possessing no general or 
residual powers which would allow it to respond to needs as they arose, 
the municipal corporation found itself constitutionally unable to per-
form vital functions at the very time the city was growing rapidly.36 
As a result, Chicago was governed by a maze of over lapping administra-
tive and fiscal authorities. In addition to the municipal corporation, 
the Cook C01.mty Board of Commissioners, the Board of Education, the 
Library Board, three Park Boards, the Sanitary District and others 
were independent governing and taxing bodies exercising various powers 
within the city's boundaries. 
The development of the Sanitary District best illustrates the 
consequences of this situation. State law limited municipal indebted-
ness to one percent of the area's full property valuation. By the 1880s 
Chicago had reached that figure and could not raise enough new revenue 
to construct desperately needed sewers and a drainage canal. Knowing 
that the legislature would not change the tax laws, the city followed 
the only avenue open to it and persuaded the state to create the Metro-
politan Sanitary District in 1889.37 Ninety-two percent of the territory 
35rllinois, Constitution (1870), article 4, section 22. For the 
early history of Chicago's municipal government see Hugo Grosser, Chicago: 
A Review of Its Governmental History, 1837-1906 (Chicago, 1906). 
36 Lepawsky, p. 115 • 
37Charles Merriam, Report of an Investigation of the Municipal 
Revenues of Chicago (Chicago: City Club of Chicago, 1906), p. 8-9. 
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and ninety-six percent of the population serviced by the District were 
within the city limits but Chicago had no control over its activities. 
Instead a nine member board of trustees was authorized to choose the 
District's minor officials, construct all sewers, buy and sell real 
estate, borrow money, issue bonds, and levy and collect taxes and 
. 1 t 38 spec1a assessmen s. 
Similarly Chicago had little control over the other governing 
bodies. Although the mayor selected the school and library board 
members, there his authority ended. The powers of these boards were 
delegated directly by the legislature and each board prepared its own 
budget and levied taxes independent]J" of the city. The three park 
boards, created by the legislature in 1869, managed all park lands 
and levied taxes for park purposes within their individual jurisdic-
tions. 
Chicago's powers were further diminished by the operation of the 
Cook County government. The County Board of Commissioners administered 
both the jail and public hospital although these institutions were lo-
cated in and much more likely to be used by the city since only ten 
percent of the county's area and population was outside Chicago. Worst 
of all, from Chicago's point of view, the county assessed the city's 
property and collected the taxes on it. This important revenue was then 
remitted back to the city on a schedule set by the state legislature.39 
Even in those instances where Chicago had the power to provide 
essential services its efforts were often duplicated by the other 
38 McCarthy, p. 47. 
39Ibld.; Merriam, Municipal Revenues, Po 9-lD. 
authorities who were empowered to provide the same services within 
their jurisdictions. For instance, the City, Sanitary District, and 
each park board maintained separate police forces. The park boards 
operated their own electric light plants and one, the Lincoln Park 
Board, had its own waterworks. The park boards had the authority to 
pave, repair, and clean streets within park lands while the municipal-
ity provided this service for the remainder of the city. 4D Besides 
being inefficient this fragmented system created a wide disparity in 
how and at what cost these services were distributed among the city's 
residents. 
Despite the vital interest of the people of the city in the de-
cisions and actions of these various governing bodies, many of the 
offices were non-elective. The mayor, as previously noted, appointed 
the school and library board members; the Commissioners of the West 
35 
and Lincoln Park Boards were appointed by the Governor while the Circuit 
Court Judges selected those for the South Park Board. The fifteen Cook 
County Commissioners were elected county-wide but only five of these 
represented the city. 
·Perhaps the most detrimental aspect of this fragmented governing 
system was that it produced an equally disjointed revenue system. The 
state designated all of Cook County as one tax district and limited the 
percentage amount of property taxes which could be levied in any one 
district. Each taxing body within the district was in turn allowed 
only a fixed percent of this tax base. Throughout the 1890s the ta.x: 
base of Cook County remained around five percent of the aggregate of 
4DMerriam, Municipal Revenues, p. 71-72. 
its assessed property value; in 1901 the Juul Law legally fixed the 
tax limit at this five percent. 41 Chicago 1 s share of the tax base for 
corporate purposes was set at two percent of the assessed property 
valuation by the Revenue Act of 1879 and the remaining authorities had 
36 
rates fixed out of the other three percent. Only the school board levies 
for school buildings and a portion of the Sanitary District's taxes were 
exempt from these restrictions.42 While this system assured all govern-
ing bodies of receiving tax revenues, it was completely inflexible. Funds 
could not be transferred from one taxing body with less need to another 
which might be critically short of money.- Nor was the city free to de-
cide on a yearly basis w.hich areas were most in need and allocate funds 
accordingly. 
Although property taxes were a major source of revenue for local 
governments, they could also issue bonds to finance municipal projects. 
Here too the s,ystem worked against Chicago because each taxing body could 
incur bonded indebtedness only up to one percent of its full property 
valuation. When Chicago had reached this limit in the 1800s the inde-
pendent Sanitary District was the result; in other cases the city simply 
postponed making much needed improvements in municipal services. 
This complex, decentralized governing structure sustained the 
political factionalism which so easily bred corruption. Comparing the 
city's government with its politics, political science Professor Charles 
4~id, pa l0-J2. The Revenue Law of 1898 fixed a ratio. of one-
fifth between the assessed and real value of property, therefore the 
tax limit of Cook County was one percent of the total real property 
value. 
42Ibid., p. 6 and J2. 
Merriam observed 43 
Just as there is no centralized control of community affairs, 
but a division of authority among eight principal and many minor 
governments, so there is no Chicago boss, but a series of four 
or five major factions and innumerable minor ones distributed 
among the three thousand percincts of Chicago and Cook County. 
Each of these factions knew that if it lost out in one area such as 
the mayor's office, there was still the chance of obtaining power and 
patronage jobs elsewhere in the Sanitary District, park systems, or 
the county government. Self-serving men outside of government quickly 
learned how to trade favors with the men who were attracted to public 
offices offering such potential for personal gain. 
m 
This untenable structure of government was retained in large part 
because of the hostility Chicago faced from the rest of Illinois. Sec-
37 
tional differences had plagued Illinois throughout the century. Settlers 
from the south and southeast United States had followed the Ohio, Wabash, 
and Y.dssissippi Rivers into the southern and south-central parts of 
the state while migrants from the northeast and mid-Atlantic areas of 
the country came via the Great Lakes and overland roads into northern 
Illinois. Contact between the two areas of the state and their diverse 
populations remained distant until the opening of the Illinois Central 
railroad in 1856. Shortly thereafter southern Illinois' sympathy for 
the South" cause in the Civil War aroused new sectional enmities. 
~ the late nineteenth century these differences had evolved 
into a serious urban-rural conflict which would intrude into all attempts 
43Merriam, Chicago, p. 98. 
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Chicago subsequently undertook to reform its municipal government. The 
majority of the state's inhabitants were from western and northern 
European Protestant stock and lived in rural areas and small towns. As 
these areas began steadily losing population after 1880 those people who 
remained were increasingly alarmed by Chicago's development into a vast~ 
urban, industrial center with a population and lifestyle very different 
from their own. Twenty percent of the state's population was foreign 
born in 1890, but forty percent of Chicago's residents were foreign 
born, and immigrants kept coming into the city. The bulk of the newer 
immigrants, moreover, were Catholics and Jews from eastern and southern 
Europe. 44 
Reflecting the fears of their constituents downstate legislators 
sought ways to minimize the city's influence in state affairs. Chicago 
held only seven of the eighty-five seats in the legislature in 1870, 
and several legislators tried to restrict its future influence by per-
manently limiting its representation to the General Assembly by a clause 
in the new constitution. They proposed replacing the current scheme 
of proportional representation with representation by county; if every 
county had an equal number of representatives, Cook County would never 
have any political weight in Illinois no matter how large its population.45 
Enough of the representatives at the Constitutional Convention dis-
liked this scheme and Chicago was saved from this initial attempt at 
44Adna F. Weber, The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century: 
A Study in Statistics (New York: Macmillan, 1899; reprint ed., New York: 
Cornell, 1967), p. 2ll and 306. Sixty-five percent of all rural areas 
in Illinois (those smaller than a town of one thousand) lost population 
between 1880 and 1890. 
45william B. Philip, 11Chicago and the Downstate: A Study of Their 
Conflicts" (Ph.D, Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1940), p. 16-17. 
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restriction. But downstaters, regardless of party allegiance, kept pro-
posing new schemes in the General Assembly. In 1891 the Republicans, 
controlling both houses, refused to reapportion the state on the basis of 
the new federal census. The following year the situation changed little 
when the Democrats gained control of the legislature for the first time. 
Nine reapportionment bills were introduced before one finalJ.y passed 
in 1.893. The reason for the legislature's reluctance was obvious: the 
Chicago-Cook County contingent was increased by fifty percent to fifteen 
Senators and forty-five Representatives. Downstate retained two-thirds 
of the total seats and a tenuous command of the Assembly. 46 
The knowledge that it was only a matter of time before the city 
would be large enough to overshadow all of state politics affected 
Chicago and downstate relations for the rest of the decade. Hostile 
legislators stepped-up their campaign to limit representation perma-
nently, and when their bills failed to pass they adopted other obstruc-
tionist tactics. They often rejected legislation sought by Chicago 
when its representatives refused to vote for restriction; at other times 
support for a general state law dista5teful to the city but desired by 
downstate was the price Chicago was forced to pay for obtaining any 
legislation it desired. At still other times downstate legislators en-
acted laws for Chicago over the protests of its representatives and 
residents. The Yerkes traction bills were among the most blatant 
examples of this practice. 
After the turn of the century antagonism worsened as shifting 
patterns of population made the rural and small town areas of Illinois 
46Ibid., p. 36-41. 
increasingly frightened of Chicago. According to the census of 1900 
over fifty percent of the state for the first time lived in urban areas. 
Since only eleven cities in the state had populations exceeding 20,000, 
s:ixtY percent of the urbanites resided in Chicago. While the city's 
population had increased by 600,000 since the previous census, forty-
nine counties had lost population. 47 The political effects of this 
population distribution were manifested in the 1901 reapportionment 
which gave Cook County nineteen Senators and fifty-seven Representatives--
one-third the membership of each house and a potential veto power over 
many important bills requiring a two-thirds majority for passage. A 
bi-partisan coalition of downstaters immediately introduced a bill to 
restrict Cook County's representation permanently to one-third the total 
of each house. The measure failed to secure the necessary two-thirds. 4S 
Chicago thus entered the new century at a virtual standstill in 
the state legislature. It could generally thwart deleterious legis-
lation aimed at itself, but rarely could it secure the relief it needed 
to cope with its serious urban problems. Downstate legislators for their 
part strove to control Chicago before it controlled the state by con-
tinuing their efforts to restrict Chicago's representation and to enforce 
general state laws inimical to the lifestyle and needs of the city's 
diverse and growing citizenry. Ultimately as more and more Chicago resi-
dents became preoccupied with finding ways to alleviate their municipal 
problems and reform their corrupt and inefficient government, the antago-
nism between city and state pushed them to demand municipal home ruleo 
47Ib.d ~., 
48Ib.d 
__!_., 
p. 2 and 50o 
p. 51-54. 
CHAPTER Ill 
INTEREST GROUPS AND ISSUES 
By the 1890s many Chicagoans agreed that the existing governing 
structure was failing in many ways to provide crucial municipal services 
and to make the city a decent, safe, and democratic place to live. 
There was, however, little consensus about what measures ought to be 
taken to remedy this situation. One striking characteristic of the 
1890s and early twentieth century was the fervent involvement of many 
different groups in municipal affairs, often with the realization that 
this involvement was absolutely necessary to protect their particular 
interests o Business and labor sought ways to protect and promote their 
interests, and their actions and attitudes in municipal affairs were 
often shaped by their mutual antagonism; women had their own, often con-· 
flicting ideas; and there were also a variety of groups organized to 
attack specific municipal problems. The organizations which these 
groups formed, the reform proposals they set forth, their responses to 
the actions and ideas of fellow citizens, and the priorities they gave 
to certain issues and not to others, reveal much about what these Chicago-
ans wanted from their city and the roles they hoped to play in its future 
development. 
I 
As a booming industrial city, Chicago attracted aspiring entre-
preneurs from throughout the countryo By 1890 men like Marshall Field, 
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George Pullman, Philip Armour, and Gustavus Swift were building com-
panies and fortunes, and they and other businessmen organized business 
clubs to promote their interests. 1 In 1877 several prominent merchants 
and manufacturers formed the Commercial Club dedicated to advancing 
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rtby social intercourse and friendly interchange of views the prosperity 
of the city of Chicago"; the club 1 s membership was limited to sixty 
men "outstanding in the most important branches of Chicago business 
life. u2 Other businessmen followed this lead and organized other clubs 
with similar aims, among them the Mercantile, Sunset, Industrial, and 
Merchant's clubs, the Association of Commerce, and the Illinois Manufac-
turer's Association. Through these organizations the business community 
directed its response to issues and events in the city, a response which 
one later observer characterized as a clash between the "respective 
rights of the many and the few" in the community. 3 The business clubs 
lobbied for favorable business and tax legislation from the city govern-
ment, demanded a greater voice in how their tax dollars were being 
spent, particularly in the running of the public schools, and championed 
the franchise system as a cornerstone of free enterprise at a time when 
so many others seriously questioned its efficacy. 
Nowhere did the desires of business conflict as intensely as with 
those of its own workers, and nowhere was business more determined to win. 
Chicago's working classes had a tradition of activism that went back 
~erce, History of Chicago, vol. 3, passim. Armour, for example 
had been a ditch-digger in the 1850s; in 1890 he was worth $25 million. 
2Thid.' p. 190. 
3Merriam, Chicago, p. llO. 
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to the 1880s when the Central Labor Union--founded in 1884 by Albert 
parsons, an anarchist who spurned the eight hour movement in favor of 
abolishing the wage system altogether--began to attract dissatisfied 
radicals out of the more moderate Chicago Trades and Labor Assembly. 
Businessmen responded to this turn of events by inviting in the armed 
forces: in 1885 the Commercial Club gave the federal government land 
for Fort Sheridan, and the Merchant's Club donated land for building the 
Great Lakes naval training station. Mill tance on both sides led swiftly 
to the Haymarket "massacre" of 1886, an event that solidified the fear 
and hatred of both sides and shaped the attitudes of the labor movement 
toward municipal affairs over the succeeding decades. 4 
The background to the massacre was a strike at the McCormick Reaper 
Works. The company, which the previous year had been forced to grant a 
fifteen percent wage increase, provoked the strike by locking out union-
ized workers in an attempt to break the union; non-union replacements were 
hired and the plant became a scene of frequent clashes between the union 
pickets and the police and Pinkertons brought in to protect the replace-
ments. On May 3 two union men were killed and several wounded by police 
who fired into a crowd harassing the new workers, and the city's radical 
labor leaders responded by summoning all laboring people to protest at 
Haymarket Square the next evening. Though tensions rose the next day 
when crowds clashed again with the police at the reaper works, the 
meeting itself was disappointingly small and the speeches fairly unin-
spiring and non-inflammatory until the police (against Mayor Harrison' s 
orders) waded into the crowd ordering them to disperse. A bomb exploded 
~e best account of Haymarket remains Henry David, The History of 
the Haymarket Affair (New York: 1936)o 
in the midst of the police, killing seven. 
The reaction of the city leaders to the massacre was not such as 
to persuade workers that they could expect fair treatment from the 
authorities. Convinced that a worker 1 s revolution was imminent, news-
papers, prominent citizens, and law enforcement officials hysterically 
accused the meeting's organizers of inciting the violence and demanded 
they be brought to trial. Advised by the state 1 s attorney to "make 
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the raids and look up the law afterward" the police conducted a ruthless 
sweep of working-class neighborhoods rounding up trade unionists, foreign-
ers, and just about anyone they wanted. 5 The business community demanded 
increased police and citizen vigilance against potential labor agitation 
and took its own steps to assure citizen participation.6 Eight men were 
tried and convicted of murder before a judge and jury who were presented 
with no bomb thrower and no evidence linking the accused to the act; de-
spite some citizen protest against the injustice of the trial proceedings 
four of these men were subsequently hanged. 
H~ket decimated the radical labor organizations although 
remnants remained in the socialist camp led by Thomas Morgan. The ma-
jority of the trades unions regrouped into the Chicago Federation of 
Labor which by the turn of the century had a membership of over two 
hundred affiliated local unions. The majority of workers were never as 
radical as the leaders of the Central Labor Union but they deeply resented 
5Ginger, p. 49. 
6Prominent businessmen formed the First Council of Conservators' 
League of America to counteract "recent labor troubles" and guard against 
future such disturbances; Cyrus McCormick, Philip Armour, Marshall Field, 
and George Pullman were members of a Citizens' Association committee which 
offered to help the police in these matters; and on the state level the 
legislature passed the Merritt Conspiracy Bill to facilitate the arrest 
and conviction of suspected radicals. See Pierce, vol. 3, p. 281 and 289. 
the trial and the anti-labor hysteria which followed Haymarket. 
If workers needed any further evidence of business hostility 
they received it over the next several years. Many businessmen in the 
out~g townships, for instance, supported annexation in 1889 because 
the township police provided them inadequate protection in times of 
labor unrest. With annexation these forces would be combined with the 
Chicago police and become a much stronger deterrent against strikers 
and demonstrators of all kinds. 7 In 1894 business carried its repres-
sive tendencies further. When workers struck the huge Pullman Works 
to protest pay cuts which were not accompanied by a reduction of their 
rent and bills in the company owned housing and stores, businessmen 
repeatedly urged the Governor and then President Cleveland to send in 
troops. Governor Altgeld refused but the President complied and fed-
eral troops broke up the strike. 
Such events convinced laboring men that they could expect little 
support from either their government or fellow citizens and that for 
the future they had to cultivate their own political power. The CFL 
therefore began developing a political program for its membership to 
follow. And a major premise of this program was that organized labor 
would consciously and actively work for a municipal government and 
political system which better met its needs in the community. 
Women too were becoming increasingly aware of themselves as mem-
bers of their community and seeking ways to participate in its affairs. 
By the late nineteenth century many of them were working for reform and 
they were often able to cut across class lines both to support one 
7 McCarthy, p • 14-15 
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another 1 s causes and to work toward common municipal goals o Women 
began to participate actively in municipal affairs in the mid-l870s 
when several prominent women seeking to be "socially useful" founded 
the Chicago Woman 1 s Club. Like similar organizations throughout the 
country the Club was initially a place for women to meet and listen to 
speakers. But such passive affairs dissatisfied many members and in 
1$76 they reorganized the Club into departments-home, education, phi-
lanthropy, reform, and later art and literature, and philosophy and 
science--for discussing, studying, and acting on current problems. 
The first projects undertaken by the Club reflected its concern 
for the special problems of women and children. It sponsored the 
appointment of a woman to the Board of Education and a woman doctor to 
the County Insane Asylum, helped establish kindergartens in the public 
schools, and supported the activities of the Women and Children's Fro-
tecti ve League. Nine hundred women paid a $15 entrance fee and $10 
yearly dues to participate in the Club r s work. 8 
The club idea appealed also to other groups of women, many of 
whom had neither the spare time, money, nor inclination to JOin an or-
ganization dominated by the city's elite; instead many middle-class. 
and working-class women formed neighborhood clubs. While these local 
clubs did not abandon the city-wide perspective of the Woman's Club, 
they also focused much of their attention to solving specific neighbor-
hood problems. This was particularly important in the poorer areas where 
mlL."licipal services were inadequate at best. In the Hull-House settle-
ment neighborhood, for instance, immigrant women banded together to 
8Adade Wheeler and Marlene Wortman, The Roads They Made: Women in 
Illinois History (Chicago: Charles Kerr, 1977), Po 63-64o 
clean up the streets, get better garbage collection services from the 
city, and attack the frightful health and sanitation conditions of the 
9 
area. 
Women also worked through labor organizations. As more and more 
women had joined the labor force they discovered the need for unions to 
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protect their economic interests. But when they received only scant sup-
port from their male counterparts Chicago women formed their own craft 
and trade unions and labor federations. Through the Chicago Working 
Women's Union, the Ladies Federated Labor Union, and later the Chicago 
chapter of the National Women Trades Union League working women expanded 
their activities into municipal affairs. 
The experience of the Chicago Federation ~f Teachers illustrates 
this process. Catherine Goggins and Margaret Haley organized the pre-
dominantly female elementary school teachers into the CFT in 1897 to 
fight the Board of Education' s threats to suspend their three year old 
pension fund. The next year the Board withdrew the first salary raise 
the teachers had received since 1877 and the leaders of the Federation 
suspected that municipal corruption and waste lay behind the city's in-
ability to pay the teachers as well as the city's inability to provide 
public services. The CFT launched its own municipal reform campaign 
by suing the city to collect unpaid public utility taxes. 10 
Because they shared a common interest in the needs and problems 
of women, women's groups worked together on many issues despite class 
9 Addams, p. 203-.205. 
10Ibid., p. 230; Wheeler and Wortman, p. 86-87; Margaret Haley, 
11~ Story11 , unpublished autobiography in Chicago Federation of Teachers 
Papers, Boxes 32 and 33, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois. 
and cultural differences. The Woman 1 s Club lent its support to numerous 
labor activities: it helped the teachers figh~ for a pension fund, sup-
ported the founding and activities of the Women 1 s Trade Union League, and 
conducted investigations of the working conditions of women in various 
industries. And though Marshall Field was a prestigious member of 
chicago 1 s economic and social circles, and possibly a good friend of 
their husband 1 s, clubwomen published an expose of working conditions 
during the Christmas rush in his and other major department stores. ll 
Working women joined clubwomen in campaigns for social reforms. Eliza-
beth Morgan, founder of the Ladies Federated Labor Union, helped orga-
nize clubs throughout the state into the Illinois Woman's Alliance, 
and together the Union and Alliance worked to enforce truancy and com-
pulsory education laws and to pass the Factory Act of 1893 which regu-
lated child labor and mandated the eight hour day for women and children. 
Women from all these social and economic groups quickly agreed 
that the key to the success of their efforts was suffrage, for without 
this power they were constantly dependent on the good will and acqui-
escence of men. Working women were tired of having to rely on men to 
protect their economic interests12; other women recognized that having 
to plead for passage of reform legislation as a personal favor, as was 
often the case, was both distasteful and inefficient. A bill pertaining 
to the Juvenile Court languished in the legislature, for instance, until 
one of the city 1 s leading clubwomen, Louise DeKove."l Bowen, met with a 
prominent legislator and convinced him that nothing in it conflicted 
L1wheeler and Wortman, p. 85. 
12
chicago Federation of Labor, Minutes, April 4, 1906. 
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with important interests of any of his colleagues. Jane Addams experi-
enced the same type of problem of having to appeal to all male voters 
when she tried unsuccessfully to oust her ward's notoriously corrupt 
alderman Johnny Powers. 13 
The right to vote therefore became a vital issue for all these 
women. Some of them favored total suffrage while others sought to vote 
only in municipal and state elections. In both cases they followed the 
lead of the National American Woman Suffrage Association and inaugurated 
petition campaigns throughout the state. In 1893 the legislature re-
ceived more petitions on suffrage than on any other issue and these pe-
titions kept coming in the succeeding years. Women looked everywhere 
for support. In 1899 the Chicago teachers collected the signatures of 
25,000 tmion men, supposedly strongly anti-suffrage, on their petitions. 14 
By the turn of the century however women had secured only the right to 
vote for school board members. As a result they entered the new c&itury 
more determined than ever to make getting the vote one of their highest 
priorities. 
To address better a wide range of municipal problems many of the 
. 
city's prominent·men orgaDized a number of civic reform groups. The 
first of these organizations, the Citizens' Association, was founded in 
1874 by a group of men seeking to upgrade the city's fire protection 
methods. After their initial successes in this endeavor, the members of 
the Association resolved to became a general watchdog group, monitoring 
the conduct of elected public officials for evidence of misconduct and 
13Louise DeKoven Bowen, Growing up with a City (New York: Macmillan, 
1926), p. J.D?; Addams, p. 222-223. 
14wheeler and Wortman, p . J.D6-J.D? • 
corruption and examining existing public policies and recommending new 
ones. The Association's first venture into municipal politics came in 
1875 when the city voted on the Cities and Villages Act of the new con-
stitution. Since under the terms of the Act Chicago would retain its 
strong Council government, a system which the Association firmly be-
lieved encouraged corruption, it drafted a substitute law creating a 
strong executive department and weakening the Council. 15 The at tempt 
failed as the voters ratified the Cities and Villages Act, but the 
Association had commenced a campaign to reform the municipal government 
which it would wage over the succeeding decades. 
For two decades the Citizen's Association remained the city's 
principal civic organization. Then in 1893, in the midst of a new 
nationwide depression which was severely affecting Chicago, the city's 
trades unions sponsored a speech by William T. Stead, an English editor 
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and reformer who had been visiting and observing Chicago. Stead 1 s criti-
cism of the city for its corruption, civic and governmental failure, and 
its callous treatment of the poor and unemployed struck a responsive 
chord in his audience of businessmen, professionals, social workers, 
labor leaders and prominent Chicago women already alarmed by municipal 
problems and growing animosity between business and labor. 16 Following 
Stead's speech, several of these people formed the Civic Federation and 
declared its aims to be honest economical government, tax reform, harmony 
between classes, and amelioration of social ills. These ideals gave the 
Civic Federation a somewhat broader and more moralistic purpose and tone 
15samuel E. Sparling, Municipal History and Present Organization 
of the City of Chicago (Madison, 1898), p. 62-65. 
16 Addams, p. l22. 
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than the Citizens' Association, at least for awhile. Despite its rhet-
oric about uniting classes however, the Federation's leadership was 
heavily middle and upper-class: I\Yman Gage, president of the First Nation-
al Bank, served as the first president and its vice-president was Mrs. 
Potter Palmer, wife of one of the city's business magnates. The member-
ships' desire for economical government quickly surpassed the other 
ideals. 
The Pullman Strike of 1894 decisively changed the Federation's 
thrust and exposed the weak ties between the classes. "When the organi-
zation failed to secure arbitration of the worker's grievances, and the 
strike was then crushed with the approval and encouragement of many 
Chicagoans, labor withdrew from the Federation, again feeling embittered 
and certain that it could never rely on the good will or methods of 
others in the community. Subsequently the Federation concentrated on 
stemming civic corruption by closing gambling houses, promoting civil 
service among municipal employees, and working to eliminate bribery in 
the awarding of city contracts. Most importantly, the Federation began 
to seek legislation regulating the assessment, collection, and use of tax 
monies. 
One problem which neither the Citizens' Association nor the Civic 
Federation had attacked effectively was the actual membership of the City 
Council. The affairs of both organizations were too diffuse to allow 
them to concentrate on any one issue and besides, they were investiga-
tive organizations that did not directly enter politics. Following the 
Ogden Gas scandal and various other franchise-grabbing schemes, however, 
several citizens decided in 1896 that the Council had to be purged. What 
was needed to accomplish this, they thought, was a new organization 
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which would participate in the electoral process. To this end they began 
the Municipal Voters league. 
Unlike the Citizens 1 Association and Civic Federation the Munici-
pal Voters League espoused only one cause: to reform the sixty-eight 
member City Council, of whom it was said at the time "there were only 
siX who were suspected of being honest. rr17 To do this the League aban-
doned the old approach of investigating those already in office in favor 
of examining the past records and promises of aldermanic candidates 
and recommending good candidates to the voters. The League gave its 
stamp of approval to candidates of either party who pledged to seek 
fair compensation for the city for all public utility franchises and 
promote municipal efficiency in general. It also emphasized ward issues 
when promoting new candidates by asking voters to consider whether the 
old alderman was keeping the streets clean, seeing that the garbage was 
collected, and other matters of immediate interest. Finally the League 
tried to back candidates it believed were popular enough in the ward to 
get elected. 18 
Half of the city's aldermen stood for election every year and 
over the next four years two-thirds of the candidates approved by the 
League won City Council seats. The League was most successful in the 
"silk-stocking" and newly annexed middle-class wards on the periphery 
of the city, and least successful in the old slum wards where it often 
found no acceptable candidates to back. But over half of the League 1 s 
l7Merriam, Chicago, p. 1D5. 
~chael McCarthy, "The New Metropolis: Chicago, the Annexation 
Movement and Progressive Reform," in Michael Ebner and Eugene Tobin, eds., 
The Age of Urban Reform (Port Washington: Kennikat, 1977), p. 50. 
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candidates were elected from the city's old wards, enough to indicate a 
general dissatisfaction with the City Council. 19 
The Municipal Voters League crusades set the tone for future po-
litical reform in Chicago. The "cleaned-up" Council ceased to be the 
target of reformers, who turned their attention to other problems 
troubling the city. The success of the campaign against corruption gave 
them every cause for optimism in new endeavors. The reformed Council 
vindicated the League 1 s belief that if issues and candidates were pre-
sented to the voters in a rational and intelligent manner, the voters 
would respond with equal intelligence and reason. The League, as well 
as other reformers, would assume in the future that reasonable men would 
share their views on reform issues. 
One more important reform organization was formed in 1903 by sever-
al members of the Municipal Voters League who wanted to expand their more 
active political approach to other reform efforts. The City Club of 
Chicago was established by these men to provide a forum for discussing 
urban topics and problems and attracting new men to help implement their 
plans for continuing to investigate and improve municipal conditions. 
Membership in the City Club was by invitation of a Board of Directors 
and "confined to those who are sincerely interested :in practical methods 
of improving public conditions. n20 Two years later the Club organized 
itself into civic committees to systematically and continuously appraise 
all aspects of Chicago affairs and also began issuing a weekly Bulletin. 
19McCarthy, "Businessmen and Professionals," p. 29-33. 
20
walter L. Fisher to Messrs. Marx and Door, November 16, 1903, 
Walter L. Fisher Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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Members of the Citizens' Association, Civic Federation, Municipal 
voters League, and City Club were among the most visible and 11respectable 11 
business and professional men in the city. They believed that municipal 
waste, corruption, and inefficiency resulted largely from Chicago's out-
moded, patchwork government. other less prominent, less wealthy pro-
fessional men believed that the cause of municipal problems lay else-
where and formed their own reform organizations to pursue other solutions. 
Many of these men belonged to the Chicago branch of the Independence 
League, a national reform coalition headed by publisher William Randolph 
Hearst. Hearst and the Independence League believed, along with many 
other Americans, that these municipal problems stemmed from a "corrupt 
bargain" between the two political parties and the big trusts and cor-
porations which gave privileges to special interests at the expense of 
the majority of the people. Because of this bargain, the League argued, 
the corporations and the rich never paid their fair share of taxes and 
the city lost millions of dollars in desperately needed revenues which 
could otherwise have been used to provide and upgrade municipal services. 
The League thus advocated a complete revision of municipal tax systems 
to compel the wealthy and powerful to pay their taxes. 
The members of the Independence League and the civic reform organi-
zations differed in other ways also. Although the former were primarily 
lawyers, these men had neither the prestige nor the wealth of those 
lawyers leading the civic reformers. And while most of the members of 
the Independence League who professed a political allegiance listed 
themselves as Democrats, the majority of the reformers were Republicans. 21 
2~hicago American, June 7 and July 14, 
Book of Chic cans: A Bio a hical Dictionar 
of Chic ago Chicago: Marquis and •-.~ompany, 
Men 
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Those who joined the Independence League were also more like~ to sym-
pathize with third party movements; HowardS. Taylor and John J. D~nohue, 
two of the League 1 s important spokesmen, had belonged to the Populist 
and People's parties respective~. 
Other influential men in Chicago did not agree completely with 
the ideas of any of these established groups and they proposed different 
solutions which attracted a certain following within the city. Louis 
Post and Raymond Robins were two of the most important of these men; 
although both men belonged to the City Club they often found themselves 
as odds with their fellow members. Post was a lawyer and newspaper editor 
who, like the Independence League, believed that unfair tax laws perpetu-
ated municipal problems. His solution though was the single tax proposed 
by Henry George in 1879. According to disciples of George only a single 
tax on_the unearned increment from land value could bring political, 
social, and economic democracy to the country and its cities. Louis 
Post was able to project this philosophy into municipal affairs. In 
the case of public utilities, for instance, Post believed that since all 
land belonged by right to all of the people municipal ownership of utili-
ties was essential. The prevailing system of "ownership by private 
moneygrubbing corporations", he argued, deprived the people of their 
right to the city streets and assured that there would never be adequate 
. . l . 22 m~c1pa serv1ceso 
Sociologist and social worker Raymond Robins wanted to make the 
municipal government more responsible for the general welfare of the 
22Louis F. Post, "Living a Long Life Over," unpublished autobiog-
raphy in Louis F. Post Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 
Po 270-72, 
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majority of its citizens, particularly the poor. The existing munici-
pal government, he believed, functioned for the benefit of the wealthy 
and the politicians and these groups had failed to provide a decent life 
for many Chicagoans. His solution was to change the municipal structure 
and laws to give the people a more direct voice in all municipal affairs. 
Clearly then, Chicago in the 1890s was experiencing the severe 
municipal problems and the lack of agreement over how to solve them and 
for what purposes which historians now see as characteristic of urban 
progressivism. 23 And as the new century got under way more groups of 
citizens with other priorities for reform organized and demanded a voice 
in any reform process. 
II 
Various groups of Chicagoans confronted each other in a number 
of important reform issues which emerged at the end of the century. 
One of the most controversial of these issues was how to administer the 
public schools. The condition of the schools attracted the attention 
of most of the residents not only because their children attended, but 
also because the system was a major recipient of property tax revenues. 
Under the prevailing system a Board of Education appointed by the Mayor 
and a Superintendent selected by the Board ran the schools, technically 
free of any outside controlo Many residents objected to this situation 
but for widely disparate reasons. Businessmen worried about how the 
schools spent their tax dollars; many of them argued that the school 
system was fiscally wasteful because the Board was appointed by a poli-
23For a brief overview of the status of this issue see Michael H. 
Ebner and Eugene M. Tobin, The Age of Urban Reform: New Perspectives on 
The Progressive Era (Port Washington: Kennikat, 1977), p. 3-l2. 
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tician and hence was subject to political pressure. Led by the Commercial 
and Merchants' Clubs these men wanted to diminish the Board's powers and 
transfer most authority to the Superintendent, who they hoped would then 
administer the schools in a more business-like fashion--that is, with 
more efficiency and economyo 24 
In contrast, the Teachers' Federation, Federation of Labor, and 
many parents and private citizens wanted to make the school system more 
democratic and directly accountable to the public. Rather than shifting 
power to the Superintendent they sought to elect the school board members, 
give teachers a greater voice in planning curriculum and deciding school 
policies, and to have the system place more emphasis on education than 
on fiscal expertise and economy. 25 The antagonism between the businessmen 
and these other groups was heightened by the former's aQvocacy of a dual 
school system: the regular schools and industrial training schoolso The 
CFL suspected that business wanted to use industrial schools both to 
train apprentices to oppose unions and to assign p9or children automati-
cally to an education designed to limit their opportunities for the 
future. 
Any reform of the public schools clearly concerned how much influ-
ence and control the broad community would have in municipal affairsj this 
was also true of the public utilities problem. Following the Yerkes and 
Allen Bill scandals of the late 1890s, labor, radical reformers and social-
ists in the city began demanding complete and immediate municipal ownership 
2~erriam, Chicago, p. 126-30. 
25Addams, p. 233-34; CFL, Minutes, December 2, 1906; Post, "Living 
a Long Life Over," p. 315; Wheeler and Wortman, p. 87-89. In a public 
policy (non-binding) referendum conducted in April 1904, two-thirds of 
those voting favored an elected school board. Chicago Daily News, Almanac 
(1905), p. 357. 
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of the utilities as the only way out of the franchise mess. While most 
of the business community decried this insidious attack on the free enter-
prise system, many politicians and moderate civic reformers agreed that 
some significant reform was needed and they looked for a less drastic 
solution than complete municipal ownership. Hardly anyone in the city 
did not have an opinion about the public utilities problem; the issue 
was so volatile that it determined the outcome of the 1903 and 1905 
mayoral elections. 
The problem was quite urgent in 1903 for existing franchises 
would soon expire and a bill to allow cities to own and operate public 
transit systems was stalled in the state legislature. Mayor Harrison 
and his Republican challenger both endorsed the bill, but only Harrison 
promised to veto any franchise extensions granted by the City Council 
before the law could be enacted. On the strength of this pledge Harrison 
was re-elected and the month after the election the legislature passed 
the Mueller Law empowering cities to build or buy and operate street 
car lines. 
To the dismay of the advocates of municipal o~ership, however, the 
Mueller Law touched off a series of political machinations which threat-
ened to impede their goal. First of all, Harrison and other influential 
men had wanted the Mueller Law simply to use as a club to force existing 
transit companies to renegotiate franchises more agree.able to the city. 26 
The mayor authorized the City Council Committee on Transportation to 
begin such negotiations even before the voters had a chance to accept or 
reject the Mueller Law by public referendumo The proponents of municipal 
26 Komons, p. 296. 
ownership knew they could obtain the three-fifths majority needed to 
ratify the Law and they attempted to counter the mayor's actions by 
pushing for an early referendum which would place not only the Mueller 
Law before the voters but also two pertinent public policy questions. 
As expected the voters overwhelmingly ratified all three measures. The 
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public policy questions urged the city to proceed immediately in acquiring 
street railways and requested the Council to refrain from granting fran-
chises during this process and instead license existing street railways 
and compel them to provide satisfactory service. 27 
D·espite this evidence of the public's sympathies, critics of munici-
pal ownership continued to seek a more moderate solution, protesting that 
it was neither financially nor legally feasible for the city to own and 
operate its own transit system. The Mueller Act had, in fact, thrown 
its own roadblock in the path of municipal ownership. It stipulated 
that cities could finance transit systems either by issuing municipal 
bonds or street car certificates to be paid from the revenues realized 
from the transit lines. Opponents seized upon this clause and argued 
that the first method was impossible because the city had reached its 
allowable level of indebtedness, and that it was also highly unlikely 
that the city could raise enough money by the latter method. In addi-
tion the traction companied threatened to test the Mueller Law in court, 
and the Union Traction Company was in federal receivership and thus re-
moved from any municipal control until the government had untangled its 
financial arrangements. 
Backed by the opponents of municipal ownership Harrison remained 
27Daily News, Almanac (1905), p. 357. Public policy questions were 
non-binding referenda. 
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firm in his intention to secure new franchises from the transit companies. 
In the late summer of 1904 he supported a settlement agreed upon by the 
Committee on Transportation and the City Railway Company in which, Harri-
son contended, the company accepted in principle universal transfers, 
the five-cent fare, and paying adequate compensation to the city. He 
then refused to submit the Tentative Ordinance, as it was called, or 
any other franchise ordinance to popular referendum. 28 In response the 
enraged supporters of municipal ownership secured pledges from a majority 
of the City Council not to pass any franchise ordinance that did not con-
tain a referendum clause, and prepared to place the transit question on 
the ballot once again at the April 1905 election. 
Harrison subsequently declined to run for another term and the 
Democrats nominated Edward F. Dunne who promised to implement immediate 
municipal ownership; his Republican opponent John .Harlan refused to sup-
port municipal ownership. Durme won the election on the strength of his 
pledge and the voters once again showed their preferences on the transit 
issue. They decisively rejected the Tentative Ordinance and approved 
measures demanding that the Council not grant any new franchise to the 
City Railway or any other traction company. 29 
But the issue was far from settled. Despite his pledge Dunne ap-
pointed Walter Fisher, a noted civic reformer and moderate on municipal 
ownership question, as his advisor on traction. Fisher proceeded to pur-
sue a moderate course and the controversy over the appropriate way to 
regulate public utilities continued to divide the city. 
28H . arrJ..son, p. 
29Daily News, Almanac ( 1906), p. 292. 
Yet perhaps no issue caused more popular uproar in Chicago than 
liquor regulation, and this issue had the additional consequence of 
causing the city's ethnic groups to become involved intensely in muni-
cipal affairs. As temperance forces in the city and throughout the 
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state grew more ardent in their quest, ethnic Chicagoans united to fight 
what they correctly perceived as a direct assault on their lifestyle. 
Once they were unified in this common cause it was only a short step for 
them to shift their efforts from a negative stance--that of opposing pro-
hibition--to the more positive one of actively deciding what kind of 
city they wanted and then pursuing their ideas and objectives. 
By the end of the century ethnic groups had already been alarmed 
by the increasing political strength of groups such as the Hyde Park 
Protective ASsociation, and the Law and Order and Anti-Saloon Leagues. 
For awhile prohibition efforts had been centered in the outlying town-
ship districts. When these townships were annexed in 1889 the prohi-
bitionists secured a guarantee for continuing these township prohibition 
districts in return for their supporting annexation. Thus when Hyde 
Park was annexed eleven of its forty-eight square miles were dry and 
the remainder subject to local option. However the Columbian Exposition 
of 1893 occasioned a reversal of this agreement and helped upset what-
ever delicate balance there had been between the residents of the dry 
townships and the wet city. Finding it unthinkable that the Exposition, 
located in Hyde Park, should not be able to sell liquor, the Board of 
Directors secured a temporary liquor license. The drys believed this 
was sinply a first step toward erasing the earlier agreement entirely 
and began working to extend dry and local option areas into Chicago 
In the first years of the twentieth century, temperance forces 
stepped up their activities by trying to compel both th~ city and the 
state to regulate more stringently the sale of liquor in the city. 30 
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The Anti-8aloon and Law and Order Leagues demanded that the City Cvuncil 
enforce the state laws regulating all places s·erving liquor and partie-
ularly that it close saloons on Sunday. Although the Cities and Villages 
Act of 1872 gave city councils power to license, regulate, and prohibit 
the sale of liquor, the Leagues contended that local legislatures had to 
stay within bounds of state laws when exercising these powers. Knowing 
that Sunday closings would be very unpopular in Chicago, in March 1906 
the City Council instead attempted to placate the Leagues by raising the 
saloon license fee from $500 to $])00, claiming this would force dis-
reputable saloons out of business while providing additional revenues for 
the city. State 1 s Attorney Jol:m Healy then threatened to impeach Mayor 
Dunne if he did not enforce the state law requiring all places serving 
liquor to close at 1:00 A oM. At the Mayor 1 s behest the Council voted 
to stop issuing the special bar permits which allowed clubs and dance 
halls to serve liquor after 1:00 A.M. 
A few days later more than 30,000 people representing many of the 
city's ethnic groups gathered in a mass meeting to protest this infringe-
ment of their social and leisure activities. Addressing the crowd in 
several languages speakers accused the City Council of constricting 
"personal liberty" and the right of everyone to choose his or her own 
form of recreation. They blamed the Council's actions on a small but 
30 Jol:m Clayton, "The Scourge of Sinners: Arthur Burrage Farwell," 
Chicago History (Fall 1974), p. 69-71; Chicago Record-Herald, February 
and March, 1906, passim. 
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vocal group of prohibitionists who were conspiring with temperance 
group~ throughout the state to force prohibition on Chicago. The cheer-
ing crowd resolved to organize a society to remove systematically all 
laws by which "bigots attempt to subjugate the majority," by securing 
complete home rule for Chicago from the state legislature.31 The re-
sults of this meeting were dramatic: the City Council rescinded its 
order and agreed to continue issuing the special bar permitso 
The size, enthusiasm, and success of this meeting impressed the 
publishers of the German language press. They placed ads in the city's 
ethnic newspapers inviting ethnic societies to send delegates to a con-
vention for organizing a permanent group dedicated to protecting and 
promoting their common interests.32 On May 27, 1906 nearly 350 ethnic 
societies representing 60,000 people sent delegates to this meeting 
where they organized the United Societies for Local Self-Government.33 
Thus using their well-established community organizations--newspapers 
and benevolent and fraternal societies--Ghic~o's ethnic groups were able 
to launch the largest interethnic group of the Progressive Era with rela-
tive easeo 
The United Societies encompassed men from most ethnic and cliss 
groups in the city. Despite German predominance the organization at-
tempted to represent directly all members by selecting a large governing 
body of nine officers and fifty-eight executive committee members from 
every ethnic group.34 Two Germans, a Pole, a Bohemian, and a Croatian 
31Abendpost, March 26, 1906. 
3~or an example see L 1 It alia, May 26, 1906. 
33see Appendix II for a list of these societies o 
34see Appendix Ill. 
were vice-presidents; the secretary and treasurer were German; and a 
Hungarian served as financial secretary. Of fifty-five identifiable 
executive committee members, twenty-nine were German, nine Bohemian, 
six Polish, four Swedish, two Swiss, and one each Italian, Irish, Dan-
ish, Belgian, and Croatian. In the subsequent annual conventions each 
nationality was to have one vote per its first 200 or fewer members with 
an additional vote for each additional 200 members. By occupation half 
these men were workers--machinists, tailors, clerks, laborers, and 
craftsmen of all kinds. There was one doctor, eight lawyers, three 
newspapermen, and eight small businessmen. Not surprisingly tep. were 
saloonkeepers and three were in the liquor business, although these men 
were no more visible than anyone elseo35 
<Ale group was conspicuously absent: the Irish. Having already 
made significant inroads into the regular political system perhaps they 
did not feel the need for ethnic solidarity to achieve their goals;36 
perhaps too the other groups resented their political power and balked at 
including them. Whatever the reason the Irish did not formally send 
delegates to the convention, but the United Societies di~_ask two Irish-
men to occupy important posts in the ·organization. Charles Gilbert, a 
lawyer, was the Societies' first president, and former Congressmen 
Edward Noonan who did attend the founding convention, acted as the 
Societies 1 lawyer. Since no mention of Gilbert 1 s selection appears in 
35The nationalities and occupations of these men were compiled from 
Abendpost, May 28, 1906; Chic ago, City Directory ( 1906 and 1907); the 
United Societies for Local Self-Government, Constitution and By-Laws (1906). 
36Edward Dunne was elected Mayor in 1905; Roger Sullivan led one 
of the factions in the Democratic party; and a number of Irish sat in 
the City Council and occupied prominent positions in the Democratic 
Party. 
the convention accounts it is impossible to say for certain why he was 
chosen, although Alex Gottfried in his biography of Anton German (perma-
nent secretary of the Societies after 1907) speculated that the Societies 
believed it "impolitic" to have a foreign name heading the organization.37 
The size (reputedly ]JQO societies representing 250,000 people by 
1919) made the United Societies probably the largest interethnic group 
of its time; its political activities made it an important force in 
Chicago in the Progressive Era. At first glance the ideas and actions 
of the United Societies do resemble the ritualistic ethnocultural orien-
tation of "personal liberty" as described by Paul Kleppner in his study 
of late nineteenth century midwestern voting patterns. To Kleppner 
"personal liberty" was the slogan utilized by ritualistic ethnic groups 
opposed to 11government whose regulatory powers are used to establish canons 
of social norms, 11 and advocating government "whose presence could be 
seen but not felt. rr38 Hence for IO.eppner and others who have followed 
his lead, ethnic opposition to prohibition stemmed from a religious 
antipathy toward government attempting to legislate morality. While 
the Societies indeed opposed prohibition, and sometimes used the slogan 
11personal liberty", it is shortsighted to categorize the Societies simply 
as an anti-prohibition group in this mold. Their motives were neither 
as culturally static nor politically limited as the ethnoculturists 
and others who study Chicago history suggest, and to apply this inter-
37Gottfried, po 53-54. Gottfried cites no source for this infor-
mation. There is no mention of Gilbert, for instance, in the Abendpost, 
May 28, 1906 account of the meeting although the names of all the other 
officers and executive committee members are given. 
38Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Mid-
western Politics, 1850-1900 (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 169 
and 178. 
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pretation to the United Societies without carefully examining what the 
organization was saying and doing underestimates the impact of the Pro-
gressive Era on all urban residents and misses the opportunity to examine 
chicago's ethnic groups as a vital part of their community and the pro-
cesses which decided municipal policies.39 
The foremost task of the delegates to the Societies 1 founding con-
vention was to adopt a statement of the purposes and principles of the 
organization, and the discussion over this issue does not reveal a cul-
turally-based concern for seeking a severely limited government. Rather, 
the speakers presented their ideas as consistent with the highly secu-
1ar and "American" principles of democracy, majority rule, and respect 
for the law. Fritz Glogauer, editor of the Abendpost, castigated tem-
perance laws as undemocratic, the "unreasonable and coerc:;,ve regulation" 
resulting from the "agitation of a tiny, but arrogant minority, 11 and 
reminded his audience that energetic resistance was "the proper think in 
a democratic republic where the majority rules, not the minority; where 
the dog waves the tail and not vice versa. 1140 One speaker proclaimed 
that he was just as good an American as anyone else and therefore enti-
tled to an equal voice in determining laws and government, while still 
others expressed concern for the general esteem for law when one group 
tries to enforce offensive laws upon the rest of society. Speakers 
39For previous treatments of the United Societies see John Allswang, 
A House for All Peoples: Ethnic Politics in Chicago, 1.890-1936 (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky, 1971); John Buenker, "The Dynamics of Chicago 
Ethnic Politics, 1900-1930," Journal of the Illinois State Historical So-
cietx_ 67 (April 1974); Gottfried, Boss Cermak; Edward Kantowicz, Polish-
American Politics in Chicago. 1888-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
197 5); McCarthy, "Businessmen and Professionals. 11 
40Abendpost, May 28, 1906. 
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furthermore stressed not freedom from government, but freedon of self-
government--an important distinction--demanding that the citizens of 
Chicago, as well as other local communities, be allowed to govern them-
selves independent of interference from the rural elements of the state. 
The convention issued a Declaration of Purposes and Principles 
reflecting these ideas. The organization's operating principles were 
based on the belief that "in a democratic republic the laws should 
conform to the views and wishes of the broad citizenry as well as the 
actual social conditions," and that "obsolete and neglected restrictive 
laws stand in contradiction with popular government." The Societies 
vowed to work for local self-government because "as city life differs 
from rural life, so should laws which regulate social customs distin-
guish between city and country life."4l 
In establishing the United Societies, Chicago's ethnic groups de-
clared themselves legitimate members of their city and served notice on 
their fellow citizens that their needs and wishes could not be ignored. 
As businessmen, labor, women, reformers, and others had formed organiza-
tions to promote the interests they had in shaping their community so too 
did the ethnic groups. 'The. Societies gave them a vehicle through which 
to articulate their concerns and desires and become involved more active-
ly in municipal affairs. Most importantly, it also succeeded in uniting 
the disparate and sometimes antagonistic nationality groups in the reali-
zation that they had certain interests in common; without unity they 
risked remaining weak and ineffectual with each group scrambling to better 
its individual situation, but unified into the Societies they learned to 
41Thid. 
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exercise the power to which they were entitled by their sheer numbers. 
All the groups trying to decide what to do about schools, public 
utilities, prohibition, woman suffrage, municipal corruption, and the 
myriad other problems facing Chicago had come to realize one important 
factor--that the solutions would depend greatly on who had the power of 
decision-making. While some Chicagoans would work to keep that power 
strictly limited, others pushed to broaden popular participation in 
government by means of the initiative and referendum. In 1902 the voters 
approved a public policy proposition that local citizens be able to in-
itiate legislation with signatures of eight percent of the eligible 
voters, and to demand a referendum vote on local legislation by petition 
of five percent. Two years later they reinforced these earlier votes 
by supporting a proposal that voters be empowered to veto any undesirable 
action of their respective law-making bodies whenever five percent of the 
voters petitioned to have such action referred to popular vote. 42 Be-
cause public policy questions were simply straw votes the results did 
not actuate these changes, but they did reflect the prevailing senti-
ment of the city that the voters should have a greater say in municipal 
affairs. 
Thus by the first years of the new century significant numbers of 
Chicagoans had organized to identify and confront a multitude of muni-
cipal problems. They had eliminated some corruption by cleaning up the 
City Council and they were anxious for more change. It remained to be 
seen how, or if, they could reconcile their conflicting desires and ef-
fectuate reforms which were acceptable to at least the majority. 
42naily News, Almanac (1905), p. 356. 
CHAPI'ER Dl 
THE BEGINNINGS OF CHARTER REFORM 
By the turn of the century, a number of prominent men in the city 
had begun to perceive that the piecemeal approach to reform stood little 
chance of success. Not on~ did this approach allow every issue to bog 
down in squabbling among different groups of people, it also failed to 
get to the heart of the matter--that the city could no longer function 
under the restrictions of the state incorporation act. In 1902 there-
fore, several politicians and civic reformers proposed that Chicago 
write a home rule charter. Such a charter, as they conceived it, would 
simultaneous~ empower the city to administer pure~ local affairs 
without state interference and allow the city to alter dramatic~ its 
governing structure. 
The idea of writing a new municipal charter was inspired by the 
city's antiquated revenue system, which made it difficult for Chicago 
either to meet its existing financial obligations or fund new municipal 
works. The system of multiple taxing bodies, each with its fixed tax 
levy, prevented the city from raising additional income from property 
taxes or from distributing the collected property tax revenue according 
to need. Moreover, the city had reached the legal limit on bonded in-
debtedness and could not issue any new bonds. To meet its financial 
obligations Chicago relied heavi~ on special assessments and license 
taxes. According to the Cities and Villages Act municipalities could 
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finance local improvements through a special tax on continuous property 
(e.g. that property fronting a street being repaved). 1 Chicago prop-
erty owners were protesting this dual tax burden and demanding relief, 
particularly since the city habitually over-assessed for the improve-
ments and failed to refund adequately the monies as required by law. 
The incorporation act also gave cities broad licensing powers and the 
City Council steadily increased license fees and created new licenses 
to help offset financial difficulties. This was a practice to which 
small businessmen in particular objected. 2 
Proposals to revamp the city's governing and taxing structures 
had been advanced from time to time. As early as 1884 the Citizens 1 
Association had recommended a series of constitutional amendments to 
accomplish this. Since there was a constitutional ban against the legis-
lature considering more than one amendment a session, this proposal met 
with little enthusiasm. In 1899 the Greater Chicago Committee, a group 
of businessmen, wanted to draft a single amendment which would extend 
the city limits to include all of Cook County and subsume all functions 
of the county government under the city. This suggestion also failed to 
attract support. However, the prospect of consolidation appealed to 
many people and in 1901 Mayor Harrison asked the City Council to recom-
mend constitutional amendments which would enable the city to consoli-
date all existing taxing bodies under the municipal governmento3 It was 
Harrison's intention then to call a constitutional convention to con-
1Illin . o~s, Constitution (1870), article 9, 
~erriam, Municipal Revenues, p. 14; Pierce, vol. 3, p. 336-37. 
3Philip, p. 166-67; Chicago, Journal of the Proceedings of the City 
Council, Meeting of October 14, 1901, p. 
sider the recommended amendments. 
Members of the Civic Federation however had already decided to 
reject this approach as too limited. They were among the growing 
number of p·eople throughout the country who believed that the existing 
legal relationship between cities and states was inefficient and in-
creasingly harmful to cities. This point of view was summarized in the 
late nineteenth century by one of the many reformers studying and 
writing on this problem.4 Our large cities, wrote Ellis Oberholtzer, 
are totally diverse from the interests of the remaining sections 
of the States in which they are placed by our artificial arrange-
ment of boundaries. We have massed different people together 
who have no mutual sympathies, who are opposites in political and 
social standards and antipodal in wants and government require-
ments •••• For the good of the cities themselves, and likewise for 
the good of the States, it is necessary that our large cities 
should be free cities. 
The solution suggested by Oberholtzer and other urban reformers was 
municipal home rule. 
The Chicago Civic Federation eagerly adopted the idea of home 
rule. In W97 it pledged to work "until full control over all legis-
lation affecting local interests is removed from the State Capitol to 
the city of Chicago" and began its own campaign to free the city from 
the Cities and Villages Act and write a new municipal charter. 5 When 
others in the city agreed that extensive local self-government was the· 
best solution Mayor Harrison adopted this approach also and suggested 
that the Council take appropriate steps to ensure that the "legally 
authorized representatives of Chicago and the County" took the lead in 
~llis P. Oberholtzer, "Home Rule for Our American Cities, 11 The 
Annals 3 (1892-1893), p. 763. 
5Chicago Tribune, May 4, 1897, 
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6 this matter rather than allowing citizens 1 groups to do so. But the 
Civic Federation had already acted. It issued a report advocating a 
new city charter which would consolidate overlapping governing bodies~ 
extend the debt limit, reform the structure and powers of the City 
Council, and in general make it easier for the city to expand govern-
mentalJ.y and geographically. 7 Within a month the Federation took the 
further initiative of inviting "influential" groups to send delegates 
to a convention to discuss these issues and recommend a course of action. 
On October 28, 1902 seventy-four men from business and social 
clubs, civic organizations, political groups, and delegates-at-large 
assembled as the Chicago New Charter Convention. The Tribune, a vig-
orous supporter of the proceedings, described the convention as "a 
realJ.y representative body. There is no prominent organization, muni-
8 
cipal, individual, or political which will not be represented. 11 The 
overwhelming majority of these men however, were successful businessmen 
and professionals; the CFL sent two delegates and except for three men 
from Jewish business clubs the city's ethnic groups were unrepresented.9 
The Civic Federation believed that the convention had two main 
tasks. The first was to decide whether to ·seek a new state constitution, 
or whether to write a constitutional amendment which would allow Chicago 
to draft a new charter. Assuming they chose the latter, the second 
6
cmcago, Journal of the City Council, September 29, 1902, p. ll04. 
7 Chicago Civic Federation, ''Preliminary Report on the Need for a 
New City Charter," Chicago Civic Federation Papers, Box no. 3 
8Tribune, October 28, 1902. 
9List of Delegates, in Civic Federation Papers, Box no. 3. 
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task was to decide if this constitutional amendment should be simply a 
general grant of power to Chicago to write a charter or whether it should 
specify the exact municipal powers the city wanted to include in the char-
tero The Tribune was as confident of a general consensus about charter 
reform as it was of the convention's representativeness. While acknow-
ledging the existence of differing opinions, the paper called upon the 
minority to surrender gracefully to the majority because a new charter 
involved "policy and not principle" and hence no opposition was legi-
timate. 10 
Opening the convention, B.E. Sunny, president of the Civic Federa-
tion, reminded the delegates that forces outside of Chicago controlled 
the legislature by a margin of two to one. These men, Sunny told the 
convention, did not want a new constitution, but they were also not 
happy.about the continuous stream of amendments brought before the legis-
lature by Chicago--there were in fact twenty-three such amendments cur-
rently pending in Springfield. This being the case, a new municipal 
charter seemed the only remedy o The delegates agreed and appointed a 
committee to draft an "enabling" amendment which would allow Chicago to 
write a new charter.ll 
The amendment which the committee drafted included three broad 
proposals. First that the legislature henceforth be allowed to provide 
a scheme or charter of local government for Chicago; second that such a 
scheme provide for consolidating in the municipal government the powers 
currently vested in the county, city, board of education, library board, 
10Tribune, October 28, 1902. 
11Chicago New Charter Convention, Proceedings, October 28, 1902. 
townships, park and sanitary districts (exactly what the Civic Federa-
tion has proposed); and third that once the city had consolidated with 
two of these bodies it would assume the debts and liabilities of such 
bodies and would henceforth be allowed to become indebted to an aggre-
gate amount not to exceed five percent of the full value of taxable 
property within its limits. Under this scheme the city's debt limit 
thus would jump from one percent to five percent, and it would control 
the tax levies from the entire tax district instead of being restricted 
to its current two percent of assessed property valuationo 12 
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When the committee reported its proposed amendment back to the full 
convention the delegates split decisively over its contento The majority 
favored the amendment as written because it satisfied their primary con-
cern about revenue. James Linehan, however, a delegate from the CFL, 
was not satisfied. He objected that the amendment was too general be-
cause it neither specified who would write the charter nor enumerated 
what municipal powers were to be included in it. He feared particularly 
that if the state legislators drafted a charter they would ignore sub-
stantially the desires of most Chicagoans as the CFL saw them. Linehan 
warned the CFL might refuse to support any amendment which "ignored the 
will of the people and failed to include a clause endorsing initiative, 
referendum, and municipal ownershipo 1113 He accused the delegates of 
duplicity in refusing to consider these issues while clearly spelling 
out the taxation powers they wanted in the charter. Although Linehan 
received support from Edward Dunne and other delegates in favor of a 
12
see above, Chapter II, p. 35-36o 
13New Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 18, 1902. 
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more democratic government~ the convention rejected a proposal specifi-
callY to authorize municipal ownership in the anendment and adopted it 
as drafted by the committee. 
Linehan's expressed fear of the state legislature and his objec-
tions to the amendment foreshadowed the conflicts which would plague 
the charter movement for the next five years. At the time though~ the 
supporters of the amendment sent it to the legislature confident of 
its passage and a future new charter. They soon experienced their first 
setback. Although the legislature generally favored a Chicago charter 
as a means of relief from the burden of local legislation, many legisla-
tors wanted the reform accomplished on their terms and not Chicago's. 14 
Downstate legislators, representing what they called the "country ele-
ment 11 attempted to exchange the amendment for new state tax laws de-
sired by downstate and for permanent limit on the number of Chicago and 
Cook County representatives. One of the leaders of this move admitted 
that 11we are using this question as a club if you like. 1115 This tactic 
failed but it certainly gave Chicago every reason to fear similar tac-
tics in the future~ quite conceivably over the charter itself. And the 
legislature did make a substantive change in the enabling amendment. 
It limited consolidation to the City~ Board of Education~ library board~ 
townships, and park districts; the County and Sanitary District were to 
remain separate governing and taxing bodies. 16 
J..4philip, p. 170-72. 
l5Record-Herald~ April 23~ 1903. 
16Illinois~ House Journal, March 24~ 1903, p. 386~ and April 22~ 
1903~ p. 795. The amendment became article 4, section 34 of the Illinois 
Constitution (1870). 
Although the revisions disappointed the proponents of charter re-
form, they accepted this form of the amendment as the best they could 
hope to get and began preparations for submitting it to a referendum 
of all Illinois voters. They were particularly anxious to obtain a 
huge affirmative vote in Chicago to offset possible negative voting 
elsewhere in the state. With the referendum scheduled for November 
1904, Mayor Harrison and the City Council tried once again to bring the 
entire issue under control of the city government. The Council author-
ized Harrison to appoint a special Council Committee to be known as 
the Chicago Charter Amendment Campaign Committee with power to take 
whatever steps it deemed necessary to promote adoption of the amend-
ment. The Committee was authorized to invite the cooperation of civic 
organizations and perhaps form an auxiliary committee of citizens to 
assist in educating Chicago voters on behalf of the amendment. 17 But 
the Civic Federation refused to relinquish its prominent role in char-
ter reform; it cooperated with the City Council committee but continued 
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to work on its own also. Through its own New Charter Campaign Committee 
the Federation disseminated literature throughout the city urging voters 
to ratify the amendment because Chicago desperately needed to be free 
of the Cities and Villages Act. 18 
Chicagoans were not unanimous in their support for the amendment. 
The CFL, for example, hesitated to recommend that its membership vote 
for it. Ratification of the Mueller Law in April 1904 defused some-
17 Chicago, Journal of the City Council, January 25, 1904, p. 2lll-
12, February 1, 1904, p. 2125, and November 21, 1904, p. 1592-94. 
18
chicago New Charter Movement, '~y the Pending Constitutional 
Amendment Should Be Adopted" ( 1904), unpublished pamphlet, Chicago 
Historical Society. 
what labor's dissatisfaction with the amendment's failure to ensure 
municipal ownership, but the CFL still objected to the amendment's 
emphasis on taxation, its failure to ensure other popular reforms, and 
its vague wording which specified neither who would write the new 
charter nor how much home rule Chicago would be granted. When the 
Civic Federation secured permission from the Board of Education to dis-
tribute pro-charter information in the schools, the CFL believed that 
its worst suspicions about who would benefit from charter reform in its 
proposed format had been confirmed. It demanded equal opportunity to 
publicize its views and to hand out literature supporting the public 
policy questions on direct primary, popular veto, and local power to 
assess and levy taxes which would also be on the referendum ballot. 19 
Rather than prolong the controversy the Board of Education rescinded 
its permission to the Civic Federation. 
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Four days before the referendum, labor urged its membership to 
reject the amendment because it was an attempt by certain groups--"every 
corporate agent, every subsidized newspaper, and every lick-spittle 
syncophant 11---to gain control of the city. 20 Indeed, many of the largest 
merchants and manufacturers had "lent" employees to help the campaign 
connnittee during the final days of the campaign. 2l The CFL proposed 
that to undercut these groups a constitutional convention be convened 
to write a new state constitution. Louis Post, an acknowledged leader 
of the city's liberal independents, took the same position. In his 
19
cFL, Minutes, October 16, 1904. 
2/J Ibid. , November 4, 1904. 
2~ribune, November 8, 1904. 
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newspaper Post argued that certain financial interests supported the 
amendment because they knew that any constitutional convention would in-
clude groups antagonistic to their desires. Both Post and the CFL be-
lieved that only in a constitutional convention would a broad segment 
of the community have a voice in how Chicago would be reformed. 22 
These arguments failed to impress the majority of Chicago voters 
who ratified the amendment by more than ten to one. A majority of 
voters in the state, most likely heeding their representatives' explana-
tion that it would free the legislature from continual Chicago legisla-
tion, also passed the amendment. The outcome of the referendum showed 
that most Chicagoans agreed with the need for municipal reform but not 
necessarily about the shape of that reform. And in fact the voting on 
three public policy questions which had shared the ballot indicated 
that the majority favored more extensive home rule and popular decision-
making than the amendment ' s principal backers had suggested. By a ma-
jority of ten to one the voters approved the proposition that citizens 
should be able to veto any undesirable action of their local government, 
and they favored by over three to one the idea that local governments 
should be empowered to adopt their own system of assessing and levying 
taxes subject to popular referendum. The voters also gave their over-
whelming support to the proposition of instituting direct primaries for 
nominating candidates for office. 23 
The next step toward charter reform was to constitute a body to 
draft a charter. Since the enabling amendment provided no mechanism 
22CFL, Minutes, November 4, 1904; the Public, November 5, 1904. 
23Daily News, Almanac ( 190 5), p. 3 56 . 
for deciding this matter several interested groups offered their own 
proposals. Everyone realized that the finished product would reflect 
the sentiments of those who drafted it on home rule, taxation, election 
reform, schools, municipal ownership, and other troubling issues. 
The CFL 1s suspicion that certain business interests intended to 
dominate charter reform was soon confirmed by events. In late November 
the extant executive committee of the 1902 convention, acting as though 
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they had priority in this matter, named a committee of seven to draft the 
new charter and authorized them to seek 11 such assistance as might be 
helpful. 1124 Three of these men, John P. Wilson, Judge Francis Adams 
and John S. Miller, were in fact members of the executive committee; 
all three were lawyers and Miller was special corporation counsel for 
the Union Traction Company, one of the franchises currently engaged 
in resisting municipal ownership. The other four were Bernard E. Sunny, 
president of the Civic Federation, Mayor Harrison, Judge Murray Tuley, 
and B.A. Eckhart, a prominent manufacturer who had represented the Board 
of Trade at the convention two years earliero 25 Furthermore, Sunny, 
Miller, Wilson, and Eckhart belonged to the prestigious Union League 
Club where Sunny was chairman of the political action committee. The 
Club was acutely aware of its influence to date in the charter movement 
and intended to remain influentialo A few months earlier Merritt Starr, 
also a member of the political action committee, had written to Sunny 
boasting about the Club 1s activities. He pointed out that of the seventy-
24aecord-Herald, November 24, 1904. 
25
rbid., List of Delegates, in Civic Federation Papers; Marquis, 
The Book of Chicagoans (1905). 
one living delegates of the 1902 convention thirty-two belonged to the 
Union League Club and declared that 11it is fair to say. that the Union 
League Club has from the beginning held a le~±ing place in the movement 
for City Charter Revision, and it desires to continue active in this 
work ••• 11 In his letter Starr also commented that the members of the 
Club sought a charter "drawn on rational and scientific lines and uti-
lYzing to the upmost all of the lessons of experience and embodying no 
rash experiments which have no justification in experience at their 
b k "26 ac • 
The convention's executive committee was not to have its way un-
opposed and the matter became quite complicated. The CFL immediately 
set out to draw up a plan for a convention to write the new chartero 
Responding to a resolution from the Carriage and Wagon Workers Union 
that fifty members of organized labor be representatives to any new 
charter convention, the CFL appointed a fifty member special committee 
to consider this question and to draw up recommendations for possible 
charter provisions. When five members of this committee met with the 
City Council Charter Committee to discuss the matter they discovered 
that the city's elected officials likeWise opposed the plan for the 
committee of seven but were attempting to replace it with one of their 
own which would place control of the charter squarely in the Council 1 s 
hands. 27 Moreover the state House Charter Committee was considering 
80 
26Merritt Starr to B.E. Sunny, April 1.4, 1905, Civic Federation 
Papers, Box no. 3. The Union League Club, according to its historian, 
"numbered a large portion of Chicago's most distinguished citizens in 
its membership. Bankers, merchants, capitalists, railroad managers, and 
officers of great corporations-the 'solid men 1 ••• " Bruce Grant, Fight 
for a City (Chicago: Union League Club, 1955), p. 175. 
27
cFL, Minutes, November 20 and December 4, 1904. 
introducing its own plan for constituting a charter convention. 
The CFL objected that none of these plans would provide popular 
participation in drafting the charter and quickly moved to formulate 
its own plan. It discarded the idea of demanding that a certain num-
ber of men from organized labor participate in any convention and in-
stead proposed a large, elected charter convention of 350 delegates. 
According to the CFL plan all Chicago citizens were to be eligible for 
membership in the convention and the delegates were to be nominated by 
petition and elected at-large by plurality vote. The CFL thought that 
this method was the only way to preclude the possibility of the con-
vention being controlled by one or two factions. 28 
The CFL sent its proposed plan to the state Charter Committee 
which rejected it and in its place Representative John McGoorty (D-
Chicago) introduced a bill to constitute a smaller convention of 
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ninety elected and twenty-five appointed members. But this bill and 
four others failed to pass the legislature and the City Council assumed 
responsibility for constituting a charter convention. 29 In the Council 
Democrats and Republicans introduced separate plans for such a conven-
tion. The Republican plan called for a convention of seventy-four ap-
pointed delegates: fifteen City Council members selected by the Council; 
fifteen state legislators chosen by the presiding officers of each house; 
and fifteen appointed by the Governor and fifteen by the Mayor. To com-
plete the convention the Board of Cook County Commissioners, Trustees of 
the Sanitary District, the Board of Education, Library Board, and the 
28Ibid., January 8, 1905. 
29Record-Herald, April l and 29, 1905; Philip, p. 173-74. 
south, West, and Lincoln Park Boards were each to appoint two repre-
sentatives. With the exception of Mayor Dunne and the library board, 
all of the appointing agents were predominantly Republican. 30 
Not surprisingly Council Democrats accused the Republicans of 
designing a Republican convention to insure that certain provisions, 
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such as municipal ownership, were not written into a new charter. Demo-
cratic alderman Joseph Kohout countered the first plan with one for 
appointing 110 delegates: one each appointed by every City Council 
member; five aldermen appointed by the Council Committee on State Legis-
lation; and five appointed by the Governor, fifteen by the Mayor, and 
two each by the previously mentioned governing boards. This plan also 
stipulated, unlike the Republican plan, that all except the governing 
board appointees had to reside in Chicago 0 By removing the state legis-
lature entirely from the delegate selection process and reducing the 
number of gubernatorial appointees the Democrats were attempting to 
shift the political balance and possibly reduce the number of politicians 
who might be convention delegates. The Republicans controlled the Coun-
cil and their plan was accepted.3l 
. 
Those men instrumental in appointing the convention were not com-
pletely unmindful of the desireability of attempting to balance some-
what the convention 1 s membership. When Governor Deneen sent him a list 
of his tentative appointees Walter Fisher suggested that the Governor 
revise his list to include more groups within the city. Fisher commended 
the choice of Lessing Rosenthal because he represented the Jewish element 
3° Chicago, Journal of the City Council, May 15, 190 5, p o 209-10 • 
3~id., June 12, 1905, p. 551-52 and June 19, 1905, Po 633. 
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and suggested that the Governor similarly seek a "prominent" Catholic 
to appoint. Fisher also observed that the list overly represented the 
"conservative and property-owning element," and proposed appointing 
"some representative of the labor or radical class." On the whole though, 
the men on Fisher 1 s list were predominantly Republican businessmen and 
civic leaders; it is indicative of his thinking that the man he suggested 
to represent the Germans and the liquor interests was also general coun-
sel and director of Republic Steel and Iron and thus, as Fisher pointed 
out, would also represent large manufacturers.32 Fisher was most con-
cerned, as were the other prominent figures in charter reform, that the 
right people be appointed to the convention and not that the convention 
be a popularly representative one. 
Despite the efforts of some men like Fisher to be fair, the dele-
gates appointed to the charter convention were, as the Democrats and 
CFL feared, neither politically non-partisan nor representative of the 
city•s population. Certain groups were obviously overrepresented.33 
Of sixty-two delegates whose political affiliation can be identified, 
thirty-nine were Republican, twenty-two were Democrats, and one called 
himself an Independent. The City Council named ten Republicans and five 
Damocrats, eight of Governor Deneen 1 s appointees were Republican, and 
only one of the General Assembly 1s choices was a Democrat. Only Mayor 
Durme appointed more Democrats than Republicans. The West and Lincoln 
32walter L. Fisher to Governor Charles Deneen, September 11, 1905, 
Walter L. Fisher Papers. 
33The information on the delegates was compiled from Chicago Char-
ter Convention, 110fficers, List of Delegates, Rules and Committees, 11 un-
published, Chicago Historical Society; Daily News, Almanac ( 1906); the 
Illinois Blue Book (1905); Marquis, Book of Chicagoans. See Append:ix rv. 
park Boards, whose members had been appointed by Governor Deneen, chose 
two Republicans each for the convention, while the "Democratic" Library 
Board selected two Democratso 
By occupation the majority of convention delegates represented 
prominent and important groups in· the city: twenty-six were lawyers, 
thirty-two businessmen, two social workers, one professor, and one minis-
ter. Many of these men had been active in previous reform ~vements 
and many held either elected or appointed offices in municipal and state 
government, including the fifteen aldermen and fifteen state legislators. 
Because of this selectivity even the few ethnic delegates were mostly 
well-to-do businessmen. Chly two subsequently joined the United Socie-
ties, and one of these men also belonged to the CFL.34 Only two dele-
gates were members of the CFL while one delegate was a black business-
man.35 These last three were appointed by Mayor Dunne. 
This imbalance has not generally been acknowledged either by the 
delegates themselves or in previous studies of charter reform. Conven-
tion Chairman Milton Foreman, at the convention's concluding session, 
declared that "an inspection of the membership will disclose the fact 
that they represent every walk and condition and poll of thought in life. 11 
One recent student of Chicago reform movements followed Foreman's lead 
and concluded that "even more than before convention membership represent-
ed a cross-section of the city's interest groups," because more business 
and reform groups were represented than in previous reform attempts.36 
1201; 
3~ayor Dunne later appointed Societies' member Walter Michaelis. 
35The Broad-Ax, November 18, 1905 o 
36Chicago Charter Convention, Proceedings, March l, 1907, Po 1200-
McCarthy, "Businessmen and Professionals, 11 p. 57. 
That major segments of the community were virtually unrepresented at 
the convention has been glossed over. 
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It is misleading however to draw easy conclusions about the con-
sequences of the convention's composition. First each man brought with 
him his own particular background, ideas, perceptions of Chicago's prob-
lems, and visions of the best government for the city, as well as the 
ideas of those groups for whom he believed he spoke. Similar political 
leanings and occupation, for instance, did not necessarily produce 
similar thinking or voting behavior during the convention. For instance, 
the concerns of Republican lawyer and banker John Smulski, a leader in 
the Polish community, might be expected to differ significantly from 
those of Walter Fisher, a Republican lawyer and leader of the Municipal 
Voters League; C .J. Vopicka, president of a small brewing company, might 
disagree considerably with John Shedd, president of Marshall Field's, 
the city's largest department store. 
Secondly, in drafting the charter, the delegates had to confront 
the myriad, often conflicting, urban political issues of the period. 
Thus, while they generally desired a more efficient municipal govern-
ment they did not always agree on what efficiency meant or how to ac-
complish it. George Cole of the Municipal Voters League was so pleased 
with the voters' response to the League crusades against the City Coun-
cil that he advocated continuing to elect a number of minor public offi-
cials although this contravened the arguments that governmental efficien-
cy required fewer elective offices. Charles Merriam proposed that a 
city tax: system be created, while other reformers argued that this would 
decrease efficiency by multiplying taxing bodies. In this case Merriam 
believed that fiscal efficiency required not reducing taxing bodies, but 
rather giving Chicago the means to control its own revenue system.37 
Obviously the issues at stake were complex, as were the problems 
of governing a city as large and diverse as Chicago. A thorough study 
of the charter convention, the subsequent ratification campaign, and 
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the aftermath of the charter's failure can move us well beyond searching 
for reformers and non-reformers, or concentrating on the ideas and needs 
of a single group. 
37Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 6 and December 19, 1906. 
CHAPI'ER V 
THE CHARTER CCNVENTION 
The Chicago charter convention is of interest to historians be-
cause it reveals the concerns of many different Chicagoans and how these 
concerns determined what they wanted from their municipal government. 
The convention debated the issues of efficiency, expertise, the nature 
of political democracy, the purposes of local government and politics, 
the relationship between Chicago and the "downstate, 11 and drafted a new 
city charter with these in mind; these were also the issues over which 
the citizens eventually supported or opposed the charter. Moreover, the 
convention gave the people a unique opportunity to participate in re-
structuring their municipal government as, in a very real sense, the 
convention became a forum for airing their diverse views. 1 Even before 
the convention convened several groups, particularly those who felt under-
represented at the convention had circulated their own proposals on many 
lcitizens in other cities generally had less input into charter 
making. The state legislature wrote Pittsburgh's new charter; in Gal-
veston and Houston leading businessmen secured commission charters 
directly from the legislature; the City Council of Los Angeles appointed 
a committee specifically to draft a commission charter; a Boston com-
mittee drafted a new charter which was approved by the state legisla-
ture without popular referendum. In Cincinnati, however, an elected 
convention wrote a new charter. See Hays, "The Politics of Reform, 11 
p. 165; Zane Miller, Boss Cox's Cincinnati (New York: Oxford, 1968), 
p. 222-23; Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency, p. 102-105 and 134-36; 
Martin Schiesl, "Progressive Reform in Los Angeles under Mayor Alexander, 
1909-1913, 11 California Historical QuarterlY 54 (Spring 1975), p. 49o 
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of these issues. The delegates were to remain constantly aware of 
the demands being made by people throughout the city while the conven-
tion was in session. 
The convention first met in July 1906 to draw up rules. No records 
were kept of this meeting, the chief work of which appears to have been 
the naming of committees to study the issues that would come before the 
full convention; among the subjects assigned were the powers and duties 
of the Mayor and City Council, public education, public utilities, pri-
mary and general election rules, parks, and the initiative and referendum. 
The committees worked independently for the next three months and sub-
mitted their recommendations to the full body in the first week in 
~tober. 
When the convention held its first regular session on November 30 
its deliberations concerned the articles defining the structure and 
efficiency of the city's government. The debates from this session, and 
indeed the entire convention, reveal that the delegates had little in-
terest in adopting the innovations elsewhere typical of the period's 
. . 1 f . 2 millllclpa re orm campa1gns. In Boston and New York, for example, new 
charters eliminated the Council's power to increase the municipal budg-
et and gave the Mayor power to appoint and remove all department heads 
without council confirmation. Pittsburgh and Boston each reduced the 
number of its city council members and changed to at-large elections. 
Commission governments were organized in many cities, and even where 
they were not instituted, reformers had often sought this change.3 
2
see Beard, American City Government, for an overview. 
3James Crooks, Politics and Progress: The Rise of Urban Progres-
sivism in Baltimore, 1895-1911 (Baton Rouge: LSU, 1968), p. 102-103. 
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In Chicago, on the contrary, many delegates to the convention believed 
the purpose of the new charter was not to clean up the corrupt City 
council or curtail its powers, but to keep Chicago advancing along the 
path of reform. 
The disinterest of the convention in major structural reforms 
reflects the opinion of many citizens that the battle against corruption 
had already been won. They agreed with convention member Charles 
Merriam that the crusades of the Municipal Voters League had "raised 
the Council to a cleaner and sounder basis •.• and gave the City for 
twenty years the best local legislative body in the country. " Merriam 
also attributed Chicago 1 s lack of corruption to the political realism 
of Mayor Harrison who had allowed the cosmopolitan character of Chicago 
to flourish, thereby avoiding splitting the city into hostile reform 
and non-reform camps, each struggling for control of the Council.4 
In this same vein, Walter Fisher wrote a correspondent from Minnesota 
that he could "cite Chicago as a city where non-partisan municipal poli-
tics has been a practical success."5 Outsiders reinforced this notion 
of progress. Lincoln Steffens, in his famous expose of urban political 
corruption, congratulated Chicagoans for beginning "slow, sure, political, 
democratic, reform, by the people, for the people," and concluded there 
6 
was "little doubt that Chicago will be cleaned up." Most delegates be-
lieved the situation was well in hand; what the city needed now, they 
~erriam, Chicago, p. 21-22 and 263-67. 
5walter L. Fisher to Leverett L. Lyon, M.arch 12, 1906, Walter L. 
Fisher Papers. 
6Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: S.S. McClure, 
1902), p. 164-65. 
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believed, was a little more efficiency, home rule, and popular govern-
ment. Most importantly, they also assumed that most of the citizens 
shared their views. Future events would show they misjudged the nature 
and extent of opposing ideas within the city, but the delegates began 
·their work in the convention under these assumptions. 
The convention first passed with little dissent the resolution 
consolidating the city, parks, board of education, and library board 
as allowed by the amendment of 1904. This provision eliminated over-
lapping administrative and taxing systems and centralized taxing and 
decision~ powers by making the parks, schools, and library de-
partments of the city government. 
No other resolution passed as easily as the delegates found out 
when they next considered the issue of distinguishing more clearly be-
tween the executive responsibilities of the Mayor and the legislative 
functions of the City Council. Some delegates wanted to alter the 
process of selecting the Mayor.by instituting the European method of 
the City Council choosing one of its own members to serve in this capac-
ity for an indefinite term, subject to removal by the Council. These 
delegates argued that popular election of a mayor was an American in-
vention which functioned badly because people voted for a mayor on the 
basis of his political promises not his administrative expertise. 7 In 
support of this idea Charles Merriam likened the city to a corporation 
in which the stockholders elect the board of directors, who then select 
the corporation officers. D·alegate Frank Bennett further argued that 
7 There was a tendency among reformers to seek examples of better 
urban government in European cities. See Schiesl, Politics of Efficien-
SL, p. 149-50. 
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the new method being proposed would insure the election of better council 
members because voters, knowing the Council would select the Mayor, would 
choose their aldermen more judiciously. 8 
The majority of the delegates accepted neither this proposal, nor 
an alternative proposal to divide the administrative and legislative 
duties between two popularly elected officials--the first to serve as 
Mayor and the second as President of the Council and chief legislative 
officer of the city. They voted instead to maintain popular election, 
although for varying reasons. George Thompson objected that the people 
viewed the Mayor as the one city official responsible to all of them 
and that City Council appointment would remove government from popular 
control. Delegates B.A. Eckhart and R.R. McCormick, on the other hand, 
spoke against the proposal because they did not trust the City Council; 
this body, they feared, might select someone they could control and not 
the best qualified and hence such a method would not guarantee more 
efficiency. 9 
The convention found a less radical way to redefine the relation-
ship of the Mayor to the Councilo On two close votes the delegates re-
moved the Mayor as presiding officer over the Council and rescinded his 
right to a vote in that body. 10 Under the new charter, the Council also 
would select its own presiding officer from among its members while the 
Mayor retained the right to introduce measures and exercise veto power. 
The delegates rejected a proposal to strip the Mayor of all legislative 
8 Charter C•)nvention, Proceedings, November JO, 1906, p. 62-67 and 
70-71. 
9Ibid., Po 63, 68 and 62. 
lOib.d -~-0, p. 85 and 90. 
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functions including his veto powero By making these moderate changes 
in the Mayor's functions, the convention believed the charter satisfied 
both those citizens seeking to insure the selection of a mayor competent 
to administer the affairs of such a large city, and those who insisted 
on the people's right to elect the Mayor. 
Of the remaining charter provisions only the ones on the Library 
Board and Penal, Charitable and Reformatory Institutions passed without 
much discussion. As the convention proceeded the issues provoked more 
controversy, more pressure from groups outside the convention, and it be-
came increasingly difficult to balance desires for efficiency, home rule, 
and popular government. 
Since the new charter expanded the role of the City Council in 
Chicago's government, the convention carefully weighed procedures for 
constituting the Council and defining its powers and duties. At the 
time the city was divided into thirty-five wards, each sending two alder-
men to the Council; these served two year terms and half stood for elec-
tion each yearo A number of delegates wanted a smaller council of 
thirty-five or fifty wards with one alderman each. Fewer aldermen, they 
argued, would carry out the city's business more efficiently because 
they would have less time to be preoccupied with the needs of the ward 
and more attentive to the whole city's needs. But the majority remained 
firmly ward oriented, insisting that servicing the ward was a vital duty 
of aldermen and that the city could not operate efficiently with any 
fewer aldermen. 11 
11Ibid., December 10, 1906, p. 209-10, 211, 217, 212, 2l3, and 214o 
D•3legate Alexander Revell presented an alternate proposal which 
simultaneously retained ward representation, acknowledged that the in-
terests of the entire city were greater than those of the particular 
wards, and increased the chances of eliminating bad candidates. 12 He 
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proposed creating sixty wards with one alderman each, with each ward 
nominating candidates for its alderman in a primary, and then the entire 
city selecting among the nominees from all wards. The convention tabled 
Revell's plan without debate so it is impossible to know whether they 
rejected it because it was too complicated and necessitated a very long 
ballot at voting time, or perhaps for some other reason. It seems likely 
however; from other debates, that the majority simply preferred a strong 
ward based government. The convention passed a compromise measure to 
redistrict the city into seventy wards with one alderman each. 
A proposal to lengthen aldermanic terms to four years sparked 
sharp disagreement. McCormick, Walter Fisher, and Lessing Rosenthal 
believed this would increase efficiency because aldermen needed time to 
do a good job and the Council needed to serve as long as the Mayor. 13 
Opponents of the proposal, led by James Linehan and Louis Post, feared 
it would lessen the people's control of their elected representatives. 
Linehan viewed the aldermanic election as a referendum.l4 
The people can change their opinion inside of two years; as an 
expression of that change, they would change the great body of 
the aldermen, and that would be sufficient notification to the 
mayor that [a] policy is no longer desirable by the people. On 
12Ibid.' 
13Ib"d -~--, 
December 3, 1906, p. 90 and D-ecember 11, 1906, p. 238-40. 
December ll, 1906, p. 242, 244-46, and 249. 
14Ibid.' p. 243. 
the other hand, if [a] policy is desirable, and the aldermen are 
not supporting the mayor, there will be an opportunity for the 
people to send in someone that will support him. 
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Although Post supported Linehan's position, arguing that the mechanisms 
of popular expression should be as easy as possible to avoid potentially 
violent alternatives such as riots, the proponents of two year terms 
were a minority and the aldermanic term was lengthened. The issue was 
quite controversial and before the convention ended the opponents of the 
four year terms forced the delegates to reconsider the issue. Although 
the vote was much closer this time, the four year term was sustained. 
The disappointed proponents of the two year term remained steadfast in 
their view that "the only excuse an alderman has for existing at all is 
because the people are too numerous to meet; therefore, it is his busi-
ness to reflect the opinion, the desire, and the demand of his constitu-
ents. 1115 
One of the most important changes proposed for the city government 
were those concerning the nomination and election of municipal officers. 
City residents throughout the country were seeking to replace the old 
system of nominating candidates by party convention with a system giving 
voters a more direct voice in the nominating process and thereby making 
political parties more responsible for men they proposed for office. 
Under the prevailing system, party voters first held a "primary" to elect 
a convention of party delegates; these in turn nominated the party's 
candidates for office. Since voters tended to shun this cumbersome 
method, party politicians generally controlled delegate selection and 
voting. Reformers sought to implement either one of two changes: a 
l5.IQig., February 18, 1907, p. 941. 
direct primary nomination wherein party voters directly selected the 
partY candidates, or petition nomination in which anyone securing the 
requisite signatures would be a candidate. The latter method had the 
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attraction, for some of the reformers, of eliminating the party entirely 
. . 1 lit• 1.6 from mun~c~pa po ~cs. 
The citizens of Chicago were virtually unanimous in advocating 
some type of election reform, although their reasons for this varied. 
In 1904 they had endorsed the direct primary method by voting for a 
public policy proposal that the state legislature so amend the state's 
system. 17 The CFL executive committee, just prior to the opening of 
the convention, circulated a resolution to its membership and state 
legislators declaring a direct primary law in Illinois as "essential to 
18 free government and the welfare of the people." The Municipal Voters 
League, midway through the convention, circulated an open letter to the 
voters urging them to work to ensure themselves of more say in nominating 
candidates, through either a petition or a direct primary system. While 
the CFL believed the direct primary was necessary to open up government 
to all citizens, the Voters League worried that the expanded fiscal and 
administrative powers given to the Council by the new charter could in-
creasethe allure of political office to grafters. Thus the League wanted 
to remove the party's control over nominations. 19 
16
see Beard, American City Government, p. 58-62; Charles Merriam, 
Primary Elections (Chicago: 1909), passim. 
17Daily News, Almanac (1905), p. 356. 
18CFL, Minutes, April 15, 1906. 
19Henry B. Favill and George Sikes to Voters of Chicago, January 9, 
1907 in Raymond Robins Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madi-
Son, Wisconsin. 
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The charter gave Chicago the opportunity to change the municipal 
election procedure without tvaiting for the legislature. The convention 
Committee on Elections recommended that candidates for city offices be 
nominated by the petition of qualified voters~ but it also submitted a 
minority proposal for a system of direct primaries. Fisher favored 
nomination by petition precise~ because it would remove the established 
parties from local elections. He believed that national party politics 
intruded into municipal affairs and that municipal parties~ whose sole 
concern was the city~ would handle city problems more efficiently and 
intelligent~. 20 
Although Fisher's position was popular among urban reformers of 
the period~ the majority of the convention delegates feared the power 
of special interest groups to select their candidates under a petition 
system more than they feared political parties. Delegate R.A. White 
cautioned that the large corporations would turn the petition method to 
their advantage and observed "that a man who seeks nomination by peti-
tion~ if he has plenty of wealth for instance~ will certain~ have an 
advantage over the man who has little or no wealth. 1121 The delegates 
rejected the petition method and adopted the direct primary with on~ 
four dissenting votes. The majority of the delegates so favored elec-
tion reform that those backing the petition method endorsed the direct 
primary method after losing their proposal. George Cole epitomized 
their situation when voting for the direct primary he declared 11 If I 
can't get a whole loaf, I believe in taking a half a loaf. , • 1122 . 
2
°Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 3, 1906, p. 102-104. 
21Ibid. , p. 98-99 and 101. 
22Ibid., p. 111. 
The Committee on Elections also recommended removing the party 
designation from the ballot and simply printing the names of all candi-
dates under the office for which they were running. A typical ballot 
at this time was arranged by "party column" with a "party circle" at 
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the top which voters could check to vote a straight party ticket. Ac-
cording to Merriam and Fisher this kind of ballot was another peculiar 
American innovation which discouraged independent voting and provided 
yet another means for national parties to control municipal elections. 23 
Few of the delegates agreed with Merriam and Fisher however~ some of 
them observing that while there was no need to facilitate straight par-
ty voting, intelligent voting did require knowing a candidate 1 s party. 24 
These men proposed~ instead~ to eliminate the party circle and column 
but to print the party affiliation after each candidate 1 s n8IIle. The 
majority agreed with this compromise. 
In this matter of party identification on the ballot the conven-
tion members appeared neither unduly afraid of the influence and power 
of Chicago's political parties, nor committed to the principal of non-
partisan politics; before the complete charter was drafted they even 
voted to reinsert the party column. Fisher reproached his colleagues 
for drafting a charter with few items of substantial progress in muni-
cipal affairs and when they reinserted the party column he rebuked them 
for striking out "the one section with regard to election reform that 
this Convention did make any progress with regard too u25 It was little 
23Ibid., December 4~ 1906, p. 120-21 and 124-25o 
24
rbid. , p. 119-20, 122-23, and 127-28 o 
25 Ibid.~ February 16, 1907, Po 881-82. 
consolation to Fisher when the delegates stopped an attempt supported 
almost exclusively by the professional politicians in their midst~ to 
delete any ballot modifications from the charter altogether. 
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Once these various changes to Chicago 1 s internal government were 
agreed upon~ the convention turned its attention to the relationship of 
the city and state. Home rule had been a strong motive behind the char-
ter reform movement~ and because a new charter would supersede the 1872 
incorporation act many believed that the delegates could redefine the 
balance of powers between the city and the state if they so chose. Yet 
agreement on this issue was not easily reached. While most Chicagoans 
agreed they wanted more home rule, their reasons for· desiring it varied 
and they disagreed on how extensive it should be and on how much author-
ity the city had in defining its own home rule powers. Since the City 
Council was designated the. supreme legislative body of the city by the 
new charter, the battle over home rule was fought over the statement on 
the powers of the Council. 
The outside pressure put on the delegates over this issue illumi-
nates the disagreements over home rule. The CFL had aJready declared 
that home rule was the most crucial feature of the new charter, In 
early 1905, immediately after ratification of the enabling amendment, 
the CFL had adopted a resolution calling for a strong home rule charter 
which would grant the city complete control of its streets, public 
utilities, franchises, street railways, municipal services, and all 
purely local government and business affairs without any interference 
or control by the state legislature. It conceded to state interests 
only in areas of safety, health, and the general commerce and communi-
cation of the state. 26 Labor demanded that the charter specifically 
grant this home rule power to the City Council, and that the specific 
grant be reinforced by strong home rule statements in the charter's 
various provisions. 
Before the convention had even met, Alderman Edward Cullerton 
(D-llth) had presented a strong home rule charter plan to the City 
Council. Cullerton proposed to reverse state domination of local 
governments by giving Chicago complete power to conduct its local as 
well as not purely local affairs, except as expressly forbidden by the 
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state or federal constitutions. To ensure this home rule power, Culler-
ton's plan also provided that in the event of any legal doubt, the spe-
cific case should always be decided in favor of Chicago.27 The City 
Council tabled this proposal but several days later the Chicago Socialist 
published a copy of what it called the Socialists' Proposed Charter 
which demanded many of the same things. 28 
The United Societies, immediately following its organization, de-
cided to use the charter to sever the state legislature's control over 
liquor regulation and municipal affairs in general. It submitted a 
broad home rule resolution to the convention asking that the charter 
vest the City Council With "all powers of local legislation which may 
under the constitution be v~sted in a municipality. 1129 The Societies 
believed it had a vital interest in this matter. It contended that 
26
cFL, Minutes, January 8, 1905. 
27 Chic ago, Journal of the City C.:>uncil, January 2, 1906, p. 2014-20. 
28Chicago Socialist, January 10, 1906. 
29
charter Convention, Proceedings, December 6, 1906, p, 190. 
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there was a grave danger of prohibition if the charter failed to con-
tain a provisions about liquor regulation. Lega.ll;y, the city would re-
main bound by any general state laws which were not specifically nulli-
fied by the new charter. Because a new charter would supersede the 1872 
incorporation act--the law which provided the legal loophole for munici-
palities to regulate liquor themselves-the general law on Sunday clos-
ings, as well as any future laws on liquor regulation would be applied 
in Chicago. 
The Societies therefore requested that the charter specifically 
vest the City Council with sole power to regulate Sunday, and the sale 
of liquor at social gatherings and entertainments. The Societies em-
phasized that such a provision mere~ legalized the prevailing customs 
and would reflect, it believed, the sentiments of four-fifths of the 
COIIliJlunity. 30 
On the other side of the temperance issue, delegate Bennett 
offered a counter resolution. He proposed that nothing in the charter 
give the City Council power to modify, impair, or conflict with the 
state laws regulating the sale of liquor.31 The organization of Chicago 
Methodist Episcopal Preachers dispatched a letter to the convention en-
dorsing Bennett's resolution and declaring that their congregations 
"desire the Charter to be proposed in such a form that they can give it 
their heartiest support, with the assurances that the moral interests of 
Chicago are safeguarded thereby. n32 
30Ibid. 
31Ibid., December 3, 1906, p. 114. 
32
rbid., December 10, 1906, p. 2J8. 
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Instead of addressing these demands, the delegates debated the 
legalities of home rule. According to Joseph O'Donnell the correct 
interpretation of the 1904 enabling amendment was that it now allowed 
Chicago to substitute local and special legislation of its own for gen-
eral state laws, and he was dismayed that the convention did not seem 
to want to take advantage of this freedom. David Shanahan (a state 
legislator) on the other hand, contended that the amendment merely gave 
the state legislature authority to pass special legislation for Chicago, 
and warned that the General Assembly would not pass a charter in which 
Chicago attempted to assert its authority in this area. The convention 
majority agreed with Shanahan and adopted a weak home rule provision 
which specified that the city did not intend to assume any home rule 
powers which conflicted with any general state law. Moreover, the 
charter acknowledged the superior legal position of the state by be-
stowing on Chicago only those municipal powers which "can be constitu-
tionally delegated to it by the legislatureo rr33 The convention then 
deferred considering the question of liquor regulation until same future 
session. 
This action truly alarmed the United Societies which believed 
that prohibition was virtually certain under this provision once the 
new charter nullified the 1872 incorporation act. The group immediately 
petitioned the convention to reconsider the general home rule provisions 
and to provide home rule on liquor, and it accused delegates Bennett and 
B.W. Snow, who were leading the fight against the latter, of collusion 
33Ibid., December 13, 1906, p. 296 and 298. 
with statewide temperance forces. 34 This weak home rule clause ob-
viously contravened the wishes of several groups in the city and the 
consequences of this action would be felt during the subsequent rati-
fication campaign. 
As the convention progressed formidable pressure from outside 
and sharp differences of opinion among the delegates complicated the 
convention's work. Agreement proved difficult to reach on the issues 
which had become increasingly controversial among the citizens: direct 
popular democracy, municipal ownership, the school system, and others. 
For ease in exposition these issues will be discussed one at a time. 
Direct Damocr acy 
Many Chicagoans wanted a greater share and more direct control 
over their city government through the power to initiate legislation 
and to approve legislation by popular referendum. In 1902 and 1904 
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the voters had approved public policy referenda on these questions35 and 
the CFL and Socialists now fought to include the initiative and refer-
endum in the charter. The CFL adamantly maintained that a charter without 
these reforms was not a home rule charter and that it would urge its 
membership to oppose such a charter. The Socialists demanded the refer-
endum, initiative, and recall-in fact the explicit aim of their proposed 
charter was to implement extensive popular control of the municipal 
government.36 
34ill.f!., December 26, 1906, p. 712-14; Abendpost, December 22, 1906o 
35see above, Chapter 3, p. 68. 
36
cFL, Minutes, December 2, 1906; the Socialist, January lD, 1906. 
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The delegates divided sharply on this issuej while most expressed 
support for the principle of more direct popular government they dis-
agreed on how easy and extensive to make this, and whether some legis-
lation, for example the granting of franchises, could be enacted on~ 
after a popular vote was taken. Delegates Snow and B.A. Eckhart wanted 
a conservative referendum measure. They proposed that the signatures 
of twenty-five percent of the voters be required in order "to show that 
a very respectable minority of the people" supported the calling of a 
referendum. Although few of the other delegates wanted to require that 
high a percentage of signatures, they rejected a motion to set the number 
at fifteen percent.37 
The proponents of a low percentage requirement accused their opposi-
tion of paying only lip service to the principle and attempting to pla-
cate the people by including some provision for referendum while setting 
the requirements impossibly high. Raymond Robins declared it was a 
question "of a real referendum or of a sham referendumj a power that can 
really be exercised, or one that is prepared for the purpose of its not 
being exercised. 11 Siding with Robins was Joseph O'Donnell who main-
tained that the high percentage favored the "public utility franchise-
seeking corporations that have done their best to kill Chicago. 11 But 
even the observation of Charles Merriam that if a question was so impor-
tant that it could secure fifty or sixty thousand votes (approximately 
fifteen percent) it was unfair to require more failed to persuade the 
opponents of the fifteen percent requirement and the convention adjourned 
37charter Convention, Proceedings, December 17, 1906, po 378-79 
and 388. 
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for the day without resolving the issue. 38 
During the convention's tenure, the people were kept well-informed 
of its daily proceedings: at least one of the newspapers could be relied 
on to report the debates and decisions of the day, and the convention 
members themselves frequently apprised interested groups of the status 
of specific issues. Hence groups outside the convention were generally 
able to respond quickly to the action of the convention. In this case 
the CFL immediately put more pressure on the convention to pass a lenient 
initiative and referendum clause. It sent a letter to the convention 
demanding that the charter set only a five percent ceiling for both the 
initiative and referendum "in accordance with the expressed will of the 
people" as shown by the votes taken in 1902 and 1904. These reforms were 
absolutely necessary, wrote the CFL, to bring democracy to Chicago and 
stop the "vulgar aristocracy" from rurming things to suit itself .39 The 
CFL did not make the most radical demands on this issue. The Socialists 
wanted the charter to require only a flat ten thousand signatures for 
both the initiative and referendum. 40 When the convention reconvened 
James Linehan proposed the five percent limit but the delegates defeated 
this and instead adopted a limit of twenty percent. 
The handling of initiative and referendum was typical of the con-
vention's attitude toward popular democracy. In general, the delegates 
preferred to let elected officials decide policy and extended few deci-
sian-making powers to the citizens. The convention never contemplated 
38Ibid., p. 379, 385, and 386. 
39Ibid., December 17, 1906, p. 406; CFL, Minutes, December 16, 1906. 
40chicago Socialist, January 1D, 1906. 
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instituting the recall which was a major component of popular govern-
ment reforms elsewhere. It also refused to provide the power to initiate 
legislation--the twenty percent limit was solely for referendum--, 
restricted the referendum to ordinances granting franchises, and re-
jected a proposal to require a mandatory city-wide referendum on fran-
chises granted for over five years. At its final session the delegates 
reconsidered the referendum issue and voted to lower the signature 
limit to ten percent. Those men who had previously rejected ten percent 
as too high now accepted it as the best they could get, and those who 
had favored twenty percent now believed that other safeguards in the 
charter adequately protected the city against unreasonable referenda. 
Some of the delegates protested to the end against any extension of 
direct democracy, warning that it was foolhardy to allow foreign voters 
(i.e.the immigrants) to decide on questions they did not understando4l 
Municipal Services 
No issue was more volatile and controversial in cities in the early 
twentieth century than that of providing and maintaining municipal serv-
ice-s, and Chicago, as has been seen, was no exceptiono Chicagoans were 
demanding change in the methods of granting franchises to street rail-
ways and public utilities with many citizens actively promoting munici-
pal ownership; various groups in the city were debating priorities and 
goals in recreation and the hiring and firing of city employees 0 De-
spite the debate over these issues in the city, however, the convention 
had little problem deciding what it wanted in the charter. 
4lcharter Convention, Proceedings, December 17, 1906, p. 417-1.8o 
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The convention decisive~ rejected the calls for complete munici-
pal ownership" Instead, it took Walter Fisher's advice that adequate 
and effective public control and regulation would eliminate existing in-
tolerable public utility abuses, while abating popular desire for total 
public ownership and operation. 42 The delegates therefore extended the 
Mueller Law to cover all utilities and strengthened the city's power 
to regulate rates charged by utilities, and forbade the City Council 
ever to limit or grant away this right. They also accepted Post 's 
amendment to substitute a simple majority vote for the three-fifths 
vote required by the Mueller Law, although several delegates objected. 
Bennett opposed the lower total because it made municipal ownership 
easier to institute. In debating this issue he, and others, once again 
voiced their fears of popular decision~aking, predicting that there 
would all;ays be a 11 large percentage of the unthinking part of the popu-
lation that \•TOuld always be ready to vote on anything that would change 
the existing conditions. u43 
Having decided ear~ in its deliberations to consolidate the parks 
with the city government, the convention also had to decide how the 
parks were to be administered under the new charter. Instead of the 
existing system of three park boards, each levying its own taxes and 
controlling all park land within its district, the proposed charter ere-
ated a City Department of Parks overseen by a Board of Park Commissioners 
appointed by the Mayor; the City Council was granted power to levy and 
42walter L. Fisher to John V. Farwell, February lJ, l906, Walter 
L. Fishe~ Papers. 
77. 
43charter Convention, Proceedings, March l, l907, p. ll74 and ll76-
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distribute tax revenues and issue bonds for park purposes, enact all 
necessary rules and regulations for governing and protecting parks, and 
with the two-third consent of the Board, discontinue, acquire, or alter 
any public park property. There was almost no dissent within the conven-
tion on this issue and most discussion centered around whether the Mayor, 
Governor, or Appellate Court Judges would appoint the Commissioners. The 
majority agreed that mayoral appointment was the only way consistent with 
home rule. 44 
The convention modified the city's existing civil service system 
in one significant way: it empowered department heads to remove any em-
ployee with a formal hearing for any cause "which will promote the effi-
ciency of the service. 1145 While accepting this provision because it 
promised increased efficiency, the delegates rejected two other proposals 
which supposedly would have brought more efficiency into the government. 
First they placed the employees of the new municipal court system under 
civil service, in spite of the plea from delegate Snow that these people 
needed to be chosen and retained for their responsibility, judgment, and 
honesty and this could be accomplished better outside of civil service. 
Second, they refused to make the bailiff and chief clerk of the municipal 
court appointed offices. In this last decision the majority of delegates 
were still feeling optimistic about the voters' ability to elect good men 
to municipal offices--an optimism generated by the cleaned-up Council.46 
44Ibid., December 15, 1906, p. 363-66. 
45Ibid.' November .30, 1906, P· 52. 
46Ibid., December 6, 1906, p. 157, 162 and 185. 
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The delegates clear J.y lmew what they wanted to do about public 
utilities, parks, and civil service and they adopted these sections with 
little dissent o Their unity, however, did not reflect accurately senti-
ment throughout the city. The delegates misunderstood the extent of 
opposing opinions on these issues, and they were to become important 
issues in the referendum campaign. 
Schools 
The convention did have greater difficulty handling the charter's 
education section. Schools were an emotional and divisive issue. Par-
ents wanted some voice in their childrens 1 education; taxp~ers wanted 
assurances that their money was properly spent; teachers and educators 
held their own ideas of the proper priorities of education, and teachers 
sought to protect and better their own places in the system. Education 
also divided people philosophically between those who thought it most 
important to make schools accountable to the citizens as a logical ex-
tension of popular democracy and those who believed that the efficacy 
and democracy of the school system depended primarily on fiscal and ad-
ministrative efficiency. Realistically, everyone worried about who con-
trolled the school system and in the convention education became a test 
of power among various groups in the city. 
In early October of 1906 the Merchants 1 Club asked that their com-
mittee on education be allowed to assist the convention's education com-
mittee in drafting the charter provisions to organize Chicago's schools 
on a "rational and business-like basis. 1147 This request evoked an out-
47
rbid., October 3, 1906, p. 2 
pouring of criticism and counter demands. The Public charged that 
businessmen were attempting to run the schools by "business methods" 
which really meant despotic rule by the Superintendent. Speaking at a 
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special meeting of the CFL called to discuss the education issue, Louis 
Post accused the convention of designing an educational system 11drawn 
up by a few members of the Merchants' Club in a back room of the Union 
League Club" who were "attempting through the proposed charter to wrest 
the control of the public schools from the people. u48 Margaret Dreier 
Robins, a prominent member of the Chicago Women 1 s Trade Union League 
was so alarmed by the situation that· she wrote to Lincoln Steffens 
asking him to come to Chicago to e:xpose the plotting of businessmen 
to take over the schools. 49 "Mass meetings are called by these rever-
end gentlemen 'to consider the crisis in the public schools'," she 
wrote Steffens 
a~d a petition has been signed by Mr. Gustavus Swift, packer, and 
others to be sent to the Charter Convention 11to curb the power of 
the School Board". The Merchants' Club is preparing a "ripper" 
bill to present to the next legislature to legislate the present 
school Board out of existence •••• Why have all the privileged in-
terests of the city combined to make this attack and make it so 
venomously? ··· 
The CFL joined the protest and wrote a letter to the convention 
reminding the delegates that the voters had approved a public policy 
proposal to elect the Board of Education and demanding that the charter 
provide for electing school board members, paying them an adequate 
48The Public, November 17, 1906; CFL, Minutes, December 2, 1906. 
49Mary E. Dreier, Margaret Dreier Robins: Her Life, Letters, and 
(New York: 1950), p. 96. 
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salarY, and vesting full control of the public schools in their hands 
and not the Superintendent 1 s. The CFL promised to 
resist by every honorable means any attempt of any and all in-· 
terests and influences to take away the control of the Chicago 
school system from the people of Chicago •••• and to stand opposed 
to any measure ••• that would place the educational system of Chicago 
in the hands and under the control of one man .•• 
and warned the convention it would accept nothing less than these 
demands. 50 
The convention's Committee on Education drafted a lengthy article 
on education, and the delegates deliberated this in light of the vari-
ous proposals they had received. The debates over this education arti-
cle reflected the citiz.ens' conflicts on this issue. From the beginning 
of the debates, however, the majority of the delegates made the adminis-
trative efficiency of the schools their top priority. Speaking for 
the members of the education committee, Graham Taylor explained that 
their education article embodied sufficiently detailed specifications 
to "assure administrative efficiency. 11 He dismissed the CFL' s letter 
as "right in theory but inefficient ••• and nothing can be worse for de-
mocracy than inefficiency. "5l 
Raymond Robins immediately offered an amendment to replace the 
mayoral appointment of the Board of Education with popular election, and 
this issue set a standard for the remaining debates on education. The 
delegates' ideas of the role and function of the Board affected their 
50Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 20, 1906, p. 561. In 
1904 the voters approved the idea of an elected school board by a margin 
of over two to one. Daily News, Almanac (1905), p. 385. 
51
charter Convention, Proceedings, December 20, 1906, p. 562 and 
votes on other school issues and their arguments reveal a resolute 
separation between those advocating efficiency and expertise and those 
favoring more popular control of municipal affairs. In general, dele-
gates voting for popular election tended to vote in favor of placing 
more power in the hands of the Board than the Superintendent, guaran-
teeing teacher salaries, and reducing the number of school board mem-
bers. 
Though each side argued that its method of selecting the school 
board protected the board from partisan party politics the true issue 
was who controlled the board. In fact it was somewhat ludicrous for 
lll 
delegates Revell and Raymer to suggest to the convention that electing 
school board members by petition nomination--the only method proposed--
would open the school system to party politics when this same method 
had been advocated to remove party politics from all municipal elections.52 
Post and Robins, on the other side, believed an elected board reflected 
the will of the community and kept special interests from seizing con-
trol of education. Others assumed certain special interests ought to 
be in charge of the schools and that the city could only get that "class 
of men tt by appointment and not be election. 53 
When the convention rejected the proposal for an elected school 
board Louis Post attempted to counter the drift toward efficiency by 
introducing two amendments aimed at dispersing power within the school 
system to make it more democratic and aimed at treating teachers as the 
real experts on education. First he proposed giving the school board 
52Ibid., p. 570-71. 
53Ibid., p. 569, 572-74, and 575. 
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rather than the Superintendent the power to introduce textbooks~ and 
to appoint~ promote and transfer teachers and principals. Second~ he 
proposed that the charter firmly protect the position of teachers with-
in the system by giving them direct access to the Board with their 
suggestions on education and by guaranteeing that their salaries would 
never be reduced during their tenure in the system. Post made these 
proposals because he concurred with the CFL's fear of giving one person 
too much control~ and his tenure as a school board member had convinced 
him that differing ideas could be represented there and perhaps heeded. 54 
The convention defeated both of these amendments~ also rejecting 
delegate White's proposal that the Board be able to remove the Superin-
tendent by a majority and not a two-thirds vote. In so doing~ the con-
vention confirmed its desire to have a strong Superintendent of Educa-
tion, independent of the Board and not subject to removal~ as one dele-
gate put it, by the "whim or caprice of a majority."55 
The convention did stop short of regarding efficiency and ~~er-
tise as the ruling criteria of public education. Delegate R~er pro-
posed reducing the Board from fifteen to nine members because a smaller 
Board would transact better the "business of education." Robins la-
mented this tendency to view business efficiency as the supreme func-
tion of the Board of Education and suggested the Board had to "be in 
touch with the people's interests because education is the hope of the 
54.rhe Public, November 17, 1906; Post~ "Living a Long Life Over~" 
p. 351. Post thought it only fair to guarantee teacher salaries since 
the charter 1 s education provision included a clause guaranteeing the 
salaries of school system officers. 
55charter Convention~ Proceedings, Dece~ber 26, 1906, p. 718 and 
722; D•3cember 22, p. 675; February 25 ~ 1907, Po JD81-84. 
people and the hope of society." Although they had turned down an 
elected school board, the majority of the delegates sympathized wit~ 
Robins on this issue. They believed that once the proper people had 
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been appointed, the Board did represent the community interest and that 
a larger board could more thoroughly investigate the educational needs 
of the entire community. 56 Therefore the delegates voted to reject 
the proposal to reduce the size of the Board. 
The last issue which the convention had to consider on the school 
system was Linehan's proposal to pay the board members $2500 a year to 
make it financially feasible for more citizens to serve on the Board. 
The existing school board served without pay, and--as Louis Post had al-
ready realized personally--serving on the Board could be an economic 
hardship for anyone without a lot of spare time and money. 57 B.A. Eckhart 
protested this proposal, saying that people willing to serve out of 
public experience and civic pride would produce a more capable board, 
while other delegates worried that paid positions would turn into polit-
ical plums.58 Linehan attacked the idea of the worthiness of civic pride 
as a blatant attempt to keep the board in control of only those who were 
wealthy enough to afford serving without pay. Why, he asked was the great 
civic pride of a millionaire without children "any more worthy of recog-
nition than the pride of the workmen, who supply all the children and all 
the money for the maintenance of the public institutions of this city"; 
56Ibid., December 21, 1906, p. 608-13, 614-16, and 617. 
57 Post, 11Living a Long Life Over, 11 p. 294. 
58charter Convention, Proceedings, December 21, 1906, p. 620 and 
622; February 25, 1907, p. 1065. 
or why was the businessman who has spent his life chasing the "al-
mighty dollar 11 of sounder character to serve on the Board ?59 Robins 
supported Linehan's proposal as a way to make the Board more respon-
sible to the people whose taxes paid their salary. 
The delegates opposed this matter less vigorously than the elec-
ted school board--perhaps feeling that if they were on the Board they 
would like to get paid-but they did not pass this amendment. No one 
questioned the city's financial ability to pay the Board, and since the 
convention subsequently passed a resolution allowing the City Council 
to pass an ordinance to this effect, it does not seem likely that money 
was the reason for the delegate's refusal to concur with paying the 
school board members. 60 More probably, they agreed with Eckhart's 
notion of civic pride and civic duty, and some undoubtedly believed 
that the wrong class of citizens could be kept off of the Board if 
there was no remuneration for serving. 
Municipal Revenues 
Not surprisingly, revenue was an important and contentious issue 
in the charter convention. The delegates worried abo1,1t the correct in-
terpretation of the enabling amendment and just how much freedom it gave 
them to change the existing governmental and revenue structures. They 
professed to trust their strong city council government, but they hesi-
tated giving it anything other than explicit powers. They were often 
uncertain on how to protect the rights of property owners while making 
Chicago a good, safe, healthy place to live. As a result they chose not 
59Ibid., December 21, 1906, p. 622-24o 
60 Ibid. , February 25, 1907, p. 1067. 
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to make a strong bid for extensive home rule, instead maintaining the 
framework of the existing municipal revenue system and simply and cau-
tiously revising its internal operations. 
From the beginning of the convention a few delegates worked to 
secure complete home rule powers for Chicago in determining its revenue 
system. When the Committee on Municipal Taxation and Revenue proposed 
sections itemizing allowable tax rates, types of permissible taxes, and 
the taxing powers of the City Council, Post, Linehan, and Joseph Patter-
son proposed that the charter simply vest in the Council power to raise 
revenue for municipal purposes. 61 Post argued that the 1904 amendment 
intended Chicago to have full powers of governing itself on taxation, 
and thus his proposal was not only sensible, but also assured the city 
of fiscal home rule. 62 As a check against abuse of this power by the 
Council, the three men recommended that the charter provide for manda-
tory vetoes by popular referendum on all subjects regarding revenue. 63 
This proposition must have caused violent shuddering among many of the 
delegates; it was hardly the way to achieve business-like efficiency in 
city government. Merriam declared that he himself regaraed "certain 
financial restrictions and limitations and safeguards upon the power of 
the city as essential," and that efficient home rule necessitated fixed 
61Ib"d 
_1._., October 3, 1906, p. 7-8. 
62IQig_., December l8, 1906, p. 467. The exact wording of the amend-
ment allowed the General Assembly to pass "any law providing a scheme or 
charter of local municipal government ••• and [such law or laws] may pro-
vide for the assessment of property and the levy and collection of taxes 
within said city for corporate purposes.,. 11 The convention members dis-
agreed on the interpretation of this clause. 
63charter Convention, Proceedings, October 3, 1906, p. 8. 
statuatory limits on bonded indebtedness, taxing rates, and other fi-
nancial powers of the city. 64 The overwhelming majority of the dele-
gates agreed with Merriam and easily defeated this proposal. They did 
not want a municipal revenue system which carried home rule and direct 
democracy to their ultimate conclusions. 
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While the delegates acknowledged the state's authority to set tax 
rates and limits on municipal indebtedness, many believed the city needed 
at least to replace the system by which the Cook County Board of Asses-
sors determined the value of city property. Merriam, in his exhaustive 
report on Chicago's municipal revenues for the City Club, concluded that 
the charter needed to replace this county system with a city tax system, 
and he joined Post, Linehan, and Patterson in proposing this to the con-
vention.65 Merriam believed this change would guarantee both efficiency 
and home rule o He argued that Chicago could only control its revenue 
system if it controlled its taxation; for example, if the city could 
raise its·property valuation it would be able to borrow more money and 
perhaps simultaneously lower the tax rate, saving Chicagoans from higher 
taxes. Merriam believed this method would insure adequate funds for 
municipal expenses, make the city government primarily responsible and 
accountable to its citizens for its expenditures, and effect municipal 
home rule. To support his position he reminded the convention that 
Chicago had a city tax system prior to the incorporation act of 1872, 
and that all large cities in the United States controlled their own 
tax assessment, collection, and distribution o James Linehan put the 
64
rbid., December 18, 1906, p. 468. 
65Ib"d 
_1._., October 3, 1906, p. 8. 
more simply, declaring he supported the proposal because it was "a 
matter of home rule ••• shall ninety-two percent of the voting people do 
the assessing or shall eight percent ••• u66 
ll? 
The convention did not agree and quickly defeated the proposition, 
although the delegates raised minimal objections. McCormick protested 
that "raising valuation to raise money is dishonest" but offered no 
substantive argument against the principle or efficiency of a city tax 
system.. Frank Shepard opposed the change on the grounds that it would 
another taxing body--an anathema to many proponents of municipal effi-
ciency--but no other delegates voiced support for his reasoning. 67 
The reasons for the defeat of a city tax system lay in other areas than 
the objections of McCormick and Shepard. 
Political maneuvering undoubtedly played a role. All ten of the 
appointees of the state legislature who were present voted against the 
proposal, as did Shepard, an appointee of the County Board of Commission-
ers--this Board of course stood to lose a substantial degree of power 
if Chicago was granted its own tax system. However, the primary reason 
why most of the delegates refused to create a city tax system was that 
they thought consolidation itself would produce a more efficient munici-
pal revenue system and provide adequate means for raising more money. 
Consolidation automatically increased the city's bonding power to five 
percent of full property valuation and its tax leVY to five percent of 
assessed valuation. 
66Merriam, Municipal Revenues, p. 94-95; Charter Convention, Pro 
ceedings, December 19, 1906, p. 526-28, December 20, p. 559. 
67Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 19, 1906, p. 528-30, 
December 20, p. 558-61. 
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Once they had decided to rely on consolidation as the primary 
means to achieve fiscal reform the delegates needed to devise a new 
system under which the city would control all property tax revenue and 
the issuing of bonds~ and the disbursement of these funds. The majority 
quickly agreed that the City Council determine annually the respective 
amounts levied for corporate~ park~ school~ and library purposes from 
the five percent tax on the city's assessed property valuation, as well 
as issue~ disburse, and repay municipal bonds. They particularly liked 
the flexibility of this system because unlike the prevailing one it al-
lowed the city to vary its expenditures from year to year according to 
68 
where the money was needed most. 
The convention was not unanimous, however; some members were skep-
tical of leaving the levies unspecified. To guarantee that schools would 
be adequately financed Post, Robins, and White-all members of the Board 
of Education-presented a~ amendment to set a minimum amount which would 
be appropriated yearly for school expenses. Their experience on the 
school board had made them wary of trusting politicians too far when it 
came to running the schools. Post and Robins in particular thought that 
in the absence of any significant popular control over the Council's 
actions, the charter needed to set more specific limitations on the 
Council's fiscal prerogatives. 69 Delegates Cole, Hoyne, and Bennett on 
the other hand believed that the system of unspecified levies was much 
more efficient and the convention easily defeated the amendment. 70 
68Ib.d -~_., December l8, 1906, P· 464. 
69Ibid.' February 25, 1907' p. 1044.-48, and 1050-51. 
70Ib"d -~_., p. 1046, and 1049-52. 
The final revenue question considered by the convention was the 
problem of special licenses and assessments. In preceding years, the 
city had relied more and more on these taxes to supplement its other 
inadequate tax and bond revenues, and the citizens complained bitterly 
about these added burdens. The delegates believed that the license 
ll9 
taxes were vital and a fair exchange for privileges received from the 
city. Although John Shedd, vice-president of Marshall Field's, protested 
that the city had no power to do so, the convention authorized the 
Council to impose such a tax on any trade, business, or occupation in 
the city and on all persons, firms, or corporations holding franchises 
from the city. The delegates also agreed to impose a tax on all wheeled 
vehicles operating within the city.7l 
The question of special assessments to p~ for local improvements 
was more troublesome and the convention refused to extend the City 
Council's unlimited power to levy such taxes. As property owners many 
of the convention members wanted to relieve themselves and their fellow 
property owners of some of this burden and therefore they put a ceiling 
on special assessments. What this ceiling should be prompted some dis-
agreement among the delegates. Pointing out that people from all over 
the city used the streets, Smulski and O'Donnell wanted no special 
assessment after the first improvement. B.A. Eckhart supported this in 
theory, but suggested that realistically the cost had to be divided, 
perhaps with the city p~g seventy-five percent and the property owner 
the remaining twenty-five percent. While there was a great deal of sup-
port for reducing the property owner's share, most of the delegates had 
71Ibida, October 3, 1906, p. 9, December 1.8, p. 470o 
to agree with Bernard Sunny that it was "theoretically right but fi-
nancially impractical" for the city to pay the seventy-five percent. 
Merriam offered what he thought was the most practical compromise: 
property owners would only be assessed for fifty percent of the cost 
after the first improvement. The delegates agreed to this compromise 
for two reasons. First because it relieved the burden of property 
owners while protecting property values--they all acknowledged that 
unimproved streets depressed property values. Secondly, because they 
were willing to concede that the city could not pay the entire cost of 
improvements and without special assessments the citizens would be re-
duced to fighting for available funds.72 
The debate over special assessments is indicative of the limited 
l20 
constituency of the convention, for the delegates clearly concerned them-
selves only with the burdens of property. Only Louis Post seriously 
asked how special assessments affected the maj.ority of Chicagoans--the 
renters. Post wanted the convention to devise a method of prohibiting 
the property owners from passing their special assessment costs on to 
their tenants. After all, he argued, if the owners were the ones bene-
fitting financially, why should the tenants pay? Furthermore, Post be-
lieved that the property owners should pay a special tax against any fi-
nancial benefits which they gained from local improvements. 73 The 
convention supported neither of Post's positions, and not even Post con-
templated how to make non-resident property owners pay for street im-
72Ibid., December 18, 1906, p. 471-76, and 481. 
73rb.;d.' 478-80 d LeY! 
_._ p. 'an '+'-'r· 
provements, although recent investigations of city street conditions 
had questioned the adequacy and fairness of a situation in which poor 
renters could not afford, and absentee landlords refused to pay for 
street improvements. 74 
In general the convention respected the rights of property. It 
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limited the special assessment taxes and defeated a motion to repeal the 
municipal ordinance requiring frontage consents from property owners as 
a prior condition for granting franchises. Proponents of repeal had 
spoken of placing the general good before the desires of individual 
property owners, but the majority disagreed with this position.75 On 
one issue though the delegates switched their thinking. The new charter 
empowered the City Council to enforce tenement ordinances by making rea-
sonable repairs and then charging the owner, if the owner refused to make 
the repairs after adequate notification by the city. A few delegates 
protested that this was an arbitrary violation of property rights and 
at tempted to delete this section from the charter. Ra.Ymond Robins 
strongly supported the proposal arguing that tenants had a right to de-
cent housing and the city a responsibility to provide it. The votes 
on previous issues suggest however that most of the delegates were moved 
more by Merriam's argument that this provision was essential to protect 
the city's health conditions. On this issue the general good apparently 
prevailed over property rights because it was easier for the delegates 
to see that unhealthy, unsanitary housing posed potential dangers to the 
74rfunter, Tenement Conditions in Chicago, p. ll6. 
75charter Convention, Proceedings, December 14, 1906, p. 338-39. 
whole city than to accept that the general welfare demanded the repeal 
76 
of frontage consents. 
Woman Suffrage 
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The convention saved two controversial issues for lasto The first 
was the question of giving women the municipal franchise. Many women in 
the city wanted to vote in municipal elections as did women throughout 
the country at this time.77 Some women believed they should have the 
municipal franchise because municipal problems resembled the problems 
in the home and family; keeping a city clean, healthy, and running 
smoothly, they argued, was similar to managing a house and family and who 
understood these problems better than women? Women who owned property 
believed it only just that they have a voice in deciding tax and property 
matters, while working women sought the vote to help protect their work-
ing conditions. 
In Chicago several groups urged the convention to include municipal 
suffrage for women in the new charter. The Women 1 s Trade Union League 
endorsed municipal suffrage "that the women working in our city may 
better protect their labor," and requested the CFL to work to get this 
put into the charter. 78 The prestigious Chicago Woman 1 s Club sent its 
members a letter informing them of the possibility of securing the fran-
chise through the new charter and asked them to do whatever they could to 
76~., February 23, 1907, p. 1015-17. 
77Aileen Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-
1920 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 3-4. 
78CFL, Minutes, April 1, 1906. 
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help accomplish this. 79 Jane Addams headed a federation of one hundred 
women 1 s organizations pursuing suffrage and the variety of women seeking 
the vote and their reasons impressed her. 80 
We were joined •• oby organizations of working women who had keenly 
felt the need of the municipal franchise in order to secure for 
their workshops the most rudimentary sanitation ••• by federations 
of mothers 1 meetings, who were interested in clean milk and the 
extension of kindergartens ••• by property-owning women, who had 
been powerless to protest against unjust taxation; by organiza-
tions of professional women, of university students, and of col-
legiate alumnae; by women's clubs interested in municipal reforms ••• 
Addams herself believed that the "government of the city is now merely 
enlarged housekeeping. u81 The investigations of her Hull-House Women's 
Club into garbage, street cleaning, and other sanitation problems had 
effectuated the only improvements in the neighborhood's conditions, and 
helped convince her that women better understood certain municipal prob-
lems. The experience also persuaded her that voluntary efforts were in-
sufficient and needed to be reinforced with political power. When groups 
of immigrant women from the Hull-House neighborhood told Addams they 
wanted the right to vote, she believed that "the time must be ripe for 
political expression of that public concern on the part of women which 
had so long been forced to seek indirection. 11 She urged the men to 
give women the "opportunity to cooperate directly in civic life through 
the use of the ballot in regard to their own affairs. 1182 
79Chicago Woman 1 s Club, Minutes of Board Meetings, September 26, 
1906, in Chicago Woman 1 s Club Papers, Chicago Historical Society. 
80 Addams, p. 237. 
8laecord-Herald, March 7, 1906. This was in a speech given to the 
Lake View Woman 1 s Club. 
82Addams, p. 203-206, and 237-38. 
Not all women agreed of course and the Illinois Association 
Opposed to the Extension of Suffrage to Women also communicated with the 
convention. The Association claimed that suffrage was impractical be-
cause women did not vote in large numbers when they received the fran-
chise. Its real emphasis, however, was on one of the more popular anti-
suffrage arguments of the period: that woman suffrage undermined the 
family, children, and urban society. Women did not help society by 
voting, said the Association, but by staying home and cultivating their 
children's souls because "children who are the outcome of such homes 
only rarely become 'mashers' or 'hoodlums 1 or degenerates of any sort. 11 
These anti-suffragists direly predicted mass voting by women in the red-
light districts and that "ambitious, self-seeking, unscrupulous women" 
would join forces with the ward-heelers and political bosses. Rather 
than helping solve municipal problems, they warned, woman suffrage prom-
ised to add more unfit voters to the electorate.83 To counter these 
allegations, the Illinois Equal Suffrage Association asked Raymond 
Robins to lead the fight for suffrage in the convention. 84 
S3Illinois Association Opposed to the Extension of Suffrage to 
Women, 11A Protest Against the Granting of Municipal Suffrage to Women 
in the City of Chicago, " unpublished pamphlet, Chicago Historical Socie-
ty. See Kraditor, p. 12-26 for complete explanation of anti-suffrage 
ideas. Also, it was the nature of the ::n.ovement for each side to attempt 
to turn the other's arguments around. Hence suffragists argued that 
rather than restricting themselves to the home, women needed "to exer-
cise their purifying influence in the voting booth, 11 and that extending 
suffrage would add more socially acceptable voters to the electorate to 
stand against the machines and illlmigrants. See Mary P. Ryan, Womanhood 
in America: From Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Franklin Watts, 
1975), Po 245; Kraditor, p. 106. 
84catherine Waugh McCullough to Raymond Robins, November 30, 1906, 
Raymond Robins Paperso 
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Women representing both sides of the issue appeared before the 
convention's committee on elections, but when the committee recommended 
five to four against conferring suffrage on women, proponents of suffrage 
petitioned the convention to waive its rules and allow women to speak 
before the entire body. Louis Post argued that the issue was so impor-
tant and the committee vote so close that the convention might well 
profit from hearing the petitions directly. He urged his fellow dele-
gates to schedule a specific date for hearing this question and invite 
women to address the group. Post believed that this was only a fair and 
just repayment to women of the city, whom he thought were partially re-
sponsible for there being a charter convention. 85 
I think it is not stating too much to s~ that if it had not been 
for the action of the women in this community who are in favor of 
women 1 s suffrage, we would have no occasion for taking up this 
question tod~ because no satisfactory amendment would have gone 
to the legislature and we would not have had the opportunity. 
Even more to the point Post, ever concerned with the people's right to 
representation, argued that women had no direct representation in the 
convention and deserved the right to be heard on this issue. 86 
B.A. Eckhart protested that if the convention permitted women 
to speak directly to the convention every group in the city would de-
mand a hearing, and while some delegates sympathized with Post 1 s ideas, 
they, like Eckhart, did not wish to set a precedent they might later re-
gret. The delegates tabled the motion to invite women to address the 
body. Fisher suggested to his fellow delegates that they could best 
85
charter Convention, Proceedings, December 4, 1906, p. 130-31. 
86The Public, January 5, 1907. 
acquaint themselves with the issue by attending one of the community 
meetings held by suffrage advocates. 87 
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When the convention finally confronted the issue of woman suffrage, 
the delegates 1 views mirrored those of the larger society. Reverend 
White summarized the pro-suffrage arguments: women were taxpayers, had 
vital interests in urban affairs, could not be assumed to agree with 
their husbands--in fact, could not be assumed to have husbands--and the 
failure to allow women to vote is "an injustice to the working women of 
Chicago, it is wrong and it is absolutezy un.American. 11 For White and 
other supporters of suffrage, any or all of these reasons sufficed to 
extend suffrage. On the other side of the question Rosenthal contended 
that onzy a small percent wanted to vote; Hoyne protested against "drag-
ging women down from the pedestal to mix in ward politics"; and Hill 
warned that the wrong class of women would vote and the 11influe!lce of the 
ladies that we seek to obtain will not be obtained. u88 The opponents of 
suffrage prevailed and defeated an amendment to give women the municipal 
franchise by a vote of seventeen to twenty-six. 
In January the Equal Suffrage Association asked delegates Robins, 
Post, Taylor, McGoorty, White, and MacMillan to a meeting to decide ffhat 
further steps they could take on the suffrage question. Although Robins 
could not attend, Catherine McCullough subsequently informed him that 
those present had acknowledged there was no hope of garnering enough 
votes to pass a charter provision on woman suffrage and that they had 
decided to ask instead that the convention submit a separate bill for 
87
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88Ibid., December 27, 1906, p. 767-72, 776, and 778. 
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suffrage to the legislature. 89 The convention however refused to do even 
this, saying it preferred that the state take all initiative in this 
matter. On the issue of woman suffrage, therefore, the charter conven-
chose to ignore the desires of many Chicago women and voted on the basis 
of their personal preferences, and prejudices, against giving women polit-
ical power • Louis Post castigated his fellow delegates for their cal-
lous treatment of women. 90 
Liquor Regulation 
Finally the convention had to confront the vexing question of 
liquor regulation. Not only was this a controversial issue throughout 
the city, it was also the one for which organized groups outside the 
convention put tremendous pressure on the delegates. When the conven-
tion adopted its statement acknowledging that the state conferred all 
powers of municipal government, 91 the United Societies accelerated its 
campaign to have some explicit home rule provision on liquor regulation 
inserted into the charter . 
First the Societies worked to strengthen the resolve of its 
existing membership. It sent a letter to all member societies attacking 
the state liquor laws as an affront to popular democracy and proclaiming 
that the organization was "strong enough and entitled to take its place 
in politics, to stand united and not be put off with poor excuses, and 
89catherine W. McCullough to Raymond Robins, January 8 and January 
14, 1907, Raymond Robins Papers. 
90 Charter Convention, Proceedings, February 16, 1907; the Public 
January 5, 1907. 
9~ee above, p. 101. 
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carry to the end a campaign against a dishonest and dependent minority. u92 
The Societies then began issuing a bulletin to inform its membership of 
the important aspects of the liquor regulation question and to enable 
them to follow the debate and events of the convention on the issue. 92 
Second~, the Societies active~ publicized its position throughout 
the city, hoping to gain new support from ethnic groups and perhaps 
other groups, who could in turn helf> pressure the convention. In this 
effort the Societies succeeded. The CFL leadership, observing that 
Sunday was the on~ day on which workers could "relax, enjoy themselves, 
and recover from their arduous week~ labors," urged workers to join the 
United Societies in their efforts to insure that saloons and other places 
of entertainment were not closed on Sundays. 93 
The Societies also succeeded in attracting more ethnic support. 
The Bohemian societies of Chicago held a mass meeting just before Christ-
mas to apprise Bohemians all over the city of the work of the United 
Societies and the danger of liquor restriction. Speakers at this meeting 
contended that the general state law under which Sunday closings was 
being threatened was so vague that it could be used to ban theatres, 
the.running of street cars, and the publishing and selling of newspapers. 
They further argued that such a law was hopeless~ out of touch with 
urban life. The gathering passed a resolution declaring that the "so-
called blue laws" were too obsolete and undemocratic to be applied in 
a cosmopolitan city, and had copies sent to the charter convention and 
to the United Societies. The Bohemians also passed a resolution asking 
92Abendpost, December 3, 1906. 
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the convention to rescind the rule which barred non-members from the 
convention floor and allow a delegation from the United Societies to 
take the floor and present its arguments. The Abendpost reported that 
additional societies joining the United Societies after this meeting 
boosted the number of affiliated Bohemian societies to 120 with an ap-
proximate membership of 20,000.94 
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The Societies took the support they received as evidence that the 
majority of Chicagoans wanted the city freed from Sunday closing and 
any other state law designed to restrict or prohibit the sale of liquor. 
The organization again warned the convention that only a specific home 
rule provision in the charter could guarantee popular sovereignty on 
this issue, without which its membership would not support any new char-
tero95 The temperance forces agreed with the Societies' assessment of 
municipal sentiment on this issue, and for this reason urged the dele-
gates to keep any home rule on liquor out of the charter. The Law and 
Order League argued that only the state laws prevented Chicago from 
eliminating prohibition districts, as well as licensing prostitution and 
race track gambling and exempting itself "from numerous other provisions 
of the Criminal Code. 11 In a letter to Raymond Robins a League spokes-
man warned that Chicago needed the protection of state laws to avoid 
being handed over to the forces of vice and corruption and he laid the 
94Abendpost, December 24, 1906; United Societies for Local Self-
Government, Home Rule Bulletin 3 (January 5, 1907), One English lan-
guage newspaper also covered this meeting but inaccurately identified 
it as one called by the United Societies. In general, the ]11glish 
press tended to make serious errors when reporting the events of the 
city's ethnic groups, and often neglected major events altogether. 
See Record-Herald, December 24, 1906. 
95charter Convention, Proceedings, December 26, 1906, p. 712-13. 
blame squarely on the city's large immigrant population. In another 
twenty-five years, he explained, when "our foreign increment has been 
digested," the situation might be different. For now he urged Robins 
to see the wisdom of allowing "the more conservative and more American 
sentiment of the country to help us out rather than to leave the whole 
matter to the population of Chicago. rr96 It was reasoning such as this 
which convinced the United Societies that the temperance movement was 
an assault by the minority on the lifestyle and character of the majori-
ty. And they deeply resented the equating of liquor with criminal 
activities of all sorts and with "unAmericanism." 
The Societies received unexpected support on this issue from con-
vention member Alexander Revell. Revell, a wealthy Republican furniture 
manufacturer, was not associated with the Societies, nor did he have much 
in common with its membership. But in a lengthy speech to the convention 
he argued that a true home rule charter must include the problem of 
liquor regulation.97 · 
Then the people of Chicago can decide whether they want Sunday 
saloons or not. And it is the people' s right, in a land of popu-
lar government, to have such laws as they desire ••.• We cannot go 
before the world with the announcement that the people of Chicago 
cannot be trusted to govern themselves. Such a policy and such a 
declaration would invide disaster and contempt. 
Revell was arguing that the right to popular government was the deeply 
rooted principle, and that to use the law to regulate personal habits was 
to misuse law and invite comtempt for it. 
96Robert McCurdy to Raymond Robins, December 3, 1906, Raymond 
Robins Papers. 
97charter Convention, Proceedings, December 27, 1906, p. 786-90; 
United Societies, Home Rule Bulletin 3. 
It is difficult to ascertain from the sparse convention debate 
exactly what individual delegates thought about this issueo They did 
not want to deny the validity of the arguments advanced by the United 
Societies or Revell; the strongest opposing argument advanced was that 
the issue did not properly belong in the charter because people would 
use it as their sole reason for voting for or against the entire char-
ter. 98 The delegates had very little else to say about this question 
and it seems obvious that they were caught between the demands of the 
United Societies, those of the Anti-saloon and Law and Order Leagues, 
and their personal predilections. The solution they arrived at was 
to frame a separate bill, which, if accepted by the state legislature, 
would Chicago voters to decide whether the city should have sole power 
to regulate liquor. The Societies accepted this compromise because 
it believed that the majority of Chicagoans would quickly enact such a 
law. 
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The compromise measure on liquor regulation concluded the drafting 
of the charter and the convention adjourned until mid-February when it 
reconvened to reconsider some of the more disputed itemso On March l, 
1907, the convention met for its final session to conduct a vote on 
accepting the proposed charter as written. While the majority of the 
delegates were quite pleased with their efforts, several of them voiced 
objections to the charter as written and the discussions over accepting 
the charter portended a difficult future for it. Most of the delegates 
continued to believe that the majority of the citizens would accept the 
98
charter Convention, Proceedings, December 27, 1906, p. 790, and 
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charter even if they disagreed with some of its provisions. Charles 
Merriam spoke of compromise and principle; he declared that he never 
thought beforehand that he would agree with everything included in the 
charter, but that what was most important was that Chicago indeed have 
this charter. "Mr. Cole and I," said Merriam, "agreed to pledge our-
selves, if the other gentlemen would do likewise, to accept this char-
ter from this convention. I do not see how a man ca.11 act on principle 
and do otherwise. "99 
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Louis Post dissented, both from Merriam's speech and from accepting 
the charter. 100 
Unlike Mr. Merriam, I did not come into this convention with any 
determination to be absolutely governed qy its decisions. If it 
had been a representative convention, elected by the people ••• 
and I had been selected to sit in it, then I should have con-
sidered that whatever conclusions that convention came to, I should 
fall in with the rest of the members. I did come, however ••• with 
the full determination, that if the members, even though appointed 
instead of elected, should formulate a home rule charter, a fair 
and good charter, that even if I did not like it in many respects, 
I would support it. 
But, Post concluded it was not a home rule charter and it violated 
many of the desires of groups outside of the convention, and he refused 
to vote to accept the proposed charter. 
Perhaps even more ominous for the charter's fate, seven of the nine 
convention members who were also state legislators attending the final 
session declined also to vote for the charter, saying they reserved the 
right to vote for changes when the legislature considered the charter. 
D~alegate Jones resurrected all the fears which various groups in the city 
99 Ibid., March 1, 1907, p. ll93-94. 
100fuQ.' p. ll94. 
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had of downstate when he declared himself open to accept changes 
suggested by downstate legislators. "If the country members of the 
Legislature were able to prevail upon my judgment, that some of the 
Provisions of the Chartero •• were erroneous, founded upon wrong principles, 
then I would vote in favor of change. "l.Ol Nothing could more anger 
several groups in Chicago than the prospect of the state legislature--
those 11country members 11--revising the charter with Chicago representa-
tives going along and voting against the wishes of the people they repre-
sented. 
10lrbid.' p. ll99. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE CAMPAIGN TO RATIFY THE CHARTER 
I 
Even after the convention had sent the proposed charter and liquor 
bills to the General Assembly in Springfield, the issue remained impor-
tant enough to Chicagoans to influence the mayoral contest in early 
April of 1907. This election was particularly important because the 
new mayor would be the first to serve a four year term and both parties 
worked hard to win. The Democrats renominated Mayor Dunne who had been 
very popular with Chicago's ethnic community two years earlier but ethnic 
support for Dunne had waned after he tried to enforce some of the state 
liquor laws in early 1906--the incident which had prompted the organizing 
of the United Societies. The Republicans, hoping to attract more ethnic 
voters, chose Fred Busse, the 11boss11 of the north side. Busse was a 
German and he promised to go to Springfield and fight for passage of the 
liquor bills. The German press endorsed Busse as the friend of the 
United Societies, 1 and this support combined with that of Chicagoans who 
opposed Dunne's radical stand on municipal ownership elected Busse. The 
new mayor publicly thanked the United Societies for its support and im-
mediately left for Springfie1d. 2 
1Abendpost, April 1, 1907. 
2Ibid. , April 3, 1907 
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Other groups from the city also sent representatives to lobby 
for their interests: a delegation from the charter convention and other 
civic and business groups pleaded for the unamended passage of the 
charter bill; and the United Societies worked to persuade the legislators 
to ratify the liquor regulation bills. But it soon became clear to 
these people that the state legislature had its own ideas about accept-
able legislation for Chicago. Downstate legislators, with the vehement 
support of their constituents who railed against Chicago's contemptible 
attitude toward liquor laws, were determined to keep the city under the 
jurisdiction of general state laws, particularly those on liquor regula-
tion. The House charter committee immediately recommended against pass-
ing the proposed liquor bills, which were tabled without discussion. 
Representative McGoorty from Chicago moved that the bills be reconsidered 
but his motion was beaten decisively.3 Furthermore, the downstaters de-
manded some concessions from Chicago in return for ratification of the 
charter. As one student of Chicago-downstate relations put it, .down-
state legislators "looked upon the Chicago charter as a form of gift 
which should be traded for some other measure more desired by the coun-
try people. 114 As they had done before, the Senators first tried to trade 
the charter for a plan to restrict permanently the number of representa-
tives from Cook County, but they could not get the two-thirds vote needed 
for this measure. The votes were cast along strict regional lines; of 
the eighteen negative votes, fourteen came from Chicago and one was from 
3Illinois, House Journal, May 2, 1907; Philip, p. 174-75. 
4philip, p. 158. 
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Cook County; 5 Chicago wanted a new charter but not at such a high costo 
Having failed to get restricted representation the downstaters resolute-
ly demanded that Chicago's representatives support a state-wide local-
option bill or see the charter fail to pass the legislature. Believirig 
they now had no choice if Chicago was to get the badly needed new char-
ter, the Chicago legislators either abstained or voted for the local-
option bill which passed both houses.6 
Acquiescence on the local-option bill did not guarantee Chicago 
that the legislature would pass the charter in its original form. 7 
Claiming that electoral procedure was a state matter, the legislature 
eliminated the direct primary method for nominating municipal candidates, 
one of the most widely-supported reform measures of the charter, and 
restored the old system of nomination by ward convention. Although the 
legislature promised that it would soon implement the direct primary 
throughout the state--the General Assembly did enact such a law in 1910--
many Chicagoans were skeptical and saw this move as further evidence 
that the state could not be trusted not to interfere in local affairs. 
The legislature also stripped the Council of the power to impose li-
cense taxes on all persons, firms, or corporations holding franchises 
from the city thereby reducing potential revenue and emphasizing that 
all authority to institute taxes lay with the state. 
5Ibid.' p. 62. 
6Ibid.' p. 270-72. 
7The original charter as passed by the convention, and the final 
version as amended by the legislature can be found in the Charter Con-
vention Proceedings, Municipal Reference Library, Chicago, Illinois. 
The final version is also printed in Illinois, Senate Journal, 1907, 
p. 1079-1160 • 
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A final modification to the charter demonstrated both the state 
legislature's absolute determination to maintain sovereignty over the 
city and Chicago 1 s vulnerableness to state and party politics: the legis-
lators altered Chicago's ward system. Instead of seventy wards with one 
alderman each the city was reduced to fifty wards and fifty aldermen, a 
system specifical~ rejected earlier by the charter convention. In the 
process the legislature flagrant~ gerrymandered wards along political 
and class lines. Working-class Democratic areas of the city were distric-
ted into wards with two and three times the population of middle and 
upper-class Republican wards. Several of Chicago's representatives 
protested vigorous~ but their colleagues, particularly in the Senate, 
remained intransigent and the Chicago men faced choosing between an 
amended charter or no charter at all. They chose the former alternative 
and in ear]y May the charter was ratified by the legislature with most 
of the dissenting votes cast by downstate legislators unhappy about 
giving the charter to Chicago without exacting more in return. 
The charter was returned to Chicago where a city-wide referendum 
was scheduled for September ··17. The state legislature 1 s conduct on this 
issue, and the changes it made to the charter, played a signifinant role 
in the subsequent charter ratification campaign. 
II 
As soon as the legislature returned the amended charter Chicagoans 
began to declare for and against. Civic, reform and business groups 
general]y favored the charter because consolidation, the revised tax 
system, and a modicum of home rule promised greater fiscal and admin-
istrative efficiency for the city. Other supporters liked the charter 
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because it satisfied their special interests: the Republican party stood 
to benefit from the gerrymandered wards; and the Anti-5aloon League be-
lieved Sunday closings, and possibly total prohibition, could be effected 
because the city would be inextricably bound to general state laws under 
the charter. 
The United Societies and the CFL quickly emerged as the leading 
opponents of the charter. Having secured absolutely no guarantee of 
home rule on liquor regulation the Societies opposed the charter for pre-
cisely the same reasons as the Anti-5aloon League backed it. Further, 
the charter's lack of substantial home rule and popular democratic re-
forms disturbed the Societies which neither trusted the motives and 
actions of the state legislature nor those of reformers touting less 
voter participation as the means to more efficient municipal government. 
The CFL thought the charter virtually devoid of popular democratic re-
forms and meaningful home rule also, and completely unfavorable to the 
city's working-class; labor particularly objected to the provisions on 
the education system and taxation. 
Radical reformers, social reformers, the Democratic party, the 
Independence League, and many women joined the Societies and CFL in 
attacking the charter. The failure to grant municipal suffrage angered 
women; the Democratic party would be hurt by the ward gerrymander and 
in general the charter seemed unfair to its working-class constituency; 
the Independence League believed the tax reforms were designed to bene-
fit the rich and the corporations while radical reformers such as Louis 
Post predicted that the whole charter would hand the city government 
over to the "Real Estate Board, the Merchants 1 Club, and the Cook County 
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Republicans. 118 Finally, the more socially-conscious reformers like 
Raymond Robins objected to the charter's paucity of meaningful social 
benefits. 
Many of the reasons advanced during the charter campaign for oppo-
sing· or supporting the charter sound like the complaints of special in-
terest groups, and to an extent they were. The Anti-saloon League wanted 
prohibition and the United Societies wanted drinking on Sundays; the 
Republican and Democratic parties were engaged in partisan politics. 
But to dismiss these reasons as irrelevant and subsidiary to charter 
reform, as did many contemporaries and those who later studied Chicago 
history, is to misread critically Chicago's charter reform movement. 
Most Chicagoans fully understood that the proposed charter would alter 
significantly their municipal government. The referendum therefore 
provided them the opportunity to try to implement the kind of government 
and urban environment they desired. Their arguments and activities 
during the charter campaign reveal the differing ways in which they 
hoped to reform Chicago. 
A debate sponsored by the City Club in mid-June is a good point 
to begin eJq)loring these differing ideas. Milton Foreman, Republican 
alderman and chairman of the charter convention, flatly denied that the 
state legislature had made any significant changes to the charter and 
asserted that "every feature of the charter that Chicago really wants ..• 
is in the charter. 119 That the legislature had redistricted and reduced 
8The Public, January 5, 1907. 
9
city Club of Chicago, The City Club Bulletin l3 (June 19, 1907), 
p. 3..47. 
the wards and eliminated the direct primary, and that the proposed char-
ter conferred strictly limited home rule bothered Foreman not at all. . 
The provisions designed to make government more efficient by consolidating 
overlapping authorities, increasing the city's taxing powers, and lo-
eating almost all municipal responsibility in the City Council remained 
intact and these were what interested Foreman. 
Edward Noonan, representing the United Societies, presented a view 
of the charter which differed significantly from Foreman's. Persuaded 
by the events in Springfield that neither Chicago politicians nor the 
charter convention understood what the majority of Chicagoans wanted, 
the Societies had voted to oppose the charter at its second annual 
convention on May 26, 1907. The threat of prohibition of course remained 
a primary reason for opposing the charter: convention speakers predicted 
that the proposed charter would subject all athletic, singing, social, 
and benevolent societies to state saloon and special license laws as 
well as close all saloons on Sundays; they accused the Anti-5aloon League 
of helping tie the charter to the local-option bill and defeat the sepa-
rate liquor bills; and they warned that the League was supporting the 
charter as a victory in the cause of state->~de prohibition. 10 This was 
not simply paranoia on the part of the Societies for the Anti-saloon 
League was in fact proclaiming these very things. 11 But in an important 
broadening of the Societies' position, several speakers protested that 
the new form of municipal government--which Foreman was extolling--bene-
fitted the state, the corporations, and the wealthy of the city while it 
10Abendpost, May 27, 1907. 
ll J .C. Jackson, "The Work of the Anti-Saloon League," The Annals 32 
(1908)' p. 485. 
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placed a disproportionate burden of the new taxes on the small property 
owner and taxpayer, reduced the equality of representation in the City 
Council, and failed to grant Chicago adequate home rule. 12 
Feeling as strongly as they did, the members of the United Socie-
ties did not intend to allow the charter to be ratified without a fight. 
They resolved to show the ethnic strength to the rest of the city by 
vigorously campaigning against the charter and to this end constituted 
an anti-charter campaign committee. Speakers called upon the member-
ship to remember that the ''world belongs to the strong" and by standing 
firm and united by themselves they could make the rest of the city pay 
attention to what they wanted. An editorial in the Abendpost warned 
Chicago that this meeting would have profound significance for the 
city's political development, and the Societies went to work to defeat 
the charter. l3 
Noonan explained the Societies' reasons for opposing the charter 
to the City Club. First of all he emphatically denied accusations that 
the Societies opposed the charter solely because it failed to provide 
home rule on liquor regulation. 14 Rather the charter 1 s gravest 1'ault 
was that it did not free Chicago from the dictates of a rural legisla-
ture--a body which had recently shown its contempt for the city by arbi-
trarily revising its ward system. Instead of home rule, the charter gave 
the City Council a few new powers in exchange for de facto recognition 
l2 Abendpost, :t'J.BY Z7, lgJ?. 
13Ibid. 
~his charge had been leveled against the United Societies in an 
editorial in the Record-Herald, May 28, lgJ?. 
of the state's ultimate authority over the city. 15 Noonan further re-
minded his audience that the charter directly contravened the wishes of 
a majority of the city's voters. In public policy referenda held from 
1904 to 1907 Chicagoans had favored instituting direct primaries, elec-
ting members of the Board of Education, allowing local citizens to de-
termine and adopt their own system of assessing and levying taxes, and 
other measures designed to increase home rule and make local government 
more directly responsible to the citizens. 16 The charter provided none 
of these, and in the case of direct primaries the legislature had ac-
tually deleted this from the charter. 
The third participant in the debate was Charles Merriam, a pro-
fessor of political science at the University of Chicago and a delegate 
to the charter convention. Merriam favored adopting the charter but was 
more perceptive than Foreman in recognizing and admitting the document's 
shortcomings. He regretted that the legislature had eliminated direct 
primaries, redistricted the wards, and in other ways altered the charter, 
but he maintained that "the fundamental difficulty with American city 
governments and with the government of Chicago has not been the lack of ... 
such statutes ••• [the] greatest troubles in city government have been the 
lack of adequate power, and the lack of unity and responsibility. n17 The 
proposed charter, Merriam believed, rectified these shortcomings. Unlike 
the United Societies Merriam believed also that the charter conferred 
15City Club, Bulletin l3, p. 153-56. 
16
see Daily News, Almanac (1905-1908). 
17 City Club, Bulletin l3, p. 152. Merriam's speech was reprinted 
in The Voter (July 1907), p. 24-32. · 
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enough home rule and that "in granting broad powers of local govern-
ment and in unifying the local governments, so that responsibility 
cannot be evaded, it lays a foundation for efficient democratic govern-
ment. n18 
For Merriam and other charter supporters efficiency in municipal 
government led axiomatically to democratic municipal government; or in 
Merriam's words "given ample power, clear responsibility and local con-
trol, and democracy will obtain results. 1119 Merriam urged his audience 
to support the charter because it delineated the clearer lines of muni-
cipal power and responsibility necessary to assure efficient, and hence 
democratic government. The members of the United Societies disagreed; 
to them, fundamental American democracy required direct citizen partici-
pation in decision-making and because the charter failed to provide this 
it violated their vision of democratic municipal government. 
This fundamental disagreement about municipal democracy was one 
of the prominent issues as the charter campaign proceeded into the sum-
mer. The CFL had not been invited to the City Club debate but the organ-
ization was definitely leaning toward opposing the charter. The CFL 
18
city Club, Bulletin 13, p. 149 
19Ibid. For comparable ideas see Chicago City Club, Civic Commit-
tee Reports 1 and 2 (1907); Chicago Civic Federation, The New Charter: 
Why It Should Be Adopted at the Special Election, September 17th (1907); 
Walter L. Fisher to M.Ho Lebensohn, September 14, 1907, Walter L. Fisher 
Papers. 
Merriam's ideas are similar to those of reformers in other cities, 
whom Martin Schiesl found equated democracy with efficiency. They be-
lieved that democracy was less a system to insure individual participa-
tion in decision-making, and more a method of making decisions which 
insured efficiency, while requiring some measure of responsiveness to 
to public opinion. The Politics of Kfficiency, p. 73-75 and 149-50. 
set up a special committee to study all aspects of the charter and con-
vene a conference composed of one representative from each union local 
to recommend a course of action to the membership, and promised to keep 
the membership informed through the monthly journal, the Union Labor 
Advocate, and their individual unions. 
The convention 1s rejection of its proposals on initiative, referen-
dum, and the school system had angered the CFL and the legislature's 
changes only deepened this anger. Consequently the special committee 
decisively recommended that the CFL oppose the charter. The revenue 
provisions, it said, were designed to increase the tax burdens of the 
renter and small property owner instead of formulating a system to com-
pel the corporations and wealthy to pay their fair share of taxes; the 
ward gerrymander would hurt the working-class representation on the City 
Council while the lengthening of aldermanic terms to four years would 
remove elected officials further from the people and give them more time 
to indulge in graft; the "progressive" reforms of initiative and direct 
primary \'ihich were being instituted throughout the country were missing; 
and the charter failed to implement municipal ownership. 20 
That the charter would b~nefit only certain groups within the city, 
the CFL was certain. It warned workers that "all the predatory, tax-
dodging, labor baiting interests ••• who fear the rule by the whole people 
[and] seek to curb the power of the electorate" supported the charter be-
cause they could use several of its provisions to control labor better. 21 
.<DCFL, Minutes, July 21, 1907. The committee's recommendations were 
also printed in the Union Labor Advocate (August 1907). 
2~id. 
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For example, the city's enhanced police powers to arrest and detain 
people for disturbing the peace could easily be used to break up politi-
cal or labor rallies and against strikers. Even more pernicious, the 
CFL feared, was the provision authorizing the city to examine and license 
workers. Without such a license they could not work and the CFL thought 
it possible that the licenses could be withheld or taken away on any 
pretext including striking. 22 Summing up the charter as containing 
nothing that will give the people better control of their own 
affairs,--nothing in the interest of democratic government,--
nothing to preserve the liberties of the people against the en-
croachments of concentrated wealth and plutocratic greed .•.. it 
is an insidious attempt to dress Chicago in a corporate strait 
jacket and to bind labor to the chariot wheel of a power mad 
plutocracy. 
the CFL declared an all-out campaign to insure that no union man be 
left unaware of the dangers posed by the charter. 23 
The CFL's class fears and its vision of municipal democracy are 
perhaps best exemplified by the controversy over the charter provisions 
on the public schools. The convention had chosen to stress fiscal and 
administrative efficiency as demanded by the business community by 
creating a strong superintendent with control of both the educational 
and administrative apparatus of the system and an appointed board which 
served at the mayor 1 s pleasure. These provisions were largely in accord 
with the views of the City Club which in April 1907 had instructed its 
Committee on Public Education to continue seeking remedies which would 
"secure more effective business administration and an education ••. more 
2~his issue provides an interesting example of new urban problems 
which were not satisfied by an old catch-all incorporation act designed 
for much smaller cities and townso 
23
cFL, Minutes, July 21, 1907; Union Labor Advocate (August 1907). 
in accordance with the demands of modern social and business condi-
tions.1124 Yet the CFL (as well as others in the city) wanted the citi-
zens to have a greater say in how their children were being educated. 
In order to accomplish this the CFL had proposed that the charter pro-
vide an elected and paid school board and give this board and the 
teachers more power and authority in the system than the superintendent. 
Mayor Busse's removal of the more liberal board appointees of former 
Mayor Durme-including two members of the CFL, and Raymond Robins and 
Louis Post, both of whom had supported the CFL proposals in the con-
vention--soon after his election only strengthened the convictions of 
the CFL. 
The Chicago Federation of Teachers, which was affiliated with but 
not an official member of the CFL, led labor's opposition to the charter's 
educational provisions. The largely female constituency of the Federa-
tion protested the position of the teachers in the system. While the 
Superintendent and regular board employees were amply protected against 
arbitrary removal, teachers were specifically exempted from Civil Serv-
ice and decisions about their retention, promotion, and transfer given 
over to the Superintendent; and the charter contained no guarantee of 
any salary stability for teacherso Finally the teachers protested that 
repudiating an elected school board and giving the Superintendent, with 
advice from the Board, all power to decide educational programs and cur-
riculum destroyed all hope of democratic participation by the citizens 
or teachers in their school system. 25 The leadership of the CFT author-
24city Club of Chicago, Civic Committee Report 1 (1906-1907), po 34o 
25Chicago American, June 16, 1907. 
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ized a committee of 250 to work with the woman suffrage organizations 
in the city to defeat the charter and, because they would not be able 
to vote on the charter, asked the CFL members to vote in their interest. 
The CFL hardzy. needed persuading on this issue. The special char-
ter committee agreed wholeheartedly that the school system proposed by 
the charter was undemocratic to both the people in general and the 
teachers. The primary question, the CFL told its members, was whether 
the schools should be managed "by the people for their children or by 
the financial interests." It accused business of using the charter to 
make the public schools "a cog in the capitalistic machine so that the 
children may reach manhood's estate, content in a condition of abject 
servitude" and of trying to thwart teacher allegiance with the CFL by 
leaving them subject to arbitrary dismissal. 26 The CFL clearly envision-
ed a school system in which a strong Superintendent, undoubtedly hand-
picked by the rich and powerful of the city--whose children did not 
attend the public schools--held the power to determine the curriculum, 
textbooks, administrators, and the financial arrangements of the schools 
with little control by the school board, teachers, or parents. Lest 
this happen, all workingmen were urged to vote against the charter. To 
augment the anti-charter campaign being conducted through the Union 
Labor Advocate the CFL also began sending speakers out to all union 
locals. 
The Civic Federation responded to the criticism of the charter by 
the United Societies and CFL in a pamphlet explaining why Chicagoans 
26CFL, Minutes, July 21 and August 4, 1907; Union 1abor Advocate 
(August 1907), p. 11. 
should ratifY the charter; this pamphlet stressed the themes of effi-
ciency and economy which charter supporters made the cornerstone of 
th~ir ratification campaign. Dismissing all criticism as selfish, bla-
.• 
tantly political, or "uttered by persons of unsafe theories and princi-
ples, 11 the Federation characterized charges that the charter was pluto-
cratic and framed in the interest of the corporations as "such as might 
be expected from socialist newspapers and socialist street corner ha-
rangues ••• u27 Having thus linked all opposition with radicalism the 
Federation then extolled the fiscal and administrative efficiency prom-
ised by the charter's revisions to the city's revenue system. More 
revenue, extended borrowing power, and centralized tax assessments and 
levies would be conducive to greater efficiency and economy in adminis-
tration and would give Chicago the ability to undertake the municipal 
improvements it desperately needed. Such improvements, the Federation 
argued, '~11 make the city a better and more desirable place in which 
28 to live and do business and consequently enhance property values." 
The Civic Federation did not address in their pamphlet the issues of 
popular democracy which so concerned the United Societies and CFL, ex-
cept to urge that people not reject the charter simply because it did 
not include the direct primary or because the wards had been redistricted 
by the state legislature. 
The basic dichotomy between the Civic Federation and the ethnic 
groups and workers of the United Societies and the CFL on the important 
27 Civic Federation of Chicago, The New Chicago Charter: Why It 
Should Be Adopted at the Special Election s.eptember 17th ( 1907), p. 2 
and 11. 
28Ibid., p. 1-2. 
question of home rule was also revealed in this pamphlet. While the 
latter groups argued that the new charter did not remove the state 
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legislature's ability to interfere in municipal affairs, the Federation 
believed that home rule was simply synonymous with the consolidation of 
governing and taxing bodies. It acknowledged that the city would not 
be allowed to change any of the charter provisions on revenue, public 
schools, public utilities, and others, but proclaimed this a home rule 
charter because it centralized in the City Council the power to pass 
ordinances on all other municipal matters. 29 
Revenue was so crucial an issue to the supporters of the charter 
that once the charter passed the legislature they sought to strengthen 
their position by backing a move by downstate legislators to repeal the 
Juul Law which set the ceiling on tax rates. While downstaters had their 
own purposes in mind for removing the tax ceiling, some Chicago charter 
advocates saw how this might work to their advantage and hence were 
distressed when Governor Deneen threatened to veto this repeal. Walter 
Fisher apointed out to Deneen that as long as the old limit remained, 
those who opposed the charter's new revenue system could urge voters to 
stick with a tax system they already knew. Without this safeguard 
however they would have to choose between the "very definite and fair-
minded limitations" set by the new charter or put themselves at the 
mercy of future laws enacted by the General Assembly.30 Frank Shepard 
further argued with Deneen that the repeal of the Law was necessary in 
29Ib"d 9 
_J._.' P· . 
30Walter L. Fisher to Governor Deneen, May 16, 1907, Walter L. 
Fisher Papers. 
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case the charter failed. In that event, Chicago would at least have 
the possibility of securing the same kind of tax reforms through the 
legislature. Deneen rejected these appeals and vetoed the measure and 
charter supporters turned their attention to convincing Chicago voters 
that they had little to lose and much to gain by ratifying the charter. 
Throughout the summer charter supporters participated in debates 
at the City Club, gave speeches, and wrote articles stressing the bene-
fits of the proposed revenue changes. Although the City Club held de-
bates obstensib~ to discuss all sides of the issues, in the main these 
tended to be forums for promoting the charter for few anti-charter 
speakers appeared. When Frank Shepard and Frank Bennett praised the 
advantages of the proposed revenue changes, for instance, there was no 
speaker presenting the opposing view. 
It was obvious from their arguments that Bennett and Shepard were 
appealing to a specific audience--large property owners and businessmen. 
Bennett spoke of how Chicago needed more money to be a greater and better 
Chicago but vowed that the per capita tax increase would be minimal 
because the new monies would result primarily from the consolidation 
scheme. Shepard seconded this assertion and reminded the audience that 
taxpayers would be protected by the conservative limiting of the total 
tax rate to five percent of assessed property valuation. Nathan W. 
MacChesney, attorney for the Real Estate Board, advanced the on~ nega-
tive note. He told the audience that the men he represented were upset 
by the charter•s failure to eliminate the special assessment tax but he 
also emphasized that despite this flaw the overall charter was so good 
that he was sure it would be supported wholeheartedly by the realtors of 
the city.3l In closing his speech Shepard urged his listeners to ap-
prove the charter.32 
It means ••• greater resources through bond issues for permanent im-
provements for the city. It means a definite, precise and perma-
nent, and at the same time conservative tax limitation for the 
taxpayer, a limitation calculated to encourage prospective in-
vestors in homes and in property in this community, instead of 
driving them, as the present uncertain tax rate must tend to do, 
out of the community to invest their property elsewhere. 
151 
Charles Merriam, on the other hand, sought in a series of articles 
appearing in the Record-Herald to assure people that all would benefit 
practically and democratically from the new revenue system. Merriam 
pointed out that under the charter all new municipal bond proposals 
would be submitted to a popular referendum, whereas current.J.y citizens 
had little control over bond issuances. According to Merriam, the new 
system enhanced home rule because it gave the municipal government con-
trol of the entire debt unlike the present system where, for example, 
the state controlled the bonded indebtedness of the park system.33 
Few other people in the city however shared Merriam's ideas on this 
issue. 
Ill 
Ey mid-summer differences between charter supporters and oppo-
nents had manifested themselves quite clear.J.y. The former were largely 
wealthy businessmen and prominent professionals; they were Republicans 
and generally members of prestigious clubs and civic organizations. 
These men formed a committee of 300 to coordinate the charter campaign 
3lcity Club, Bulletin 14 (June 20, 1907), p. 157-63. 
32Ibid.' p. 161. 
33Record-Herald, Ju.J.y 3, 1907. 
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and its Committee on Oratory which was to "look after the aggressive part 
of the campaign" was composed deliberately of representatives from the 
Union League and Hamilton Clubs, the Real Estate Board, the Manufacturers 1 
Association, and the Chamber of Commerce.34 wrnile claiming to be non-
partisan and seeking only what was best for the entire city and its 
future, in reality they sought an efficient municipal government most 
beneficial to their economic, social, and political needs. 
The city's three most prestigious newspapers solidly backed the 
charter. The Tribune represented the conservative Republican opinion 
while the Daily NIDm and Record-Herald styled themselves as the spokes-
men of the liberal Republican or independent-minded good government 
reformers. All three papers actively promoted the proposed charter, re-
porting on pro-charter gatherings, events, and speeches and publishing 
articles explaining why it should be ratified. Charles Merriam wrote a 
series of such articles for both the Daily News and Record-Herald while 
the Tribune ran a series by convention member Alexander Revell. The 
Tribune backed the charter so ardently that Raymond Robins lambasted the 
paper for being in league with "the brutal bosses in Chicago politics 
and the big thieves in Chicago business. u35 Their opponents accused the 
Tribune and Daily News of standing to profit financially from the char-
ter; both papers held long-term, low-rent leases on some Board of Educa-
tion property and the charter allowed the Board to continue its practice 
of granting ninety-nine year leases. 
34undated, unnamed newspaper clipping in Raymond Robins papers. 
35 American, July 19, 1907. 
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A broader spectrum of the city's social and economic groups op-
posed the charter; they tended to be drawn largely from the working-class 
and ethnic population but they included middle-class professionals, and 
they all attacked the charter's lack of democracy and the privileges it 
bestowed upon the few. They rejected both the supporters' claims to 
non-partisanship and their vision of the city. 
Several of the remaining daily newspapers opposed the charter. 
William Randolph Hearst owned the Chicago American and Sunday Examiner. 
The Chicago branch of Hearst's political organization, the Independence 
League, was violently anti-charter and the newspaper produced a steady 
stream of vitriolic editorials. It also sympathized with the United 
Societies and prominently announced all anti-charter activities through-
out the summer. The Chicago Journal adopted a more subdued approach; 
until mid-september the paper confined itself to pointing out the char-
ter's defects and then urging the citizens to vote no because the new 
tax and ward schemes would only benefit the corrupt political bosses. 
The Journal skeptically predicted that increased taxation would not re-
sult in more funds for badly needed municipal services, as charter advo-
cates touted, but in "new vistas of riotous expenditures ••• [by] jobbing 
politicians, leagued with dishonest contractors. u36 The Inter-ocean, pub-
lished by traction magnate Charles Yerkes, opposed the charter because it 
opposed charter reform per se. One can only be cynical about the paper's 
stance that only the character of the men elected to office mattered, 
not any kind of structural reform. Yerkes after all had profited quite 
nicely from the current system and its public officials. 
36Chicago Journal, September 13, 1907. 
The charter's fiscal provisions particularly incensed the Inde-
pendence League. Its members, although primarily lawyers, had neither 
the wealth nor the prestige of the professionals who had sponsored the 
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charter refirm, attended the convention, and were now backing the char-
ter. The League accused these men of conspiring with big business to 
design a charter from which they would benefit politically and economi-
cally while higher taxes "would fasten a yoke around the necks of the 
people which they could never shake off. u37 
The League was able to keep its anti-charter activities constant-
ly before the public because of its connection with the American; man-
aging editor A.M. Lawrence was one of the organization's leading figures. 
The League and the American attacked the special privilege character of 
the charter, charging that it sanctioned the corporate tax-dodging that 
was responsible for the current lack of money to provide municipal serv-
ices: "If the taxing bodies did their duty, " declared the League, "there 
would be enough and millions to spare. 1138 They accused International 
Harvester of dodging $2.1 million in taxes--enough to "educate 75,000 
children, or raise firemen's pay, clean streets, open parks, build more 
public baths, pay policemen more"--and declared that the "kings of Pack-
ingtown, convicted of a thousand offenses against the public from whom 
they derive their revenue run a close race with the International Har-
vester gang of tax-dodgers .. o u39 
37 American, August 7, 1907 . See Appendix V. 
38Ibid. , July 5, 1907. 
39Ibid., July 4 and July 5, 1907. 
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To support their contentions of corporate pressure behind the char-
ter, the American reported campaign chairman Milton Foreman calling for 
business to raise at least $100,000 to fight for the charter. The paper 
.· 
further quoted him as saying "it would be cheaper for the corporations 
to put up $50 million than suffer a constitutional convention. "4D There 
is no way of ascertaining the validity of this quote; nevertheless its 
printing in a daily newspaper helped fuel the suspicions of those al-
ready inclined to expect the worst from big business and the charter sup-
porters. 
Two of the more radical former convention delegates Louis Post and 
Raymond Robins believed that Chicago deserved and could get better muni-
cipal reform and they worked hard against the charter. Post followed 
up his attack on the charter at the final meeting of the convention with 
more criticism in his newspaper, the Public. He assailed the charter as 
11a charter by politicians and corporations for politicians and corpora-
tions. 1141 He charged that the document had resulted from the fraudulent 
and prejudiced selection of the delegates--by his calculations at least 
fifty of his seventy-three fellow convention members had represented the 
Republicans, corporations, and large property owners--and the interference 
of the state legislature. He continued to protest, as he had done during 
the convention, the charter's unfair tax provisions, its school system, 
and its lack of municipal ownership. 
40chicago Sunday EKaminer, July 7, 1907. The CFL and other groups 
in the city were already demanding a new constitution to give local gov-
ernments complete control of their revenue and tax systems, presumably 
to alter these systems to the detriment of the wealthy and the corpora-
tions. 
4~e Public , May 18, 1907. 
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Robins agreed with Post that the convention and legislature had 
combined to produce a seriously flawed charter. He charged that the 
convention had been chosen by the same corrupt and incompetent offi-
cials the people had been railing against and that the legislature had 
eliminated all of the provisions which had been forced into the charter 
by the independent~ded convention delegates. 42 It genuinely dis-
tressed Robins that the result of this selfish maneuvering, as he saw 
it, was so unf'air to and uncaring about the majority of the people. 
Sitting in the convention and on the Board of Education had convinced 
·him that children could not receive a decent education because the city's 
powerful and influential citizens were more interested in fiscal account-
ability and securing good business deals for themselves when leasing 
school property than in the schools providing a good education. Robins 
firmly believed the problem was one of class in which the children of 
the working-class who made up the bulk of the public school population 
would continue to be shortchanged until the citizens and teachers had a 
greater voice in the schools. Nothing that he could see in the proposed 
charter moved the schools in this direction. 
Robins disliked much of the charter as written--the schools, tax-
ation, limited home rule--and the legislative changes intensified his 
disapprobation. One change epitomized to him the struggle between a 
rich and powerful minority and the rest of the people. When, over the 
anguished cries about the sacredness of private property, he had per-
suaded the convention to empower the City Council to force landlords to 
~blic Policy League, Bulletin 1 (September 1907). This was a 
reprinting of a speech delivered by Robins to the Public Policy League 
in July 1907. 
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meet the municipal housing codes, Robins believed the city was taking a 
giant step toward municipal responsibility. Unfortunately the legisla-
ture thought th~ rights of property owners more important and struck 
this provision from the charter. By the time the charter came back from 
Springfield Robins could see little social or politicial benefit in it 
and he began an earnest campaign to defeat it as the "deformed product 
of political and business thieves. 1143 
The Democratic party and women also joined the anti-charter cru-
sade. In early July the party finally decided after some in-fighting 
among the various factions, to organize its own anti-charter committee. 
William 0 1 Connell, chairman of the Cook County Democratic Central Com-
mittee and former mayor Durme became two of the leading spokesmen of 
the Coiliiiiittee which drew up a pamphlet on the "Reasons Why the Proposed 
Charter Should Be Defeated. 11 'I'hese reasons closely resembled those of 
the United Societies and the CFL though with distinctly more emphasis 
on how the charter favored the "powerful Republican machine. n44 
The women's groups which had petitioned the charter convention to 
include municipal suffrage for women continued their fight by opposing 
the charter. The Illinois Equal Suffrage Association, t~e Woman's Club, 
the Women 1 s Trade Union League, and various civic improvement groups 
all complained they could neither protect themselves economically nor 
secure their social and civic ends without the vote. 45 Union member 
43 American, July 19, 1907. 
~is pamphlet can be found in the Charles Merriam Papers, Box 72 
folder JD, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. 
45chicago Inter-ocean, September 9, 1907. 
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Elizabeth Maloney told a meeting of the Women 1 s Trade Union League 
that if women did not help defeat the charter it might well be twenty 
years before they had another opportunity to attain suffrage. Women of 
all classes refused to wait that long. They increasingly thought of 
themselves as part of the community who were "not indifferent to Chi-
cago 1 s welfare, 11 and they were demanding a more effective voice in 
the city's affairs both as just and as a necessity.46 
Finally, the activities of one more group are worth examining 
here, though no absolute conclusions can be drawn about its stance on 
the charter. The black community seems to have participated very little 
in the charter movement probably for the general reasons mentioned by 
Allen Spear in his book BJack Chicago: first blacks mistrusted middle-
class reformers and saw most progressive reforms as schemes to deprive 
them of what little political clout they had in the party bosses; and 
secondly no one had ever tried to include blacks in a reform coali-
tion. Blacks were deeply afraid however that the charter convention 
might legally segregate the public schools and the Illinois Niagara 
Movement persuaded Mayor Dunne to appoint a black delegate, D.R. Wilkins, 
to present the case against segregation. 47 Other leaders in the black 
community wrote the convention asking it to support the anti-segregation 
provision which Wilkins had introduced. Black fears on this issue proved 
groundless as the convention easily passed the anti-segregation clause. 48 
46 American, August 4, 1907. 
47 Spear, p. 7, 86, and 121. 
48Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 26, 1906, p. 744, and 
December 28, p. 851. 
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Outside of this~ the only evidence of black interest in the char-
ter comes from the Broad-Ax, one of'the community's two newspapers, 49 
which consistently attacked the charter's economic implications for 
blacks. The tax provisions, declared the Broad-Ax, were designed to 
benefit the wealthy tax-dodgers at the expense of the small businessman~ 
small property owner~ and laboring man. The paper agreed with the In-
dependence League 1s position that Chicago needed fairer tax collection~ 
not higher taxes, and urged "all those who have not been born with a 
silver spoon in their mouth" to vote no. 50 Whether blacks heeded this 
admonition cannot be said: on the one hand they might well have followed 
the Republican party and voted in favor; on the other hand if they be-
lieved that most progressive reforms were economically and politically 
detrimental to blacks they might have voted against. 51 
The various groups opposing the charter never formed a united or-
ganization for planning common strategy and activities. Although the 
Independence League and Democratic party each proposed such a move, the 
leaders of the United Societies demurred. 52 Since the Societies drew 
support from people with varying political allegiances, their leaders 
49The other newspaper, the Defender, began publishing in 1905 but 
copies are not extant until 1909. 
50The Broad-Ax, September 14, 1907. 
5lrhe bulk of the black community lived in the second and third 
wards which narrowly passed the charter. These wards however were re-
spectively only sixteen percent and twenty-two percent black and the only 
way to discern the actual black vote would be to identify primarily 
black precincts, which I did not undertake for this project. Figuring 
out the black vote is complicated by the fact that the Broad-Ax was a 
Democratic paper and most blacks were Republicans. 
52Record-Herald, August 9~ 1907; Abendpost, December 17, 1906; 
Illinois Staats-Zeitung, August 9, 1907. 
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claimed they did not want to link their cause with any political organi-
zation. A more important motive for rejecting the coalition, however, 
may have been the desire to show ethnic strength to the city by cam-
paigning and defeating the charter largely on their own. 
With its established and efficient organization, an overwhelming 
desire to crush the charter, and the potential to mobilize a large num-
ber of Chicago voters, the Societies in effect led the anti-charter 
movement. Immediately following its May convention in 1907 the Socie-
ties had begun working to defeat the charter. While sending Noonan to 
speak before the City Club conveyed its ideas to the civic reformers and 
charter supporters, the Societies knew that the real effort had to be 
made among the ethnic community and workers. To accomplish this it be-
gan distributing throughout the city pamphlets and circulars explaining 
its position, sending speakers to ethnic society meetings, arranging 
anti-charter rallies and speeches, and engaging in common activities 
with other groups opposing the charter. These facets of the Societies' 
anti-charter campaign reveal much about what ethnic groups wanted from 
their municipal government and how the charter not only failed to satis-
fy these desires but actually endangered them; they also reveal how the 
Societies' ideas and goals meshed with those of other groups in the city. 
The Societies made its most comprehensive statement of objections 
to the charter in a pamphlet which it distributed throughout the city.53 
In this pamphlet the Societies rejected the specific provisions on self-
government, schools, parks, taxation, public utilities, civil service, 
53united Societies for Local Self-Government, Seven Reasons to 
Vote Against the Charter (1907). Reprinted in Staats-Zeitung, August 1, 
1907. 
and ward redistricting. Taken together these objections show that the 
Societies opposed the charter for three fundamental reasons: it left 
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the state too much control over municipal affairs; it failed to give the 
citizens enough popular control over their government; and it favored 
certain groups in the city at the expense of others. 
Since the proposed charter neither ended Chicago's subordination 
to general state laws nor granted the city complete control of its muni-
cipal affairs, the Societies rejected any notion of its being a home rule 
document. Freedom from state laws had been a goal of the Societies 
since its inception for without this, Sundaf closings and ultimately pro-
hibition were distinct possibilities. After downstate legislators suc-
ceeded in passing a new state local-option law it hardly seemed the time 
to abandon the existing protections afforded by the Cities and Villages 
Act for a charter which explicitly acknowledged the superiority of state 
laws except those it directly contravened. The charter further violated 
the Societies' ideas of home rule and popular democracy by denying voters 
the right to revise certain provisions, among them taxation, public 
utilities, and schools, without going ·through the legislature. Not only 
would the state continue to legislate for the city, warned the pamphlet, 
it would also interfere in those areas which "directly touched the wel-
fare and rights of Chicagoans." The redistricted ward system was simply 
further proof, as far as the Societies was concerned, that the legisla-
ture disdained local self-government and could not be trusted to act in 
Chicago's best interests. 
Charter supporters believed that efficiency and economy would re-
sult from consolidating the governing bodies and centralizing decision-
making in the City Council. Exhibiting both a distrust of the Council 
and of centralization in ge..'leral the Societies thought the true result 
of these measures would be s~verely curtailed popular control of govern-
ment. For example, under the existing park system each of the three 
park boards controlled its local parks and many people thought that this 
decentralized system made each board more attentive to neighborhood 
needs. Now they were being asked to approve a system in which one park 
board shared power with the City Council over all park lands and the 
Societies dourly predicted in its pamphlet that giving the Council con-
trol of park property would probably result in the parks being sold 
away from the people without their consent. 
The pamphlet most vigorously attacked the charter's tax provisions 
as distinctly unjust to the working people and small property owners. 
The Societies simply did not believe the claims being made by some of 
the charter's supporters that property tax increases resulting from the 
new fiscal system would be either minimal or equitably distributed. On 
the contrary, the Societies had no doubt that these changes would signif-
icantly raise property taxes, while failing to eliminate the special 
assessment taxes, and that this burden would fall disproportionately on 
those who could least afford it. Small landowners and landlords who had 
few assets other than real property would be hit hard by tax increases 
and would of course pass their higher costs on to their tenants while the 
"rich would conceal their assets in cash and bonds, and the powerful cor-
porations would, as usual, avoid taxes. u54 
54staats-Zeitung, August 1, 1907. 
Behind all of the Societies' objections lay a profound distrust 
of the state legislature and a refusal to rely on its goodwill in any 
dealings with Chicago. This distrust was borne out by the activities of 
certain legislators, who thrust themselves into the campaign and threat-
ened dire consequences if the charter failed. State Senator Orville 
Berry (Republican from Carthage, Illinois) promised the Republican 
businessmen of the Hamilton Club that if Chicagoans did not pass the 
charter, they could expect no essential or desirable laws from the legis-
lature in their lifetime, while House Speaker Edward Shurtleff (Repub-
lican from Marengo) declared that a vote against the charter would prove 
the city incapable of governing itself and threatened to call a con-
stitutional convention to restrict permanently Chicago's legislative 
representation. Prohibition forces further threatened that if the char-
ter lost Senator Berry would run as Republican-Prohibitionist candidate 
for Governor and they predicted he would win.55 
That many charter supporters accepted this reasoning instead of 
standing up to the legislature further incited the Societies. In dis-
cussing the charter's political features before the City Club Morton 
Hull, a Republican state representative, told the audience that Chicago 
could receive a new charter only by abject compromise. In this instance 
compromise had meant the local-option bill; if this charter failed any 
future charter legislation could only be gained by paying a higher price, 
most likely permanent restriction. James Kittleman likewise declared 
himself ready to let the legislature (of which he was a member) dictate 
55Ibid., August 1 and August 8, 1907. 
terms to Chicago. He dismissed all protests against that body's hand-
ling of the direct primary and ward districting provisions and warned 
that the city would never again have the opportunity to secure so much 
home rule from the legislature. 56 
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The Societies accused the downstate legislators and Chicago char-
ter advocates of conspiring to force an undesirable charter upon the 
city and ultimately prohibition; the legislators, said the Societies, 
were "the newest threat to the local community which the charter sup-
porters have thrown up. u57 The Staats-Zeitung pointed out to its readers 
that Senator Berry had both sponsored the new local-option bill and had 
tried to bury the liquor regulation bills in committee and thereby sti-
fle any open discussion on them. The United Societies could not help 
but be suspicious about Berry's motives in supporting the charter. More-
over the ethnic groups found the now-or-never argument tota~ unaccept-
able, especially since they believed they had more home rule protection 
against prohibition under the Cities and Villages Act. For the United 
Societies this reform movement had become a choice between ratifying a 
charter with objectionable features and trusting the goodwill of the 
. 
General Assembly and the willingness of Chicago's representatives to 
fight for the interests of the majority of their constituents, or reject 
this charter and pursue more complete local self-government. The ethnic 
organization easily committed itself to the latter course; the charter 
contained too many distasteful provisions and seemingly guaranteed Sun-
56city Club, Bulletin 15 (June 27, 1907), p. 165-67 and 173. 
57 Staats-Zeitung, August lD, 1907. 
day closings and would conceivably give the temperance forces the 
weapon they needed to bring about prohibition. 
IV 
In the final weeks before the scheduled referendum each side 
stepped up its efforts to publicize its campaign and attract new sup-
porters. Despite the backing of the three major newspapers, the Repub-
lican party, civic organizations, and prominent citizens the pro-charter 
drive was faltering and suffering defections. George Cole, a former 
convention delegate and founder of the Municipal Voters League, decided 
he could not accept the altered charter and declared his willingness to 
wait instead "for a constitutional convention that will give every 
municipality in the state thorough home rule and leave to the legislature 
merely the enactment of general legislation for all the state. 1158 When 
the Real Estate News predicted that property owners of all types could 
not be counted on to vote yes because they were so disgruntled over the 
impending tax increases, the charter forces experienced another shock. 
They had expected the official organs of the real estate community to be 
enthusiastic backers of the charter; while the paper did not outright re-
ject the charter it did conclude sympathetically that "the owner of real 
estate cannot be blamed for looking upon the inevitable growth of his 
tax bills as conclusive reason for voting against ••• 1159 A further blow 
came when the commissioners of the South Park Board, which would disband 
58 American, August 17, 1907. While this paper was partisan in its 
anti-charter coverage, there is no reason to suspect they made this up; 
in fact Cole was still advocating this approach a year later. Record-
Herald, Spetember 4, 1908. 
59Real Estate News, August, 1907. 
with consolidation, urged their constituents to vote against the char-
60 ter. 
A frustrated Mayor Busse, now an ardent backer of the charter, 
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lashed out at the United Societies denouncing the organization as a tool 
of the brewers. He threatened to invoke the state law and close all 
saloons on Sunday if the charter was defeated. 61 This, in turn, out-
raged the leaders of the Societies who emphatically denied any collu-
sion with brewing interests.62 Nicholas Michels, secretary of the or-
ganization's anti-charter campaign, accused Busse of personally insult-
ing the group 1 s JDO,OOO members, who were "opposed to the charter on 
principle. " Michels predicted that rather than intimidating ethnic 
voters Busse's threats would strengthen their determiniation to vote 
down the charter. 63 
While the pro-charter campaign was faltering their opposing num-
bers were growing. The various opposition groups organized rallies and 
speeches to keep both their membership and the rest of the city in-
formed about their cause up to the day of the referendum. The Independ-
ence League and the Democrats concentrated on attracting support on the 
ward level while the CFL and United Societies worked through their 
natural constituencies, although the Societies did send members of its 
anti-charter committee to attend and sometimes address rallies organized 
by other groups. The CFL continued to work hard against the charter by 
60Am . erJ..can, August 27, 1907 • 
6~ecord-Herald, September 6, 1907o 
62Two members of the executive committee did own small breweries. 
63staats-Zeitung, September 7 and September 8, 1907. 
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disseminating information through its member locals. 
The Societies conducted an all-out assault on the charter in the 
two weeks before the referendum. ·The executive committee barraged its 
membership with messages reminding them that it was important to re-
main united to "show that it was they who were responsible ior the char-
ter 1 s defeat. u64 They also worked hard to recruit new support among 
ethnic societies. After listening to Nicholas Michels exhort them to 
stand united with others in the ethnic community on this issue the 
Chicago Turngemeinde adopted a resolution labeling the charter the "off-
spring of selfish politics, ruthless capitalism, narrow-minded bigotry, 
and loathsome hypocrisy. 11 Its official publication, Die Harmonie, urged 
the membership to reject the charter because its gravest defect was its 
failure to grant the democratic right to self-government. Representa-
tives from eighty affiliated societies of the Deutsch-Amerikanischen 
Nationalbundes (most of whom did not belong to the Societies) likewise 
adopted a negative stand against a charter they labeled a "shameful 
proposal which rural legislators and a few selfish local politicians 
might thrust upon the Citizens. 1165 
Because the Societies was strongest among the city's Germans and 
Bohemians it made a special effort to reach more personally other ethnic 
groups. On Saturday September 7 it sponsored a gathering for ethnic 
families at Riverview Amusement Park, and the next day distributed liter-
ature outside churches after services. Several aldermen sympathetic to 
the Societies campaign were also working to secure the ethnic vote in 
64Ibid. , September 1, 1907. 
65Ib"d -~_., August 25, August 27, and September 5, 1907. 
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their wards and kept the Societies apprised of their progress. For 
example, Alderman Bowler (D-19th) reported that he had instructed the 
Germans and Bohemians of his ward about the dangers of the charter, and 
that although Yom Kippur began on the evening of voting day, the Jews 
of the ward strongly opposed the charter and he would work hard to see 
that they got to the polls. 66 
The final campaign activities of both sides contrasted in style. 
The pro-charter forces were less visible to the rest of the city as they 
maneuvered among themselves collecting last minute endorsements. They 
were worried about Governor Deneen's lack of vocal support for the char-
ter; he was apparently being cautious because people from his southside 
home area were unhappy about the park consolidation. Supporters breathed 
a sigh of relief when Deneen finally endorsed the charter for its home 
rule features, placating his constituents with assurances that any defects 
in the charter could be corrected later. 67 The Hyde Park Protective 
Association and several Protestant pastors around the city reaffirmed 
their support for the charter because it would better regulate liquor 
consumption in the city. 
Not all of the supporters' activities were circumspect however. 
The Republican party controlled several important municipal offices 
and the opposition forces charged that last minute anti-charter rallies 
were being raided by the police and that the post office was failing to 
deliver their literature.68 (Mayor Busse was formerly the postmaster of 
66Ibid., September 7, 1907. 
67
rnter-0cean, September ll, 1906; Tribune, September 16, 1907. 
68 Inter-ocean, September .14, 1907. 
the city and presumably not without lingering influence over in the 
post office.) These charges remained unsubstantiated but three days 
before the referendum the charter supporters did petition the election 
board (composed chiefly of Republicans) to reverse its earlier ruling 
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and designate the referendum a special and not a general election. This 
was extremely important because in a special election workers were not 
entitled to two hours off work for voting. Despite the protests of the 
United Societies, the CFL, and others that this was a blatant attempt 
to hinder working-class voters and thereby diminish turnout among those 
most likely to be voting no, the election board made the change. 69 
The three newspapers supporting the charter ran last minute edi-
torials and endorsements, all of which appeared to confirm the opponents' 
suspicions that this was an eli test charter. Mayor Busse, for instance, 
was quoted as saying "the best thought of the best citizenship in this 
community approves the Charter. It is demanded by the press, the pulpit, 
the COIIIIII.ercial and industrial interests. n70 The editorials were in the 
same vein, stressing the progressive nature of the charter and those fa-
voring it, and dismissing again the validity of all protests about the 
legislature Is changes. The Daily News characterized opponents as part 
of the world-wide movement against progress which was being stirred up 
by interests who operated best under weak, disorderly, and confused gov-
ernment. 71 The Tribune printed a cartoon with a hand labeled "Progressive 
Citizen" casting an affirmative vote and bearing the caption "Tonight the 
69
staats-Zeitung, September 14, 1907; Examiner, September 15, 1907. 
7°Record-Herald, September 14, 1907. 
7lnaily News, September 16, 1907. 
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city will know whether it is under the control of progressives or reac-
tionaries. 11 Finally, Alexander Revell, in a series of Tribune articles, 
specifically discounted the loss of the direct primary using reasoning 
which contradicted his eloquent defense during the convention of popular 
democracy and the competence of the people to govern themselves. The 
direct primary, remarked Revell, could only work when the people acquired 
"a sufficient knowledge of public affairs and sufficient independence to 
act for themselves independent of the leadership of the bosses." Since 
such conditions did not prevail, it was "useless to legislate too far 
in advance of popular conditions. n72 
The Independence League and United Societies concentrated their 
final energies on holding large public rallies on the weekend before the 
referendum. For a week preceding its rally the Societies and the two 
major German language dailies increased their coverage of the anti-char-
ter campaign. The newspapers repeatedly exhorted Germans, as· the impor-
tant leaders of the United Societies, to turn out at the rally in great 
numbers, and also printed every day the Societies' announcement of the 
demonstration and the notices of individual German societies urging their 
members to at-tend the rally. In its announcement the Societies pro-
claimed that the time had come for Chicago citizens to vote on whether 
they will "preserve their hard-earned progress on the difficult ques-
tions of personal liberty" or whether they will subjugate themselves to 
the dictates of rural fanatics and hypocritical lawmakers. u73 
7~ibune, September 1.6 and September 17, 1907. 
73staats-Zeitung, September 11 thru September 17, 1907. 
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The Societies then climaxed its campaign at a rally in Grant Park, 
just east of the city's downtown area, attended by more than 35,000 
people. 74 Half of the participants assembled at various points near 
downtown and paraded through the streets with banners, flags, and bands. 
Ten thousand Germans, Swiss, and Luxemburgers, marching with eight 
bands and six drum and bugle corps converged on Grant Park from the 
near north side, while 5000 Bohemians, 5000 Creations, and members of 
Danish, Polish, Belgian, and Italian societies, all with marching bands, 
came from the southwest and other areas of the city. Speakers addressing 
the crowd in several languages urged their listeners to vote in spite 
of the hardship it might entail because the proposed charter threatened 
them persona.lly and working people in general. They charged that the 
taxation scheme of the charter "deprived the masses for the benefit of 
the few because what really was needed was a scheme to compel all to pay 
their fair share and not a higher tax rate"; that Sunday closings were 
a real threat if the charter was ratified; and that redistricting "de-
prived the working man of his vote. n75 Nothing new T..ras said at this 
rally but its size and enthusias!II. should have told charter supporters 
quite clearly that they faced a tough fight at the polls. 
Two days later the voters soundly defeated the charter J21, 935 to 
59,786; on~ four of the city's thirty-five wards ratified the charter 
and two of these wards contained a high number of Republican middle and 
upper-class voters. The Democratic wards voted heavily against the 
74A.bendpost and Staats-Zeitung, September 16, 1907. The 35,000 
ticipants were almost exclusive~ male and hence potential voters. 
75staats-Zeitung, September 16, 1907. 
par-
charter and the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth wards where the 
United Societies was very strong defeated the charter by a margin of 
almost four to one. 76 
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The losers responded with a mixture of bitterness and resignation, 
but with little understanding or feeling for the concerns which had 
been expressed by their opponents and had led to the charter's defeat. 
A kee~ disappointed Walter Fisher charged that the charter had been 
beaten by a "combination of selfishness and stupidity with which every 
constructive movement has to contend ••• "; this was the same man who 
four days earlier had expressed supreme confidence in the people 1 s in-
tegrity to always reject political bosses. 77 The Tribune declared that 
the city had proved "it does not want home rule ••• that it does want a 
patchwork of taxing bodies ••• that it does not want uniformity, efficien-
cy, and sanity in government. u78 Only the Record-Herald attempted a 
more even-handed assessment, attributing the loss to the citizens' fear 
of increased taxation and Sunday closings. 79 Charles Merriam, a month 
later, suggested that while these fears may have been real, they were 
unwarranted and irrational and that "political juggl.;Lng" had organized 
and played upon these fears. (Precisely what "political juggling11 
meant, he did not explain.) He could not understand why men such as 
Post and Robbins had opposed the charter, and he was saddened by the 
76Daily News, A1manac (1908), p. 495. Referenda conducted at spe-
cial elections tended to produce a lower voter turnout than those held 
at regular elections. See Ibid., 1900-1908. 
77Record-Herald, September 18, .1907; Walter Lo Fisher to MoHo 
Lebensohn, September 14, 1907, Walter L. Fisher Papers. 
78Tribune. September 18, 1907. 
79Record-Herald, September 18, 1907. 
charter's defeat. 80 Finally one anonymous loser suggested that the 
"uplifters" such as Fisher and Milton Foreman would have to be shaken 
off before Chicago could compromise on charter reform. 81 
On the other side the anti-cnarter forces were elated by their 
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success. The Broad-Ax called it a "Giant Victory for the common people." 
William O'Connell declared it a sign that "the men of Chicago will not 
accept a charter prepared for them by a convention of special interests 
and given its finishing touches in a legislature dominated by party 
politics." The American proclaimed victory for the Independence League, 
United Societies, Democratic party, CFL and other labor groups over the 
wealth of the corporations and the Republican organization. 82 But no 
group was happier than the United Societies. The organization assumed 
credit for engineering the charter's defeat proclaiming that the people 
of Chicago realized the threat to personal liberty and the other dan-
gerous provisions "thanks to the work of the charter opponents, espe-
cially the United Societies. n83 
Over the next few months both sides began planning their next 
steps in trying to bring political reform to Chicago, for no one was 
content to allow prevailing conditions to continue. The day after the 
referendum the United Societies warned the city that the charter's 
80Charles Merriam to H.B. Chamberlain, October ll, 1907; Charles 
Merriam to G.A. Cuthbertson, October 17, 1907, Charles Merriam Papers. 
The charges of political juggling were echoed by Milton Foreman in 
"Chicago New Charter Movement--Its Relation to Municipal Otmership, 11 
The Annals 31 (May 1908), p. 1-2. 
8lrnter-0cean. September 18, 1907. 
8~oad-Ax, September 21, 1907; Record-Herald, September 18, 1907; 
American, September 18, 1907. 
83staats-Zeitung, September 18, 1907. 
defeat had only been the first round. ''We have not only won," said 
Nicholas Michels, ''we are preparing for a second fight ... We will not 
rest until our citizens have secured personal liberty forever." 84 
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CHAPI'ER VII 
CHICAGO REMAINS "UNREFORMED" 
Efforts to reform the municipal government did not cease immedi-
ately, but a new charter was never again presented to Chicago voters. 
Disregarding all evidence to the contrary the reformers hoped that the 
disagreements of the previous year could be overcome if they tried again. 
But the group alignments which had developed in 1907 as well as the po-
sitions these groups had assumed remained firm and hampered compromise. 
Also, the antagonism between the city and state seemed worsened after 
the city rejected the legislature 1 s amended charter, as important mem-
bers of the legislature had promised during the campaign. Equally im-
portant for the fate of subsequent reform efforts, and the city's future 
political development in general, the United Societies had emerged from 
the 1907 campaign as a political force which could not be ignored. And 
the Societies was resolutely determined to promote and protect ethnic 
interests in all municipal affairs. 
I 
The warning signs that these conflicting ideas could not be over-
come easily were evident soon after the referendum. The CFL continued 
to call for municipal reform based on the extension of popular democracy. 
Encouraged by the charter's defeat the labor organization again demanded 
a new state constitution rather than a municipal charter. The primary 
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issue of reform, argued the CFL, was who controlled government, the 
people or ''PIRATICAL wealth." Since the old constitution gave control 
to the wealthy and the corporations-the same groups the CFL believed 
to be the most avid supporters of a new charter-such a new charter was 
simply an amendment which transferred some power to the municipality 
but kept control of the government in the hands of the privileged few. 
Only a new constitution, drafted by a popularly elected convention, 
would give the citizens a real voice in enacting both state and local 
reforms. The CFL once more urged its membership to oppose any measures 
which would not satisfy the goal of popular democracyo 1 
other groups were less adamant about the idea of a new charter, 
but they too stressed that such a reform would never be accepted if it 
ignored the wishes of the majority. In a speech before the City Club 
in late October Raymond Robins admonished the reformers for underesti-
mating the independence and intelligence of the citizens. The people re-
jected the charter, Robins said, because they "intend to govern Chicago. 
They intend to make Chicago what they want it to be, and if they don't 
want it to be what you want it to be your wise policy will be directed 
toward changing their desires. " They would not accept reforms gene-
rated by a body which neither represented nor was directly responsible 
to them, warned Robins, nor would they accept the "dishonest and corrupt" 
work of the legislature on the basis that it was the best that could be 
2 gotten. 
lcFL, Minutes, October 6, 197. 
2City Club, Bulletin 19 (October 23, 1907), Po 219-18. 
No group was more encouraged by the charter's defeat or more 
determined to influence any future-reform attempts that the United So-
cieties. The charter campaign, Nicholas Michels told the same gather-
ing of the City Club, was a "great lesson for those who thought they 
could control the city and the votes of the ethnic groups. u3 It had 
also been a great experience for the ethnic groups themselves; they 
had learned how to organize, strengthen their ranks, and to publicize 
and fight for their interests. From now on Chicagoans could expect 
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to hear from the Societies on every issue of importance to its members. 
Any future charter, according to Michels, had to provide for free and 
equal elections, a uniform and equitable system of taxation, and most 
importantly home rule on all questions "dear to the majority of our 
people. 114 
In the succeeding months the United Societies sought to capital-
ize on its success. First it consolidated its position as the voice of 
the city's non-Irish ethnic community. By May of 1908 the organization 
claimed that eighty-eight societies with over 23,000 members had joined 
since the charter campaign for a total of 628 member societies--315 
German, 173 Bohemian, eighty Polish, thirty-three Italian, and twenty-
seven Danish, Belgian, and other ethnic societies.5 Secondly the Socie-
ties outlined a political program it would follow in the future. An 
important component of this program was a decision to enter directly the 
political arena, either by running their own candidates or actively sup-
3Ibid.' Po 216 o 
4Ibid.' p. 217. 
5staats-Zeitung, May 24, 1908. 
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porting and opposing others. As its first step in this direction the 
political action committee requested all candidates in the April 1908 
aldermanic contest to support the Societies' stand against Sunday clos-
ings, high saloon licenses, and all temperance measures in general; it 
then urged ethnic voters to defeat all those who refused to give such a 
pledge. The election results cheered the Societies which claimed that 
twenty-two of the thirty-five aldermen elected had supported the group's 
•t• 6 pos~ ~on. 
The decision to support candidates had not been made without re-
sistance, however, and at the third armual convention several delegates 
at tempted to temper this policy by proposing that no officer of the 
organization be allowed to hold public office. The delegates making the 
proposal were primarily German and among the original founders of the 
Societies. While they had genuine doubts about the wisdom of this new 
political course their proposal was also a thinly veiled attempt to 
limit the influence of Anton Cermak, the Bohemian state legislator who 
had become the organization's Secretary. The opponents of the proposal 
countered by arguing that electing members of political office would fa-
cilitate the Societies' goals and the proposal lost decisively with many 
Germans joining the almost solid opposition of the Bohemians, Poles, and 
other ethnic groups. 7 The German influence in the Societies was dimin-
ished somewhat after this incident, although by no means eliminated as 
Germans continued to occupy many important offices in the following 
years. After this convention the Societies experienced little opposition 
6Record-Herald, February 27 and April 8, 1908. 
7staats-Zeitung. May 25, 1908. 
from within its ranks over the new political activities. 
The Societies' political program was aimed at promoting cultural 
and political democracy in Chicago by instituting municipal self-gov-
ernment and popular decision-making. It was rooted in a profound dis-
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trust of the rural state legislature which time after time had attempted 
to impose unpopular restrictions upon the city; a resolve to fight prohi-
bition and any other attacks on their way of life; and a refusal to rely 
on any other group~ including political bosses~ to protect ethnic in-
terests.8 The Societies was determined to fight any future reform pro-
posals which violated any of these tenets. · 
Despite these signs of strong and possibly irreconcilable desires 
among the various groups in the conmrunity several of the more ardent 
supporters of the old charter renewed the campaign in the fall of 1908. 
They knew that as long as the 1904 enabling amendment was in effect the 
city could continue to prepare a new charter and they decided to recon-
vene the old convention and try again. Forty-four members of the old 
convention thus met in September to consider the best way to go about 
writing another charter. They appoirlted a committee of sixteen to re-
draft a charter by comparing the original as written by the convention 
with the legislature 1 s version and arrive at "just compromises" on the 
disputed provisions. 9 The committee was then to bring their proposals 
to the full convention. 
Some spirit of compromise did exist for awhile among the members 
of the reconvened body. They agreed, for instance, that the provisions 
8For examples see Ibid., January ;;!>, February 10, and May 25 ~ 1908. 
9Record-Herald, September 4 and October 13, 1908o 
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in the old charter which had raised the most objections--e.g. revenue, 
Sunday closings, ward redistricing-needed to be redrawn to satisfy 
more of the citizens. Further, in response to a request from Catherine 
McCullough of the Illinois Equal Suffrage Association, the convention 
decided to aiiow non-members an opportunity to appear before the con-
vention, thereby reversing one of the hotly disputed policies of the 
earlier assembly. J.D 
Women immediately availed themselves of this opportunity and 
representatives of professional, club, and working women's groups 
once again appealed to the men to give women an official voice in muni-
cipal affairs. The majority of the convention still balked at includ-
ing woman suffrage in the charter however and instead they agreed to 
submit a separate bill on suffrage to the legislature hoping to appease 
women enough to keep them from opposing the charter. This maneuver dis-
heartened women who suspected, as Charles Merriam told the convention, 
that suffrage needed to be incorporated into the charter because the 
ll legislature would surely defeat any separate measure. 
The United Societies, on the other hand, was not disappointed. 
Vowing that it would not countenance another separate bill on liquor 
regulation, the United Societies sent representatives to speak before 
the convention on this matter, and to counteract the demands of the Law 
and Order League's spokesman that the matter be left entirely to the 
state legislature. The Societies asked that the charter give the City 
J.DCharles Merriam to Catherine W. McCullough, November 4, 1908, 
Charles Merriam Papers. 
llaecord-Herald, November 17, 1908. 
Council sole power to control and regulate the sale of liquor along 
with providing that any ordinances changing the charter provisions on 
this matter were to be submitted to popular referendum. 12 Arthur 
Farwell of the Law and Order League asked that the convention turn 
down the Societies' request because "the farmers of the ·state are 
stronger on moral questions than is the council. 111.3 Most members of 
the convention acknowledged the role this issue and the Societies had 
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played in the earlier defeat and they were inclined to dismiss Farwell' s 
request and accept the proposal of the United Societies. Walter Fisher 
had in fact reversed his previous stance and urged his colleagues to 
give the city broad home rule powers on this and other issues.14 The 
convention therefore agreed to include the Societies' proposal in the 
charter. 
The convention made other substantive changes to the original 
charter which it hoped removed the major objections enough to con-
vince the voters to adopt it in its new form. 15 To lessen fears of 
higher taxes they reduced the limit of allowable bonded indebtedness 
from five percent to four percent of full property valuation and re-
placed a vaguely worded section with one that specified that for general 
tax purposes assessed valuation would be one percent of the full value. 
The new charter reinstated the old ward system of thirty-five wards with 
12Ibid. , December 1, 1908. 
13Ibid. 
lh.rbid., October 28, 1908. 
14chicago Charter Convention, An Act to Provide a Charter for the 
City of Chicago (1909), unpublished, Chicago Historical Society. 
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two aldermen each and mandated that any ordinances changing this system 
could be submitted to a referendum by petition of fifteen percent of 
the voters. The convention also heeded requests to place the security 
and health of the people ahead of private property rights and gave the 
City Council power to force owners to make necessary improvements in their 
property. In a final gesture to the United Societies, the convention 
agreed to include a provision that specifically exempted Chicago from 
any future state laws on liquor regulation. 16 Several sections of the 
original charter including the all-important consolidation bill remained 
unchanged in this new version. 
Just when it appeared that the convention had agreed on a municipal 
charter which not only reflected the wishes of the majority--there was 
still hope that the CFLwould find enough popular democracy in the new 
charter to support it-but also promised to give Chicago a solidly 
reformed and progressive government, several of the more conservative 
convention members intervened. Led by B.F. Sunny, these men proposed 
a further compromise: instead of submitting the complete charter to the 
legislature it should be broken down and presented as separate bills. 17 
. 
The legislature would then be free to reject any provisions to which it 
objected without Chicago once again being deprived of all the benefits of 
reform. In despair over this new development, Walter Fisher pleaded 
that the new charter "is a compromise. Every provision is a compromise, 11 
and he asked the convention to reject Sunny 1 s proposal because it was 
16
chicago Charter Convention, "Resolutions and Communications 
Received at the Meeting Held January 29, 1909, 11 unpublished, Chicago 
Historical Society. 
17Record-Herald, February 8, 1909. 
time for the city to demand exactly what it wanted from the legisla-
ture.18 Fisher believed that this new proposal, if accepted, would 
undo all the careful compromises 1t1hich had been worked out. Fisher 
was right. The convention voted by a margin of nineteen to seventeen 
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to submit eleven separate bills19 and this decision combined with legis-
lati ve maneuverings combined to doom charter reform altogether. 
The United Societies was outraged; it had already warned the con-
vention that it would not accept a separate liquor bill because the 
legislature was certain to defeat it as it had done in 1907. Feeling 
betrayed the Societies announced it would not support the separate bills. 
'We are not going to vote for a lot of measures for these so-called re-
formers," proclaimed Anton Cermak, "and then get stuck ourselves. 1120 
The Societies feared that some Chicago legislators who had no strong 
feelings on the liquor question could be persuaded by prohibition legis-
lators to vote against the liquor bill by promises of support for other 
measures which were more important to them. Furthermore, before the 
liquor bill was sent to Springfield its article on general state laws 
was amended. Rather than stating outright that any new state laws on 
liquor would not apply in Chicago, the amended version said such laws 
would not be presumed to cover the city if they conflicted with the 
liquor bill unless the legislature expressly declared that the law would 
cover the entire state. 21 The conservatives were able to change this 
18Ib'd -~--, February 23, 1909. 
19The most important of these were consolidation, home rule, Sunday 
closings, woman suffrage, education, referendum, and public utilities. 
20Record-Herald, March 16, 1909. 
21Ibid., March 24, 1909. 
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section as well as win on the question of separate bills largely be-
cause attendance was quite erratic and what measures passed at any one 
meeting depended on which members were present. 
It did not take long for the charter package to unravel completely. 
When the bill to consolidate the city, parks, and board of education was 
introduced several legislators once again introduced yet another bill to 
limit permanently Chicago's representation and announced a trade-off: 
consolidation for restriction. 22 Then other Republican legislators 
attempted to amend the bill to give the Governor power to appoint the 
park board members rather than the Mayor-a blatant partisan move based 
on the presumption that the Governor was more often a Republican and the 
Mayor a Democrat--and Representative Cermak vowed to vote against the 
consolidation bill, and all hope for charter reform vanished. 23 The 
consolidation bill failed by one vote in its first Senate vote with all 
but one of the downstaters voting against it as well as United Societies 
member Cyril J andus. The final defeat in the legislature was decisive: 
the bill lost in the Senate twenty-one to twenty-six, and thirty-four 
to ninety-eight in the House where Cermak and twenty-three Cook County 
Democrats either voted no or did not vote. Their votes could not have 
passed the consolidation bill but they gave downstaters an excuse to 
reject this and other charter bills on the grounds that they could hardly 
be e..'"q)ected to know what Chicago wanted when the city itself did not seem 
to know. 24 
2~ilip, p. 66-72. The restriction bill failed by a vote of thirty-
one to nineteen in the Senate, all negative votes cast by Chicago Senators. 
23Record-Herald, May 6 and May 12, 1909. 
~ilip, p. 178. 
Consolidation had been the heart of the charter reformers' pro-
gram for without it they could not change the revenue system and when 
it was defeated this second time they were too disheartened to begin 
again. But the municipal problems persisted and the heavy hand of the 
state legislature continued to be felt in municipal affairs. In 1913, 
for instance, it placed all public utilities under the Jurisdiction of 
a state commission, a move that completely severed the city's control 
of the utilities. While other states had also created such regulatory 
commissions and there were applauded by some reformers who believed 
they would greatly enhance efficiency, to many in Chicago this was yet 
another example of the state usurping legitimate municipal powers. 
Since the defeat of the 1909 charter the City Council had been 
1.85 
considering the question of charter reform but had taken little action. 
Then in early 1914 it created a thirty-member commission--fifteen alder-
men, four state representatives, and eleven private citizens--to draft 
a charter which would consolidate the taxing bodies and give Chicago the 
home rule powers to control public utilities and completely overhaul the 
revenue system. 25 This effort was as ineffectual as the previous two; 
the state legislature passed only the bill to consolidate the parks 
with the city and refused to pass any others. The minor consolidation 
bill was subsequently defeated in a referendum vote and the issue of 
charter reform faded from public view. 
25chicago, Journal of the City Council. July 22, 1912, p. 1644; 
January 20, 1913, p. 3353; February 14, 1913, p. 3730; March 9, 1914, 
p. 4362-63. For details of this Commission's work see Proceedings of 
the Permanent Charter Commission (1914-1915), MUnicipal Reference Library, 
Chicago, Illinois. 
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The quest for home rule powers that nearly everyone professed to 
favor was in reality, as those who study the Progressive Era realize, a 
struggle over who was going to rule at home. The good government forces 
wanted to revise the revenue and governing structures for greater effi-
ciency, to increase potential tax monies, and to centralize the deci-
sion-making powers of the municipal government. The CFL and the United 
Societies wanted to make that government more directly responsible to 
the voters through extensive local self-government, initiative and ref-
erendum powers, and direct elections of more governing officials, while 
women wanted an official voice in municipal affairs. Charter reform 
failed in Chicago, in the final analysis, because the citizens could not 
agree on the purposes and objectives of such reforms. 
Cities throughout the country faced similar problems and yet enacted 
reform charters during the Progressive Era; why were these problems in-
surmountable in Chicago? First of all, any charter legislation for the 
city had to be submitted to popular referendum, a technical problem 
which other cities did not face. For example, in Pittsburgh (1911), 
Galveston (1901), and Houston (1904) influential businessmen wrote new 
charter bills which were then passed by their state legislatures and 
automatically enacted because there was no requirement that they be put 
before the voters. Half of Boston 1s charter of 1909 was simply enacted 
by the legislature while the rest went to popular referendum. In Chicago 
on the other hand the charter convention of 1902 had specifically written 
a clause in the enabling amendment which stipulated that any charter 
legislation for the city had to be ratified by the voters. This clause 
meant that the disagreements among Chicagoans on their aspirations for 
the city could become an insurmountable obstacle to the enactment of a 
new charter. 
The referendum gave Chicagoans the opportunity to reject a charter 
they disliked; the substantive reasons for its defeat 1~ in the strength 
of the feelings that divided them. Class issues~ for example~ were ex-
tremely important in Chicago politics. Class antagonisms here went back~ 
as shown earlier~ to the 1880s. H~ket ~ Pullman~ and other instances 
of industrial strife had provided~ labor believed~ ample evidence that 
business intended to use government to further its own interests--partie-
ularly to keep the working people powerless and oppressed. Although the 
Socialists and the more moderate elements of the labor movement remained 
divided on policies~ tactics~ and ultimate goals~ all agreed by the early 
twentieth century that every municipal issue was potentially a class 
issue. These fears were clearly manifested throughout the charter cam-
paign as the CFL proffered for one issue after another~ solutions which 
differed dramatically from those favored by leading business and pro-
fessional groups. In the end the CFL would denounce the proposed charter 
as an "insidious attempt to dress Chicago in a corporate strait jacket 
. . 26 
and to bind labor to the chariot wheel of a power mad plutocracy. 11 
A similar story can be told of conflicts between prohibition and 
ethnic forces~ which were also common throughout the United States. 
In this case the intensity of the struggle was heightened by the unre-
lenting antagonism between Chicago and the rest of the state. Ethnic 
groups firmly believed that the majority of Chicagoans were against pro-
hibition and that this sentiment should determine all temperance decisions 
26cFL~ Minutes, July 21~ 1CfJ7. 
188 
within the city. Once the proposed charter threatened to place the city 
back under general state laws and the legislature forced passage of a 
new local-option act in return for the charter, the United Societies 
was convinced that being in the majority in the city meant nothing. The 
ethnic community envisioned being overrun by the rural Protestant tem-
perance forces in the rest of the state and could not accept any charter 
which increased this possibility. For its part the state tied its effort 
to impose its will on Chicago to the charter--and this quite probably 
meant stricter temperance laws--and in 1907 the United Societies had 
the power to thwart this. 
The eagerness of the legislature to impose prohibition on Chicago 
was typical of relations between the city and state. Chicago was a huge, 
growing industrial and immigrant city in the early twentieth century. 
No other urban area in Illinois could begin to compare with it and the 
rural and small-town elements of the rest of the state were t·errified of 
being dominated by the city. The state legislature thus tried to use the 
charter movement to control the city by making it clear it would grant 
only limited home rule, by attempting once again to trade passage of the 
charter for permanent restriction of Chicago's representation in Spring-
field, and by rejecting the separate bills on liquor regulation and forc-
ing Chicago's representatives to accept the local option-bill in return 
for the charter. Indeed most of the men who write the 1907 charter ac-
knowledged that certain provisions could not be put into the charter 
even though highly desired by the majority of the city because the state 
legislature would not accept them. The people of Chicago resented the 
legislature's attempt to interfere in municipal affairs as they had re-
sented all earlier incidents, and groups such as the United Societies 
and the CFL were prepared to fight for extensive home rule as the only 
way to insure their municipal objectives. Whatever chance there may 
have been for Chicagoans to compromise among themselves on the charter 
was virtually destroyed by the enmity between the city and the rest of 
the state. 
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The charter reform movement played an important role in Chicago's 
history. First, because the charter failed, Chicago, unlike other large 
cities in the Progressive Era never experienced the structural reforms 
which consolidated overlapping and wasteful governing bodies, encouraged 
government by experts, and diminished the influence of party politics in 
municipal government. The ward-based decentralized structure persisted 
and municipal government remained the preserve of party politicians who 
garnered personal and party loyalty in return for personalized govern-
manto Furthermore, without charter reform the city had to wait until 
the new constitution of 1970 to secure any measure of home rule. Without 
home rule Chicago, in the twentieth century, has continued to have cer-
tain municipal affairs directed by the General Assembly and because the 
antagonism between city and state has also continued, this situation has 
often worked against the city. 
Another important consequence of the charter movement was that it 
politicized the city's ethnic groups and organized workers--the people 
who would form the backbone of the political machine. The CFL had al-
ready been moving toward increased political participation and the tenor 
of the charter reform ~ovement further convinced organized labor of the 
absolute necessity of continuing in this direction if they were to avoid 
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being crushed by the city's powerful business interests. In the United 
Societies ethnic groups had learned the value of organization and polit-
ical activism for getting what they wanted. Under the leadership of 
Anton Cermak the United Societies, in the ensuing years, worked to elect 
men sympathetic to its causes and to thwart all attempts to impose pro-
hibition measures on Chicago. By 1931 when Cermak was elected the first 
non-Irish ethnic mayor, ethnic groups had come to know and understand 
the necessity of standing up for themselves. 
Finally Chicago's charter reform movement is important because it 
reveals what the various groups which comprised the city wanted from 
their municipal government. Charter reform was not the concern of any 
single social, economic, or political group nqr were those groups who ul-
timately opposed the charter simply playing negative roles. The various 
groups clearly understood their interests and realized that the pro-
visions of a new charter would in fact determine the distribution of 
political power within the city. In the charter movement women, ethnic 
groups, and organized labor declared themselves legitimate members of 
their community entitled to help write the laws and shape the municipal 
government under which they would live and work. In the process the 
United Societies and the CFL led their constituencies in formulating a 
vision of political and cultural democracy based on municipal self-
government and popular decision-making which was incompatible with the 
goal of a government run with business-like efficiency and expertise 
desired by many reformers and businessmen. The charter failed because a 
majority of Chicagoans did not like the municipal government which it 
would have established and these people had the power and the incentive 
to reject this charter. 
BIBLIOORAPHY 
PRIMARY M;ATERIALS 
Manuscript Collections 
Chicago Federation of Teachers. Chicago Historical Society. 
Chicago Woman 1 s Club. 
City Club of Chicago. 
Chicago Historical Society. 
Chicago Historical Society. 
Civic Federation of Chicago. Chicago Historical Society. 
Walter L. Fisher Papers. Library of Congress. 
Charles E. Merriam Papers. University of Chicago. 
Louis F. Post Papers. Library of Congress. 
Raymond Robins Papers. State Historical Society of Wisconsino 
Newspapers and Journa1s 
Abendpost, 1906-1908. 
The Broad-Ax, 1904 and 1907. 
Chicago American and Sunday Examiner, 1907. 
Chicago Daily News, 1900-1909. 
Chicago Inter-ocean, 1907. 
Chicago Journal, 1907. 
Chicago Evening Post, 1907. 
Chicago Record-Herald, 1900-1909. 
Chicago Daily Socialist , 1906-1907 . 
Chicago Tribune, 1895-1909. 
Illinois Staats-Zeitung, 1907-1909. 
191 
L'Italia, 1906-1907, 
The Public: A Journal of Democracy, 1904-1907. 
The Union Labor Advocate, 1907. 
Documents 
Chicago Charter Convention. An Act to Provide a Charter for the City 
of Chicago (1907). 
. A Bill for An Act to Provide a Charter for the City of 
---o""'::'f Chicago ( 1907). 
Officers. List of Delegates. Rules and Committees (1905). 
Proceedings, October 3, 1906 -March l, 1907. 
----· An Act to Provide a Charter for the City of Chicago (1909). 
--~-· "Resolutions and Communications Received at the Meeting Held 
January 29, 1909 . 11 
Chicago Department of Health. Biennial Report (1.895-1896). 
Chicago Feder at ion of Labor. Minutes, 1904-1907. 
Chicago New Charter Convention. List of Delegates (1902). 
Proceedings, October 28, 1902 - January 7, 1903. 
Chicago Permanent Charter Commission. Proceedings, 1914-1915. 
City Club of Chicago. Civic Committee Reports, 1906-1907. 
City of Chicago. Journal of the Proceedings of the Chicago City 
Council, 1900-1907 and 1912-1915. 
Illinois. Constitution ( 1.870). 
House Journal, .1903 and 1907. 
Senate Journal, 1903 and 1907. 
Pamphlets 
192 
Chicago New Charter Movement. Why the Pending Constitutional Amendment 
Should Be Adopted (1904). 
Civic Federation of Chicago. The New Chicago Charter: Why It Should 
Be Adopted at the Special Election, September 17th (1907). 
193 
Preliminary Report on the Need for a New City Charter (1902). 
Cook County Democratic Central Committee. Reasons Why the Proposed 
Charter Should Be Defeated (1907). 
Illinois Association Opposed to the Extension of Suffrage to Women. 
A Protest Against the Granting of Municipal Suffrage to Women 
in the City of Chicago (1906). 
United Societies for Local Self-Government. Constitution and B¥-Laws 
(1906). 
Home Rule: The Truth About the Sundav Question ( 1907) . 
Seven Reasons to Vote Against the Charter (1907). 
Printed Sources: Books. Periodicals. Directories 
Addams, Jane. Twenty Years at Hull-House. New York: Macmillan, 1910. 
Beard, Charles. American City Government: A Survey of Newer Tendencies. 
New York: Century, 1912. 
Bowen, Louise DeKoven. Growing Up with a City. New York: Macmillan, 
1926. 
Chicago City Directories, 1902-1908. 
Chicago Daily News, Almanac, 1902-1908. 
City Club of Chicago. Bulletin, 1907-1908. 
Crafts, Clayton. Local Self-Government in Illinois." Municipal Affairs 6 
(March 1902). 
Dillon, John F. Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations. 5th 
ed. Boston: IJ.ttle, Brown, 1911. 
Dreier, Mary. Margaret Dreier Robins: Her Life, Letters and Work. New 
York: 1950. 
Eaton, Amasa. "The Right to Local Self-Government. 11 Harvard Law Review 
13-14 ( 1900-190 l) • 
Foreman, Milton J. "Chicago New Charter Movement - Its Relation to Muni-
cipal Ownership." The Annals 31 (May 1908). 
194 
Goodnow, Frank. City Government in the United States. New York: 
Century~ 1904. 
"Municipal Home Rule." Political Science Quarterly 10 (1895). 
"Municipal Home Rule." Political Science Quarterly 21 (1906). 
"The Relation of City and State." Municipal Affairs 2 (1$98). 
Grosser, Hugo. Chicago: A Review of Its Governmental History, from 
1837-1906. Chicago: 1906. 
Harrison, Carter. Storm;v Years: The Autobiography of Carter H. Harrison, 
Five Times Mayor of Chicago. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1935. 
Hatton, Augustus R. Digest of Cit:v Charters Together with Other Statu-
tory and Constitutional Provisions Relating to Cities. Chicago: 
Chicago Charter Convention, 1906. 
Hunter, Robert. Tenement Conditions in Chicago: Report by the Investi-
gating Committee of the City Homes Association. Chicago: City 
Homes Association, 1901. 
Jackson, J .c. "The Work of the Anti-Saloon League." The Annals 32 
(1908). 
King, Hoyt. "The Reform Movement in Chicago." The Annals 25 (1905). 
Illinois Blue Book, 1905-1907. 
Maltbie, Milo R. "City-made Charters." Yal.e Review 13 (February 1905). 
Marquis, Albert N., ed. The Book of Chicagoans: A Biographical Dic-
:tionary of Leading Living Men of the City of Chicago. A.N. Marquis 
a.?J.d Company, 1905 and 1911. 
McBain, Howard L. "The Doctrine of an Inherent Right to Self-Government. 11 
Columbia Law Review .16 ( 1916). 
Merriam, Charles E. Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics. 
New York: Macmillan, 1929. 
--~-· "Chicago Charter Convention." American Political Science 
Review 2 (November 1907). 
Primary Elections. Chicago: 1909. 
Report of an Investigation of the Municipal Revenues of 
Chicago. Chicago: City Club of Chicago, 1906. 
National Municipal League. A Municipal Program. New York: National 
Municipal League, 1900. 
195 
(l:)erholtzer, Ellis P. "Home Rule for Our .American Cities." The Annals 
( 1.892-1.893} 0 
Post, Louis F. "Living a Long llfe Over. 11 Unpublished autobiography. 
Public Policy League. Bulletin, 1907. 
Sparling, Samuel E. Municipal History and Present Organization of the 
City of Chicago. Madison: 1.898. 
Steffens, Lincoln. The Shame of the Cities. New York: S.S. McClure, 
1902. 
Weber, Adna F. The Growth of Cities in the 19th Century. New York: 
Macmillan, 1.899; reprint ed., Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1963. 
Woodruff, Clinton R. "A Freer City: A Plea for Municipal Home Rule." 
Yale Review 12 (February 1904). 
Allswang, John M. 
1890-1936. 
SECONDARY MATERIALS 
A House for All Peoples: Ethnic Politics in Chicago, 
Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1971. 
Angle, Paul M., ed. Prairie State: Impressions of Illinois 1673-1967, 
by Travelers and other Observers. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1968. 
Banfield, Edward C. and Wilson, James Q. City Politics. New York: Vin-
tage Books, ·1966. 
Buenker, John D. "The Dynamics of Chicago Ethnic Politics, 1900-1930. 11 
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 67 (April 1974). 
Urban llberalism and Progressive Reform. New York: Norton, 
1973. 
Chudacoff, Howard. The Evolution of American Urban Society. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975. 
City of Chicago. Historic City: The Settlement of Chicago. Chicago: 
Department of Development and Planning, 1976. 
Clayton, John. "The Scourge of Sinners: Arthur Farwell. 11 Chicago 
History (Fall 1974). 
196 
Crooks, James. Politics and Progress: The Rise of Urban Progressivism 
in Baltimore, l895-19ll. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1968. 
David, Henry. The History of the Havmarket Affair. New York: 1936. 
Ebner, Michael and Tobin, Eugene, eds. The Age of Urban Reform: New 
Perspectives on the Progressive Era. Port Washington: Kennikat, 
1977. 
Ginger, Ray. Altgeld's .America. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1958; 
reprint ed., New York: New Viewpoints, 1973. 
Gottfried, Alex. Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leader-
~. Seattle: University of Washington, 1962. 
Grant, Bruce. The Story of the Union League Club of Chicago and Its 
Times, 1880-1955. Chicago: Rand MeN~ and Company, 1955. 
Green, Paul. "The Rise of the Democratic Party in Chicago, 1.840-1920. 11 
Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago, 1975. 
Griffith, Ernest. A History of American City Government: The Conspicu-
ous Failure, 1.870-19()0. New York: Praeger, 1974 
A History of American City Government: The Progressive Years 
and Their Aftermath, 1900-194). New York: Praeger, 1974. 
Hammack, David C. ''Problems in the Historical Study of Power in the 
Cities and Towns of the United States, 1.800-1960." American 
Historical Review (April 1978). 
Harris, Car 1 V. Political Power in Birmingham, 1.871-1921. Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1978. 
Hays, Samuel. "The Changing Political Structure of the City in Indus-
trial .America." Journal of Urban History 1 (November 1974). 
----· 
11The Politics of Reform in Ml.Ulicipal Government in the Pro-
gressive E.t'a." Pacific Northwest Quarterly 55 (1964). 
____ • "The Social Analysis of American Political History, 1880-
19.20. 11 Political Science QuarterlY 80 (September 1965). 
Holli, Melvin. Reform in Detroit: Hazen S. Pingree and Urban Politics, 
New York: Oxford, 1969. 
Kantowicz, Edward. Polish-American Politics in Chicago, lSSS-1940. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975. 
Kleppner, Paul. The Cross of Culture: A Social AnalYsis of Midwestern 
Politics, 1850-1900. New York: The Free Press, 1970. 
Komons, Nick A. "Chicago, 1893-1907: The Politics of Reform." Ph.D 
dissertation, George Washington University, 1961. 
197 
Kraditor, Aileen. The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, ]$90-1920. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. 
Lepawsky, Albert. Home Rule for Metropolitan Chicago. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1932. 
McCarthy, Michael. "Businessmen and Professionals in Mnnicipal Reform: 
The Chicago Experience, lBS'l-1920. 11 Ph.D dissertation, North-
western University, 1970. 
Merriam, Robert E. and Elken, Norman. The Charters of Chicago: A Sum-
~· Chicago: 1952. 
Meyer, Harold and Wade, Richard. Chicago: Growth of a Metropolis. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. 
Miller, Zane. Boss Cox's Cincinnati. New York: Oxford, l96S. 
Pease, otis. "Urban Reformers in the Progressive Era: A Reassessment. 11 
Pacific Northwest Quarterly 62 (1971) o 
Philip, William B. "Chicago and the Downstate: A Study of Their Con-
flicts. 11 Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago, 1940. 
Pierce, Bessie L. 
1673-1933. 
As Others See Chicago: Impressions of Visitors, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933. 
History of Chicago, vol. 3 The Rise of a Modern City, 1871-
.J$9.1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957 o 
Reed, Thomas and Webbink, Paul, eds. Documents Illustrative of American 
Municipal Government. New York: Century, 1926. 
Rice, &adley. "The Galveston Plan of City Government by Commission: 
The Birth of a Progressive Idea." Southwestern Historical Quar-
terly 73 (1975). 
Ryan, Mary. Womanhood in America: From Colonial Times to the Present. 
New York: New Viewpoints, 1975. 
Scharnau, Ralph. "Thomas J. Morgan and the Chicago Socialist Move-
ment, 1876-1901." Ph.D dissertation, Northern Illinois Univer-
sity, 1970. 
198 
Schiesl, Martin J. The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration 
and Reform in America. 1880-1920. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1977. 
----::--0 "Pr.ogressive Reform in Los Angeles under Mayor Alexander, 
California Historical Quarterly 54 (Spring 1975). 
Spear, Allan H. Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-
1920. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. 
Sutherland, Douglaso Fifty Years on the Civic Front: A History of the 
Civic Federation. Chicago: 1943. 
Tarr, Joel A. A Study in Boss Politics: William Lorimer of Chicago. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971. 
Thelen, David P. "Social Tension and the Origins of Progressivismo 11 
Journal of American History 56 ( 1968). 
Wendt, Lloyd and Kogan, Herman. Bosses in Lusty Chicago. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, l943o 
Wheeler, Adade and Wortman, Marlene. The Roads They Made: Women in 
Illinois History. Chicago: Charles Kerr, 1977 o 
199 
Appendix I 
UNION LOCAlS AFFILIATED 'NITH 
CHICAGO FEDERATION OF LABOR-1907 
Analgamated Association of Street Railway Employees - 4 locals 
Amalgamated Street Railway ~nployees - 2 locals 
Amalgamated Street Car Men - l local 
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers - l local 
Associated Vaudeville Artists - l local 
Asphalt Pavers and Helpers - l local 
Bakers Union - l local 
Bakery and Confectioners - 2 locals 
Barbers - l local 
Bartenders - l local 
Beer Bottlers - l local 
Bill Posters and Billers - l local 
Bookbinders - l local 
Bookkeepers Association - l local 
Boot and Shoe Workers - 5 locals 
Bottlers Protective Union - l local 
Blacksmiths and Helpers - 3 locals 
Brewers and Malters - 2 locals 
Brewers Laborers - l local 
Brickmakers - 7 locals 
Brush Makers - l local 
Car Workers - 2 locals 
Carpenters and Joiners - 23 locals 
Caulkers - l local 
Chicago Trades Union Label League 
Cement Finishers - l local 
Cement and Construction - l local 
Cement Workers - 2 locals 
Cigar Makers - l local 
Cigar Packers - l local 
City Firemen's Association - l local 
Clerks (Retail) - 2 locals 
Clo.th1 Hat and Cap Makers - l local 
Conduit Trench Laborers - l local 
Coopers - 4 locals 
D~ain Layers and Helpers - l local 
Egg Inspectors - l local 
Electrical Workers - 5 locals 
Elevator Conductors and Starters - l local 
Firemen, Stationary - l local 
Flat Janitors - 2 locals 
Freight Handlers - 4 locals 
Gardeners and Florists - l local 
Garment Workers - 7 locals 
Gas and Electric Fixture Hangers - l local 
Gas Fitters - l local 
Glove Workers - 2 locals 
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Grocery Employees - l local 
Hod Carriers - l local 
Horse Shoers - l local 
Horse Nail Makers - l local 
Hair Spinners - l local 
Hat Finishers Association - l local 
Hoisting Portable Engineers - l local 
Iron Moulders - l local 
Iron Workers - l local 
Jewelry Makers and Workers - 2 locals 
Laundry Workers - l local 
Lithographers - 2 locals 
Machinists - 7 locals 
Mailers Union - l local 
Marble Workers - l local 
Marine Cooks - l local 
Marine Firemen, Oilers and Watertenders - l local 
Metal Polishers - l local 
Musicians - l local 
Municipal Water Pipe Layers - l local 
Piano Workers - l local 
Painters and Decorators - l local 
Paper Hangers - l local 
Pattern Makers - l local 
Photo Engravers - l local 
Photographic Employees - l local 
Plumbers - l local 
Postoffice Clerks - l local 
Pressmen - l local 
Printers' Roller Makers - l local 
Seaman's Union- l local 
Sheet Metal Workers - 4 locals 
Shipwrights - l local 
Sprinkler Fitters - l local 
South Chicago Trades and Labor Assembly 
Spring Workers - l local 
Sewer Cleaners - l local 
Steam Engineers - 3 locals 
Steam Fitters - l local 
Steam Pipe and Boiler Coverers - l local 
Stove Mounters - l local 
Stone Pavers - l local 
Suspender Workers - l local 
Stable Employees - l local 
Sub Paving Inspectors - l local 
Stereotypers - l local 
~~tchmen - 2 locals 
Tailors - l local 
Chicago Federation of Teachers 
Teamsters - 13 locals 
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Telegraphers - 1 local 
Theatrical Employees - 1 local 
Tugmen - 2 locals 
Typographical Workers - 3 locals 
Tuckpointers - 1 local 
Upholsterers - 2 locals 
Watchmakers - 2 locals 
Water Pipe Extension Laborers - 1 local 
Waiters - 1 local 
Waitresses - 1 local 
Wallpaper, Machine Printers and Color Mixers - 1 local 
Wax and Plaster Model Makers - 1 local 
Webb Pressmen - 1 local 
Well Drillers - 1 local 
Women 1 s Trade Union League 
Women 1 s Trade Union Labor League 
Woodworkers - 5 locals 
Wood, Wire and Metal - 1 local 
APPENDJX II 
MEMBER SOCIETIES OF THE UNITED 
SOCIETIES FOR LOCAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT MAY 1906 
Schwaben-verein von Chicago 
Gesangverein harmonie 
Concordia Minnerchor 
Junger Mannerchor 
Korner Loge, 64 
Seneselder Liederkranz 
Chicago Stamm No. 286 
Freundschaft Loge No. 6 
Verein der Braudenburger 
North Chicago MBnnerchor 
Arion ~erchor der Sudseite 
Sozialer Turnverein 
Liedertafel Eintracht 
Teutonia Mannerchor 
Nordwestseite Turnerschaft 
Alter Wirthsverein 
Turnverein Eiche 
Katholisches Kasino 
Hessen-verein von Chicago 
Schweizer Mannerchor 
North Chicago Wirthsverein 
Hamburger Klub 
W·estseite Harmonie 
Richard Wagner MBnnerchor 
Deutscher Verein der Westseite 
Gemischter Char "Fritz Reuter" 
Verein der Hannoveraner und 
Brauschweiger 
Deutsch-Amerikanischer Kranken-
Unterstutzungs-Verein 
Central-Turnverein 
Gesangverein 11Frohsinn 11 
Geneva Klub 
Sud-Chicago Turnverein 
LaSalle Turnverein 
Grosspark Liederkranz 
Nordwest Chicago Concertina Club 
Kaiser-Friedrich Unterstutzungverein 
Deutscher Klub von Chicago 
Liedertafel Vorwarts 
Prinzessin HeinrichUnterstutzungs-
verein 
Verein des Ost-und Westpreussen 
Trierischer Unabh. Bruderbund 
Olympai Mannerchor 
Schiller Mannerchor 
Lessing Loge 
Nordseite Badtscher 
Lincoln Loge No. 569 
Trierischer Unterstutzungsverein 
Westseite Sanger kranz 
Turnverein Einigkeit 
Sudseite Liederkranz 
Douglas Gegens.Unterstutzungs. 
Verein Saxonia 
Gemischter Char Unabh. 
Chicago Loge No. 1 
Deutsche Krieger-Kameradschaft 
Deutscher Kriegerverein von Chicago 
StSktion 1.4, Gegens.Unterstj.itzungs. 
Deutscher Freundschafts-Bund 
Order Mutual Protection No. 47 
Brighton Park Loge 
Chicago Turngemeinde 
Altdeutscher Unterstutzungs. 
Vorw~ts Loge No. 137 
Badischer Unterstutzungsverein 
der Sudseite 
Hoffnung Loge 
Deutscher Fleischer Unterstutzungs. 
Oesterreicher und Bayern-Verein 
Gegenseitiger Unterstutzungs 
Verein "Bavaria" 
Oesterreicher Verein "Stock im 
Gisen" 
Gegens. Unterstutzungs.-Verein 
von Chicago 
Deutscher Kreigerversin Sud-Chicago 
Chicago Fraternal League 
Chicago Frosch Klub 
Beckmann Loge No. 188 
Union Mannerchor 
Schiller Liedertafel 
Pf alzer Verein 
Turnverein Vorwarts 
Reuter Liedertafel 
Sozialer Arbeiterverein der Sud-
westseite 
Aurora Turnverein 
Rheinischer Verein 
Treue Bruderloge No. 325 
GrUtst-Verein 
Lincoln Park Loge 
Kurhessischer Unterstutzungs-
Verein 
"Fidelia" Gemischter Char 
Teutonia.MBnnerchor 
Fritz Reuter Council 
Prinz Heinrich Unterstutzungs. 
Progretz Loge 
Deutscher Verein Prinz Heinrich 1 
Garfield Unterstutzungsverein 
Orvheus Mannerchor 
Schleswig-holsteiner Verein 
Deutscher Kranken Unterstutzungs. 
Schwabischer Sangerbund 
Klub Frohsinn 
Vorwarts MBnnerchor 
Kurhessischer Unterstutzungs. 
Liedertafel Einigskeit 
Orden der Hermanns-sohne 
Deutscher Landwehr Verein 
Verband der Veteranen der Deutschen 
Armee 
Sehleswig-holsteiner Sangerbund 
Harugari MBnnerchor 
Bayrisch-Amerikanischer Verein von 
Chicago und 1D zweig vereine 
Deutscher ~den Harugari und unter-
georduete Logen 
Plattdeutsche Grotz-gilde und 45 
Gildern 
Teutonia Turnverein 
Wicker Park MBnnerchor 
Chicago Quartett Klub 
Euphonia Gesangverein 
Douglas Loge No. 177 
Typographia No. 9 
Vereinigte Schweizer Vereine 
W•3st Chic~o Wriths-Verein 
Columbus Mannerchor 
Verein Deutscher Wassengenossen 
Erster Bohmischer Katholischers 
Unterstutzungs., 16 IJJgen mit 
6000 Mitglieders 
Nordfelles Supreme IJJge 
Kroatian Liberty Society 
Kroatian Sloga Society 
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Brindisti di Montagna 
Singing Society 11Zora11 
Lodge Jan Nernecke No. 181 
Polish Mechanics Society No. 8 
Hungarian Singing Society of Chicago 
Plzensky Sokol 
Bohemian Saloonkeepers Association 
Prytiti So. Kiri 
So. Vaclerva 65 
Rav Praka--cis--13 
Bohemian Foresters 
The Danish Veterans 
Turning Society Slvanska Lipa 
Firu Hungarian Social and Bene-
volent Society 
Leif Erickson No. 9 
Montezuma Benevolent Association 
Sokol Chicago 
Lodge 24 Firi Podebradsky Bohemi-
an Benevolent Association 
The Polish Turners No. 1 
St. Prowsims 1 
Svi thiod Lodge No. 1 
47 Societies of the Polish National 
Alliance 
26 Lodges of the Bohemian Bene-
volent Association 
Nera Fryge No. 1 
Norwegian Bjorgrein Singing Society 
Independent Order of Svithiod 
22 Lodges 
Singing Society Magnetio 
Grotz Society 
Italienische Gesellschaften 
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APPENDIX III 
OL<'FICERS 
Irish 
UNITED SOCIETIES FOR LCCAL SELF-GOVEfu~T 
OFFICERS AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 1906 
Charles C. Gilbert - lawyer 
German 
Franz Amberg - liveryman 
George Pfeiffer - occupation unknown 
John P. Rickard - conductor 
Felix wYsow - bookkeeper 
Bohemian 
John A. Cervenka - saloonkeeper 
Croatian 
Steve Popovich - saloonkeeper 
Polish 
S. W. Haremski - lawyer 
Hungarian 
Berthold Stark - foreman 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 
German 
William Arens - post office superintendent 
John Arndt - lumber worker 
Hans Borg - carpenter 
Horace L. Brand - President, Brand Brewing 
L.E. Brandt - insurance 
Otto Ernst - President, Colonial Laundry 
August Eschemann - occupation unknown 
Fritz Glogauer - President and Editor, Abendpost 
Max Haenel - saloonkeeper 
Heinrich Hartung - physician 
Emil Hoechster - deputy sheriff 
M.J. Huss- lawyer 
John Koelling - Koelling & Klappenbach, Booksellers 
G. Landau - cigarmaker 
C. Linnemayer - solicitor 
Conrad Linz - painter 
August Lueders - agent 
George A. V. Massow - editor, Illinois Staats-Zeitung 
Walther R. Michaelis - business manager Freie Presse 
Nicholas Michels - lawyer 
Christian Muth - ironworks 
2fJ7 
Fritz Nebel - stone contractor 
John Neumann - agent 
Eugen Niederegger - Niederegger and Thomas liquors 
T.G. Richter- saloonkeeper 
Julius Schmidt - Schmidt Dancing Academy 
C. Siemsen - saloonkeeper 
Enil A. Tauebert - printer 
William Vocke - lawyer 
Louis Wreden - insurance agent 
Bohemian 
Joseph Babka - occupation unknown 
Michael Brichak - saloonkeeper 
John Filas - saloonkeeper 
Joseph Hladovic - saloonkeeper 
Cyril R. Jandus - lawyer and state senator 
Anton Kocka - presser 
Vincent Kolar - clerk 
Thomas Polivka - janitor 
V. Roubal- coalman 
Polish 
Nicholas Budzbaum - saloonkeeper 
Cornelius Frey - laborer 
Theodore Helinski - bank cashier 
Franz J. Karch- conductor 
W. Lachkowski - driver 
John F. Smulski - lawyer and banker 
S'rriedish 
C. Hjalmar Hedin - clerk 
John D. Lindstrom - toolmaker 
Swan P. Norman - draftsman 
A.P. Olson - machinist 
S1dss 
J. Bodemann- President, Chicago Embroidery Co. 
Xavier Walther - secretary 
Belgian 
A. Landa - leather goods 
Danish 
Max Henius - brewer, chemist 
Croatian 
Tony Ravich - saloonkeeper 
Irish 
Edward Noonan - lawyer, ex-congressman 
Italian 
Vincenzo Lavieri - tailor 
2J8 
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APPENDJX IV 
DELEGATES TO CHICAGO CHARTER CONVENTION: 1906-1907 
Political Other 
~ Occupation Affiliation Aoooint5!d b~ Public Offic~li! 
Joseph Badenoch grain merchant Republican City Council Alderman, Board of Elec-
tion Commissioners 
' 
William H o Baker coal merchant Republican Sanitary Trustees Sanitary Trustee 
Walter E. Beebe lawyer Republican Legislature State Representative 
A. W. Beilfuss printer Republican City Council Alderman 
Frank I. Bennett lawyer Republican City Council Alderman 
real estate 
Z.P. Brosseau grain commodities Democrat Public Library Library Board 
William M. Brown food merchant Republican Legislature State Senator 
Richard E. Burke lawyer Democrat Mayor Dunne State Representative 
Thomas Carey unknown Democrat City Council Alderman until 1906 
Chester W. Church lawyer Republican Legislature State Representative 
B.F. Clettenberg real estate Republican Legislature State Representative 
George E. Cole President, George Independent Governor Deneen none 
Cole & Coo, printing Republican 
Daniel F. Crilly real estate Republican South Park Board none 
1\) 
b 
Political 
Name ~~ Occupation Affiliation ApQointed b~ 
Daniel L. Cruice lawyer Democrat Mayor Dunne 
William E. Dever lawyer D•3mocrat City Council 
George W. Dixon lawyer Republican Legislature 
Thomas J. Dixon general manager Republican City Council 
Arthur Dixon Co. 
B.A. Eckhart manufacturer Republican Governor Deneen 
John W. Eekhart President, J.W. Democrat Public Library 
Eckhart & Co. 
Henry F. Eidmann real estate Republican City Council 
F .E. Erickson salesman Republican Legislature 
Walter L. Fisher lawyer Republican Governor Deneen 
** John J. Fitzpatrick plumber, President Democrat Mayor Dunne 
of CFL 
Milton J. Foreman lawyer Republican City Council 
F.H. Gansbergen lawyer Republican Lincoln Park Board 
* attended one meeting; replaced by ~nil Ritter on December 13 
~~~ 
attended no meetings; replaced by Walter Michaelis on December 28 
Other 
Public Offices 
none 
Alderman 
State S'ilnator 
Alderman 
President, West Park 
Board; former state 
senator 
President, Library 
Board 
Alderman; Sanitary 
District Trustee 
State Representative 
none 
none 
Alderman 
Lincoln Park Commis-
sioner 
1\) 
~ 
Political other 
Name Occupation Affiliation Appointed b;I Public Offices 
Andrew J. Graham banker Democrat Mayor Dunne W~st Park Board 
Commissioner 
__ Greenacre unknown unknown Mayor Dunne unknown 
John Guerin unknown unknown Mayor Dunne Board of E:iucation 
Joseph F. Haas merchant Republican Legislature County Clerk; former 
Senator until 1906 
Carter Harrison lawyer Democrat Governor Deneen former Mayor 
John W. Hill lawyer Republican legislature State Representative 
Frank G. Hoyne real estate Democrat Governor Deneen none 
Thomas M. Hunter broker Republican City Council Alderman 
Alexander J. Jones lawyer Democrat Sanitary District Sanitary District 
Trustee 
James Kittleman manufacturer Republican Legislature State Representative 
Bryan Lathrop real estate Republican Lincoln Park Board former Lincoln Park 
Commissioner 
James J. Linehan janitor, CFL Democrat Mayor Dunne none 
Carl Lundberg broker, real estate Republican Legislature State Senator 
Thomas MacMillan clerk, U.S. District Republican West Park Board former State Represen-
Court tative 
R .R. McCormick lawyer Republican City Council former Alderman 1\) ~ 
Name 
John P. McGoorty 
M. L. McKinley 
Charles E. Merriam 
Walter Michaelis 
Occupation 
lawyer 
lawyer 
university professor 
business manager 
Joseph A. 0 1Donnell lawyer 
Theodore Oehne 
John E. CMens 
* 
President, Conrad 
Seipp Brewing 
lawyer 
Joseph M. Patterson newspaper editor 
(Medill family) 
G.W. Paullin fur manufacturer 
Robert E. Pendarvis lawyer 
Louis F. Post newspaper editor 
John Bowers politician 
* 
Political 
Affiliation 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Republican 
unknown 
Democrat 
unknown 
Democrat 
Appointed by 
Mayor Dunne 
Legislature 
Governor Deneen 
Mayor Dunne 
Mayor Dunne 
Mayor Dunne 
Mayor Dunne 
political Mayor Dunne 
11leftish gadfly 11 
Republican Legislature 
Republican Legislature 
Democrat Mayor Dunne 
{ 11single-taxer 11 ) 
Democrat City Council 
attended one meeting; replaced by Mr. Greenacres on December 28 
Other 
Public Offices 
State Representative 
State Representative 
none 
none 
former State Repre-
sentative 
none 
former city attorney 
former Commissioner of 
Public Works 
Sanitary District 
Trustee 
State Representative, 
Chairman of House Com-
mittee on Charter Leg-
islation 
Board of Education 
Alderman; State 
Senator 
1\) 
~ 
Name 
Edward J. Rainey 
Walter J. Raymer 
Occupation 
undertaker 
manufacturer 
Political 
Affiliation 
Democrat 
Republican 
Alexander H. Revell furniture manufacturer Republican 
Lewis Rinaker 
Emil Ritter 
Raymond Robins 
Lessing Rosenthal 
C.O. Sethness 
David Shanahan 
John G. Shedd 
Frank L. Shepard 
John F. Smulski 
Bernard W. Snow 
B.E. Sunny 
George B. Swift 
lawyer Republican 
unlawwn unknown 
social worker Democrat 
lawyer Republican 
President, Sethness unknown 
Company 
lawyer, real estate Republican 
President, Marshall Republican 
Field's 
lawyer Republican 
banker, lawyer Republican 
crop expert Republican 
business manager Republican 
General Electric Co. 
President, Swift & 
Company 
Republican 
Appointed by 
Legislature 
City Council 
Governor Deneen 
Legislature 
Mayor Dunne 
Mayor Dunne 
Governor Deneen 
Board of ~iucation 
Legislature 
Governor Deneen 
Cook County Board 
W•:3st Park Board 
City Council 
Governor Deneen 
Governor Deneen 
other 
Public Offices 
State Senator 
former Alderman 
none 
State Representative 
unknown 
Board of Education 
none 
unknown 
State Representative 
none 
Cook County Board 
Cormnissioner 
former Alderman; for-
mer city attorney 
Alderman 
none 
former Mayor; 
former Alderman 
l\) 
t= 
Political Other 
Name 0-:!cupation Affiliation Appointed b~ Public Offices 
Graham Taylor social worker, unknown Governor Deneen none 
professor 
George Thompson cigarmaker unknown Governor Deneen none 
C.J. Vopicka President, Atlas Democrat Mayor Dunne former park Commis-
Brewing sioner 
Edwin Ko Walker lawyer Republican Cook County Board Cook County Board 
Commissioner 
Charles Werno lawyer Democrat City Council Alderman 
R.A. White minister unknown Board of Education Board of Education 
D .R. Wilkins printing company unknown Mayor Dunne none 
president 
John P. Wilson lawyer unknown Governor Deneen none 
Edward Co Young manufacturer unknown Governor Deneen none 
Michael Z:i.mmer lawyer Democrat City Council Alderman 
l\) 
~ 
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APPENDIX V 
MEMBERS OF THE INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE 
* Men listed in the Book of Chicagoans 
Henry M. Ashton: lawyer~ Democrat 
Miles J. Devine: lawyer~ Democrat 
John T. Donahue: lawyer~ Democrat 
A.D. Gash: lawyer~ Democrat 
James J. Gray: lawyer~ Democrat 
A.M. Lawrence: newspaper editor~ Democrat 
John E. Owens: lawyer~ Democrat 
Howard S. Taylor: lawyer~ Democrat (former Populist) 
Joseph F. Triska: lawyer~ Democrat 
():.her members 
John T. Bowers 
M. C • Buckley 
William A. Dudley 
Robert Dus sman 
J.W. Ernst 
John C. Harding 
W.H. Holly: lawyer 
John Kantor: lawyer 
Sam Koenigsberg 
C.J. McGurn 
Charles H. Mitchell 
P. J. Moloney 
Theodore Nelson 
W. J • Nevin: lawyer 
Thomas J. 0 t Hare 
Edwin J. Raber 
* nine of these twenty-five men were listed in this biography of the 
11leading men 11 of the city while fifty-one of the seventy-seven charter 
convention members were listed 
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